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More than 2.4 billion people live within 100 km of the sea coastline. Between 2016-2019 
there has been a rising trend in tropical cyclone’s intensity and the frequency. Such 
cyclone events irrespective of their hurricane categorisation have persistently triggered 
coastal flooding such as storm surges of at least 7 ft (2 m). Over this period disaster losses 
from tropical cyclones have been estimated as US$ 343 billion, with over 3,333 deaths. 
A review of previous studies found that 47% of the Atlantic Cyclone’s deaths were caused 
by storm surges-triggered by hurricanes and not just by hurricanes themselves. The 
unique characteristics of storm surge and the uncertainty coupled with the lack of 
hurricane intensity prediction potentially leave coastal communities and the infrastructure 
directly exposed to the socioeconomic risk. The aim of this research is to develop a 
framework which helps enhance the resilience of coastal habitat to storm surge hazard. 
The proposed framework considers the adaptive capacity of developing countries, and its 
structure is developed by reviewing the current practices and strategies of disaster 
management for storm surge hazard triggered by tropical cyclones identifying the gaps 
and challenges. A framework approach could support the future resilience, reducing the 
disaster losses, both in terms of lives and in terms of socioeconomic, and environmental 
impacts of countries. This research fits within the wider knowledge field of disaster risk 
management and sustainable community’s enhancement adopts a qualitative exploratory 
research design based on case study methodology.  The study focused on the 
implementation of four main disaster phases such as the (i) preparedness (ii) response (iii) 
recovery and (iv) mitigation of the disaster risk management (DRM) and disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) which had occurred from different events chosen for the case study and 
had occurred between 2000-2017. The examination of individual case studies and the 
cross-case syntheses of the cases resulted in identifying the commonalities and obtain 
insights into the DRM practices and governance in various countries. Gaps within current 
DRM strategies and their practices before, during and after the occurrence of the disaster 
were also identified which has assisted in the recommendations within this study. The 
findings then led to the proposal of the Disaster Adaptation to Mitigate Storm Surge 
(DAMSS) framework and guidelines for best practices. The findings and suggested 
approaches may also help governments, planners, engineers, builders, forecasters, 
emergency managers, relief workers, regional bodies, insurance, civil protection 
organisations, public and private officials of all the developing countries, to reduce future 
losses, where there is not the same supportive development infrastructure. 
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This chapter introduces the background to the research, detailing the motivation for this 
study. The chapter also discusses the aim and the objectives considered for this study and 
the research questions constructed to guide the process. The structure of the thesis is 
explained in the final section of this chapter.  
1.1 Background to the research 
The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change in their 2015 report (Intergovernmental 
Panel for Climate Change, 2015) stated, that they had evidenced gradual changes from 
extreme weather and climate-related events since 1950. One aspect of climate change is 
the melting ice glaciers which are predicted to cause a rise in sea levels (Henson, 2008) 
and other is thermal expansion factors.  Therefore, sea levels are further expected to rise 
approximately 26-inches (65cm) by 2100 globally, with the current projection for the rate 
of rising of oceans (NASA, 2018; Lindsey, 2019).   
Coastal areas are also exposed to extreme weather events (EWE) such as tropical 
cyclones, coastal floods, tsunamis, tornadoes. More than 2.4 billion people live within 
100 km of the coastline (The Ocean Conference, 2017). Historically, these towns and 
cities grew as major trading posts. Societal change and ability to be near major transport 
hubs, both rail and air, has encouraged increasing populations over the last century. The 
more recent expansion of these coastal areas as coastal cities and mega cities may be due 
to many of their beneficial factors such as economies, industry sectors such as renewable 
energy, port facilities, shipping and logistics, seafood and marine production or oil and 
gas extraction.  
According to the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (2019), intensities of the 
tropical cyclones are more likely to increase in the future from 1-10% for a 2 degree 
Celsius of global warming with the lowest emissions projections. It was also stated that 
the number of global events of these tropical cyclones reaching Categories 4 and 5 in the 
Saffir-Simpson Wind Hurricane Scale (SSWHS) is also more likely to increase. The 
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Atlantic hurricanes (2016-2019), involving Hurricane Matthew (2016) (NOAA: NCEI, 
2017), Hurricanes Harvey-Irma-Maria (2017) (NOAA: NCEI, 2018), Hurricanes 
Florence- Michael (2018) (NOAA: NCEI, 2019), Hurricanes Dorian-Lorenzo (2019) 
(NOAA: NCEI, 2020) were all observed as major Category 4 and 5 hurricanes 
individually. Also, this 2019 report stated that the frequency of these tropical cyclones is 
also expected to increase subsequently.  
Advanced computer-aided models and simulations can forecast and predict tropical 
cyclones and the possible path of an approaching cyclone known as the ‘cone of 
uncertainty’, five-days in advance (National Hurricane Center, 2019). However, 
predicting the intensity of the tropical cyclones and resultant influences on a storm surge 
event remains critical and complex (NPR, 2011). Storm surges which are associated with 
tropical cyclones and extra-tropical cyclones are predominantly becoming a major threat 
for lives and assets in coastal areas.   
In abstract, global warming and the subsequent consequences such as sea-level rise, 
increase the intensity and the frequency of tropical cyclones. The limitation in hurricane 
intensity prediction indicates there is an increasing risk of tropical cyclone-triggered 
storm surges. These impending risks will place both the coastal communities, habitats 
and the critical infrastructures in these coastal towns, cities, and mega cities at severe risk 
globally of further future damage due to storm surges.  
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Storm surge, which is an abnormal rise in water typically produced from cyclones and 
hurricanes, is a complex phenomenon. This is due to their sensitivity to the slightest 
changes in their characteristics like storm intensity, storm speed, central pressure, 
continental shelf, and angle of approach towards the coast (NHC, n.d.).  
Although, the occurrence of storm surge is natural, with any land falling cyclones, their 
severity is aggravated when taking place in highly populated coastal areas with 
communities, assets and infrastructures exposed, which can transform this natural event 
into a disastrous event.   
Tropical cyclone-generated storm surges have resulted in significant fatalities and have 
inflicted severe economic damages in the past (Ellis & Sherman, 2015). Previous events 
which assert the importance of this hazard include: 
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• Galveston Hurricane (1900) killed more than 8,000 people in Texas  
• Bhola cyclone (1970) killed more than 300,000 people in Bangladesh  
• Hurricane Katrina (2005) killed more than 1,800 people  
• Cyclone Nargis (2008) killed more than 140,000 people  
• Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda (2013) killed more than 6,300 people 
and the more recently:  
• Cyclone Idai (2019) killed more than 1,000 people. 
In the last five years from (2015-2019), the USA has encountered 69 climate and weather-
related events resulting in total damages estimated at US$ 531.7 billion with 3,863 deaths 
(NOAA, 2020). Tropical cyclone-led damage was estimated at US$ 343 billion with 
3,333 deaths (NOAA, 2020), representing 65% of all estimated damage and 86% of lives 
lost. Part of this study investigates the proportion of storm surge damage relative to total 
cyclone/hurricane damage.Despite the increasing intensity of cyclones, a frequent 
occurrence, and the scale of these calamities, the ‘space of uncertainty’ around storm 
surge and their limitations in managing these types of hazard continues to prevail. With 
scientific advancements superseded by the increasing coastal extremities, the process of 
adaptation and mitigation measures remain critical, especially for those developing and 
underdeveloped countries who could not invest in storm surge barriers or engineered 
structures. Therefore, a potential solution through an integrated framework approach in 
reassessing risks, supporting preparedness, and enhancing the storm surge resilience for 
coastal habitat is vital for both the near term and for the future scenarios. Understanding 
existing disaster risk management procedures and strategies and to investigate and 
develop suitable approaches and strategies is, therefore, a necessity. This can not only 
enhance the current approach and minimise the limitations but also potentially lead to 
improved practices for the future.  
1.3 Research aim and objectives 
1.3.1 Aim 
The principal aim of this research is to propose a conceptual framework for storm surge 
resilience and adaptation to coastal habitat. The study concentrated on the coherent and 
comprehensive information on the existing gaps within the disaster risk management 
(DRM) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) adapted in different countries to mitigate to 
storm surge. The framework is addressed throughout this research as Disaster Adaptation 
to Mitigate to Storm Surge (DAMSS) framework. The DAMSS framework is expected 
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to enhance the preparedness for future storm surge events to support more socioeconomic 
resilient outcomes, for coastal habitats and communities. 
1.3.2 Objectives 
The research objectives serve the purpose of this study, which summarises what is to be 
studied. The accomplishment of each objective is to provide additional knowledge and 
new insight and providing a platform to convert the vision into a framework approach.  
To achieve the defined aim, the following objectives were considered for investigation: -  
• To analyse the current practices and strategies of disaster management for 
storm surge hazard triggered by tropical cyclones. 
• To investigate and identify the crucial aspects, gaps, and challenges in 
mitigation the process and phases of disaster management and disaster risk 
governance followed in different regions. 
• To capture the key activities and participants within the four key phases of 
disaster risk management providing a comparative advantage and to explore 
and identify the requirement for the best practices. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
A research methodology is a fundamental prerequisite for any research. The principle step 
in carrying out research and obtaining the results relies on the successful choice of 
research methodology. This study embraces qualitative research techniques and 
qualitative case study methodology. With the aim of developing a framework for storm 
surge resilience, the research adopts a case study approach, to utilise the option of 
exploring various cases, their outcomes, effects, evidence, and the DRM strategies 
practised in the subject field. Considering the literature, the process and direction of 
guiding this research and in pursuance of achieving the aim and objectives, a multiple-
case study method is chosen to support analysis and interpretation of data collected from 
the different events. Chapter 4 discusses detailed research methods, approaches and 
techniques.  
1.5 Research design 
Research designs are the plans and procedures that transform the assumptions into 
detailed methods of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2009). The purpose of this 
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research is to develop a framework reviewing the literature regarding the operational 















In addition, the research investigates the current limitation of the DRM and DRR 
strategies in developed and developing countries to storm surge. This task is integrated 
into the research design as illustrated in Figure 1.1.   
1.6 Contribution to the knowledge 
The knowledge contribution from this research focuses on proposing a framework 
approach for storm surge thereby contributing to enhancing the disaster risk management 
(DRM) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies. This is achieved by understanding 
the intricacies of storm surge which is fundamental, in understanding the hazard, 
vulnerability and the underlying risks. By investigating the disaster risk governance and 
practices of the countries aligned to the case studies insights into key areas for lessons 
learnt and future approaches into a potential framework approach were drawn. 
Literature review  
Preliminary data 
collection  
Case studies  
Data analysis and 
discussion  




• Inductive theory logic 
• Literature review 
• Gaps identified in literature 
review 
• Country profiling and 
choice of case studies  
• Qualitative case study 
methodology  








Figure 1.1 Illustration of research design 
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As such, much least developed countries still lack a proper disaster management 
framework in place and the DAMSS framework would directly enhance their strategies 
to enact for future preparedness and improve methods to assess and evaluate the hazard.  
This research will further add to the existing literature available for storm surge and 
contributes by highlighting the gap between current approaches and future needs. The 
research also adds to previous theories and will act as a base study for any following 
research which addresses the storm surge protection enhancing community resilience to 
coastal flooding.  
1.7 Outline of the research  
Chapter 2 describes the relationship between climate change, global warming, sea-level 
rise, tropical cyclones, and storm surges. By illustrating the unique characteristics of 
storm surge, the considerations for storm surge resilience to become a global priority is 
outlined. This section also discusses the storm surge measuring parameters and coastal 
defence mechanisms currently in practice to mitigate this hazard.  
Chapter 3 investigates, reviews, and presents the historical events of storm surges. The 
challenges in processes of its implementation are the detailed literature review on global 
concerns, storm surge, policies, and laws in practice. A critical literature review on 
existing mitigation methods and related frameworks benchmarking the coastal protection 
and preparedness alongside storm surge are presented. The section further highlights the 
limitation of existing methods in practice elucidating the strength and weakness of any 
existing frameworks and provides evidence to necessitate the requirement of a future 
storm surge framework.  
Chapter 4 outlines the research methods and design, in addition to the philosophies, 
appropriate approaches and strategies that were chosen to support the research. This 
chapter also discusses the research sampling made from the total research population, 
justifying the choice of case studies chosen and the reliability of the data collected.  
Chapter 5 studies the disaster phases of the two major Atlantic hurricanes, which are 
Hurricane Katrina (2005) and Hurricane Sandy (2012). These two cases were studied 
from the perspective of response exhibited by the USA’s as a developed country. A key 
element of this chapter is studying the existing planning and construction guidance for 
coastal locations and Base Flood Elevation (BFE) levels. BFE’s are calculated elevation 
levels to which flood waters are anticipated to reach during a coastal flooding or storm 
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surge event. Depending on these BFE’s the coastal new housing habitat and buildings are 
then designed and planned accordingly.    
Chapter 6 explores the disaster phases involving two significant events which occurred 
in the North Indian Ocean and North West Pacific Ocean. These involve Cyclone Nargis, 
which occurred in 2008, and Super-typhoon Haiyan, which occurred in 2013.  
Chapter 7 discusses two significant Atlantic hurricanes, as recognized from the viewpoint 
of Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Hurricane Matthew (2016) from Haiti’s point 
of view as a UN member and Hurricane Maria (2017) from Puerto Rico’s perspective as 
a non-UN member is investigated in Chapter 7.  
Chapter 8 summaries the qualitative data analysis using cross-case syntheses. A detailed 
analysis of the commonalities and differences across the six cases and a gap analysis of 
the timeline of the key activities of DRM are analysed. The commonalities were further 
clustered as phase 1- preparedness, phase 2- response, phase 3- recovery and phase 4- 
mitigation stages integrated as the DAMSS framework. The designed framework 
anticipates, to define the DRM and DRR strategies while minimising the gaps in the 
before-impact, during-impact, and post-impact stages of disasters. A detailed discussion 
interpreting the key activities and their recommendations are included in this chapter.  
Chapter 9 outlines the guidelines and recommendations that supplements the DAMSS 
framework. The purpose and benefits of the proposed framework are also discussed in 
addition to the discussion of the extended practical uses and the feasibility of the 
framework. Analysis of future retrofit safety-resilience applications to existing housing 
is also provided. 
Chapter 10 summarises the achievements of the research aim and objectives and presents 
the contribution to knowledge gained from the research. The critical reflection of the 
limitations of the research with future recommendations was further discussed in this 
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CHAPTER 2 
EFFECTS AND INFLUENCES OF STORM SURGES 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses storm surge and its characteristics which occurs predominantly 
from hurricanes or tropical cyclones or typhoons. The chapter also discusses the 
influences of storm surge and how it affects a specific region. The interconnection 
between climate change, global warming, sea-level rise, and storm surge is also discussed. 
Studying this relationship is essential to understand the storm surge characteristics, their 
effects, to determine future awareness and measures to be taken to mitigate these hazards. 
In addition to this, traditional and computational storm surge measuring methods and 
coastal protection mechanisms were also elaborated to identify the efficiency of current 
measuring systems and effectiveness towards addressing these extremities.   
2.2 Storm surge: Definition  
The National Hurricane Centre (NHC) defines storm surge as “an abnormal rise of water 










Figure 2.1 is a basic schematic diagram of storm surge driven by the hurricane-force 
winds to onshore. As stated by the NHC, the abnormal rise of water is predominantly 
caused by tropical cyclones or hurricanes or typhoon. Although, storm surge originates 
Figure 2.1 Schematic diagram of storm surge rising above mean sea level 
Storm surge driven by 




Sand Dune Average tide 
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from tropical cyclones, they do not entirely depend on the wind speed of the hurricane. 
For example, Hurricane Irma with a wind speed of 178 mph and brought a maximum of 
6-8 ft storm surge (Carision et al., 2018) and Hurricane Irene with a wind speed of 70 
mph brought 8-11 ft. storm surge (NHC, n.d.). From the example, the wind speed does 
not have a relative impact on the storm surge. To underline the complexity of this 
phenomenon, during a hurricane event, an emergency manager remarked that “people 
worry about wind and are hit by a surge” (Morrow et al., 2015, p. 35). 
Carision et al., (2018, p. 44) defined storm surge/residual as ‘the onshore rush of the sea 
or lake water caused by the high wind and the low-pressure centres associated with the 
land falling hurricanes or other intense storms. While storm tides are “the maximum water 
level elevations measured by a water level station during storm events” (Carision et al., 
2018). Nott’s (2015) simplified definition of storm tide is, they are the level of the 
combined inundation resulting from storm surge and astronomical tide (Nott, 2015) as 









Figure 2.2 shows the difference between the meal sea level, predicted astronomical tide, 
storm surge, and storm tide. Predicted astronomical tides are “the periodic rise and fall of 
a body of water resulting from gravitational interactions between sun, moon, and earth” 
(Carision et al., 2018).  
Furthermore, storm surge also bears a huge similarity and difference with tsunamis 
(Nirupama & Murty, 2016). This misconception of the similarities between tsunamis and 
storm surge can be observed especially in developing and least-developed countries. 
Typhoon Haiyan is a perfect example where the storm surge was misunderstood as a 




Predicted astronomical tide 
Mean sea level  
Figure 2.2 Difference between storm surge, storm tide, high tide and MSL  
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similarity of being classified as long gravity waves and both can produce in coastal floods 
inundating from the near-shore to the far shore in-land eventually resulting in substantial 
loss of lives and economic damage. The major difference is tsunamis’ can be seismic or 
non-seismic and are mostly associated with earthquakes and sometimes with meteorites 
and landslides. But storm surges are associated only with tropical or extra-tropical 
cyclones (Nirupama & Murty, 2016). 
Table 2.1 Similarities and differences between tsunami and storm surge 
 Tsunami Storm surge 
Similarities - long gravity waves 
- Results in coastal flooding 
- long gravity waves 
- Results in coastal flooding. 
 
Differences - Hydrological (Seismic/non-
seismic) 
- associated mostly with 
underwater earthquakes 
- meteorological 
- associated only with 
tropical and extra-tropical 
cyclones 
 
Though tsunamis and storm surges share some similarities they significantly vary in 
characteristics remarking two different phenomena as shown in Table 2.1. Tsunamis are 
classified as ‘hydrological hazards’ and often are propagated from deep oceans caused by 
a marine earthquake (EM-DAT, n.d.), but storm surges are ‘meteorological hazards’ 
typically caused by water being pushed from cyclonic winds. Storm surge is not generated 
from deep oceans rather they occur on the surface of the ocean. Due to the seismic force 
exerted from the earthquakes, tsunamis are generally capable of producing harbour waves 
which can inundate the coasts further inland than storm surges. However, storm surges 
were also capable of inundating further inland like a tsunami particularly those coasts 
with estuaries, bays and creeks connected to the ocean. Coastal topography, the 
bathymetry of shallow coastal water, the slope of the continental shelf were other storm 
parameters capable of influencing the storm surge inundation further inland  (Nirupama 
& Murty, 2016). According to EM-DAT classification, tsunamis are geophysical and 
storm surges are meteorological (EM-DAT, n.d.).  
Storm surge is also mixed up with other factors such as seiches and storm tides. Seiches 
are nothing but the oscillation of standing wave in the opposite direction back and forth 
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like a seesaw motion. In 2008, a 12-16 feet (3.7-5.5m) seiches were created in Lake Erie 
further leading to flooding. These are usually formed in water bodies such as bays, lakes, 
and ocean shelves and harbours during severe storms. The extended period between the 
high and low oscillation was often mistaken for astronomical tide (NOAA, 2018). 
2.3 Climate change, consequences, and storm surge  
2.3.1 Climate change and storm surge  
Before the 20th century, the direct linkage between climate change and the increase in the 
hurricane intensity lacked evidence (Emanuel, 1991). However, the IPCC fifth 
assessment report (IPCC, 2015) observed that since 1950, there is evidence of gradual 
changes in extreme weathers and climate-related events. According to IPCC (2015), even 
though the global change in cyclone intensity cannot be related to any specific cause, it 
is undeniable that since 1970, the intensity of tropical cyclones has increased globally. 
The recent global tropical cyclone events from the years 2015 – 2019 as shown in Figure 
2.3 should be considered as a substantial indication of a change in climate patterns 
specifically in tropical cyclones and storm surge history, which is also one of the 
































































Figure 2.3 Overview of major tropical cyclone events which occurred globally in tropical water from 
2016-2019 (Base map image: GEBCO) 
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Figure 2.3 shows the recent events as major Category 3 and above cyclones, triggering at 
least 7ft (2m) storm surge shows the new evidence indicating the increase in cyclone 
intensities throughout the tropical and extra-tropical regions. Although, the current data 
range is small, this could provide useful evidence in future when aggregated with past 
and present events. It may also possibly alter previous assumptions and conclusions 
regarding climate change and its consequences such as tropical cyclones and storm 
surges.  
According to the National Hurricane Centre (NHC), the mid or pre-seasonal outlook 
estimated that the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season would have at least 11-17 named 
storms out, of which, 5-9 will develop as hurricanes and 2-4 major hurricanes. The pre-
seasonal predictions advised the hurricane season would be an above-normal year with 
45% of likelihood of occurrence (NOAA, 2017). However, the actual Atlantic hurricane 
season (2017) was observed with seventeen named storms out of which ten tropical 
depressions developed as hurricanes from which six hurricanes were major above 
Category 3 hurricanes. The variation in the prediction was later claimed as an extremely 
active hurricane season due to the weak or non-existence El Nino factor (NOAA, 2017; 
NOAA, 2017).  Although, various external factors were interfering with the seasonal 
predictions, the underlying factor of the increasing number of hurricanes and their 
increased intensity and possibility of becoming major hurricanes is inevitable.  
The increase in the number of hurricanes means that these hurricanes could potentially 
trigger a greater number of storm surges. They further underline that, if these indications 
were to be ignored, and should the current opportunities be overlooked, may result in lack 
of action towards adaptation or mitigation for future coastal extremities. 
2.3.2 Global warming and storm surge  
Like climate change, the attribution of global warming with cyclone activity not directly 
linked until the 1990’s. Soon after, some significant events which occurred globally were 
identified to have a link with the changing precipitation and the hydrological cycle of 
these tropical cyclones particularly the extreme weather events (EWE) (Trenberth, 2008). 
This relationship was further defined as the influence of the surface temperature from 
global warming which affects the temperature of the sea (Rahmstorf, 2017).  
Page | 13  
 
Global warming influences coastal flood risk in two ways mainly (i) the melting ice 
glaciers which directly contributes to the rise in sea levels, (ii) influencing the ocean 
temperature resulting in hurricanes which bring coastal flooding through storm surge 
(Henson, 2008). The theory of the formation of hurricanes requires warm ocean at a 
certain temperature. 
The increase in the global temperature in 1975 and 1991 is shown in Figure 2.4(a) and 
(b).  
              
 
Figure 2.4 Global temperature recorded in (a) 1975, (b) 1991, (c) 2015 (d) 2018 AA in May 
2016 [source: NASA (2020)] 
To potentially intensify and develop further, the cyclone still needs convention between 
the warm ocean and low barometric pressure on the sea surface. A minor change in the 
sea surface temperature (SST) to 1℃ can majorly impact the cyclone’s intensity (Miles 
et al., 2017) followed by rapid changes in the storm activity thereby changing the surge 
   
    2.4 (a)      2.4 (b) 
   
   2.4 (c)      2.4 (d) 
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statistics (Rahmstorf, 2017). Furthermore, the NOAA's Geophysical Fluid Dynamics 
Laboratory (GFDL) model projections suggests that the intensities of tropical cyclones 
are likely to increase by an average of 1-10% for a 2℃ global warming (NOAA, 2019). 
In line with Miles (2017), Rahmstorf (2017) and NOAA (2019) findings, Figure 2.4(c) 
and (d) the increase in the global temperature. The visualization of global temperatures 
for the year 2015 and 2018 visually highlights how the increase in the temperature can 
result in the formation of an increased number of tropical cyclones eventually bringing 
storm surge to their potential coast. Furthermore, the recording of OSPO-NOAA (2013), 
also outlines that the NOAA’s satellite observation of the global sea surface temperature 
(SST) contour charts has identified the increase in the sea temperature along the tropical 
waters. According to Emanuel (1991), water temperature above 27℃ is typical for a 
tropical depression to be formed and further develop into a matured hurricane.  
Joined efforts to mitigate global warming, such as the Kyoto Protocol aimed to minimize 
the emission rate globally were initiated in 1992 (UNFCCC, n.d.). However, countries 
like China and the USA delayed their ratification and withdrew their participation 
regardless of their high- greenhouse gas (GHG) emission index which did not 
significantly contribute to the mitigation efforts. Achieving the target of global warming 
prevention require strong commitment from all the high-GHG emission countries and 
non-participatory motives, shall merely remain as a limitation of such initiatives (Henson, 
2008; Hare, 2013). Continuing to work towards reducing global warming, is a long-term 
adaptation however, these are essential to reduce the impacts of coastal extremities which 
could occur anytime in the given year.   
2.3.3 Sea- level rise and storm surge  
Rising sea levels are indirect impacts of climate change consequences. Their effects are 
not immediate however, rising sea levels amplifies the risk to existing coastal extremities. 
Sea level rise (SLR) varies from region to region and factors such as land subsidence, 
regions with high tide range and wave height influences the change in sea-levels (Wahl, 
2017). Due to the change in these influential factors, countries which are currently not 
vulnerable to SLR’s may become vulnerable in the future. Rising sea-levels tends to shift 
the tidal behaviour thereby changing the storm surge behaviour (Henson, 2008). This 
implies that SLR may set a new base for potential storm surge and countries which are 
currently not vulnerable to storm surges may become vulnerable in the future from 
elevated storm surge baselines.   
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According to Muis et al., (2016), socioeconomic development has been observed to be 
the prime driver of increasing coastal risk in many countries, and he claims that this may 
be changed in the future as sea-level rise to be the prime driver for increasing risks. Sea 
level rise along the coast varies vastly due to the factors such as (i) shape of the coastline 
(ii) coastal bathymetry. To understand the extremity of rising sea levels and calculate their 
future impacts, a time-series based recording of sea levels which measures the changes in 
storm regimes is required (Muis et al., 2016). Although, this is easily adapted from the 
tide gauge observations, many regions have a limited number of tide gauges. This limits 
the measurement of extreme sea-level rise and their estimation (Wahl, 2017; Muis et al., 
2016) leaving the uncertainty around these hazards to persist for the future.  
2.3.4 Tropical Cyclones and Storm surge  
According to Emanuel (1991, p. 179), “a mature hurricane is idealized as a natural 
Carnot engine, where the hurricane converts the heat energy extracted from the sea to 
mechanical energy”. He further claims that the tropical cyclones comprise a wide range 
of fluid-dynamical process which includes rotation, convection, and interaction between 
air and sea. The intensity of the storm results from the low central pressure. A typical 
cyclone event can produce various associated perils such as strong winds, storm surge, 
tornadoes, coastal flooding, inland flooding from rainfall, rip currents and large rogue 
waves (Emanuel, 1991). Tropical cyclone or hurricanes or typhoons are the same 
phenomena, addressed by different names in different regions and they typically occur in 
the tropical zone close to the equator line. Figure 2.5 illustrates how the same 
phenomenon is identified by different names depending upon the region of occurrence. 
              
Figure 2.5 Illustration of occurrence of tropical cyclone, hurricane, typhoon by region [source: 
NASA (2018)] 
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Figure 2.6(a) NOAA-GOES 16 captured the 2017 
Atlantic hurricane season [source: NASA (2017)] 
Figure 2.6(b) NASA-VIRUS on Suomi NPP Satellite 
captured the 2018 Atlantic hurricane season [source: 
(NASA, 2018)] 
From all the associated perils of a tropical cyclone, storm surges predominantly occur 
from tropical cyclones and extra-tropical cyclones when combined with high tides. 
Tropical cyclones-related surge observations or database on a global scale is not available 
(Needham et al., 2015). Figure 2.6(a) shows the hurricane trio of Katia-Irma -Jose in 2017 
Atlantic hurricane Season and Figure 2.6(b) show the clustering of storms Florence-Isaac-
Helene from the 2018 Atlantic hurricane season. 
 
 
   





The clustering of the storms observed for two consecutive years in the Atlantic Oceans 
shows the increase in the frequency of tropical cyclones. The clustering may also lead to 
another impact. As the frequency decreases between two cyclones, particularly when the 
distance between the two cyclones is within 900 miles (1448-km), may 
 
Figure 2.7 Fujiwhara effect displayed by Super Typhoon Melor and Typhoon Parma (7 October 2009) 
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effectively lead in creating an interaction between the two cyclones resulting in a 
‘Fujiwhara effect’. Figure 2.7 shows the Fujiwhara effect highlighting the interaction 
between two or more cyclones. During the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season, Hurricane 
Wilma, interacted with Tropical Storm Alpha, and their interaction resulted in Hurricane 
Wilma developing into a Category 5 storm as per the Saffir- Simpson Wind Hurricane 
Scale (SSWHS) causing potential economic damage and loss of lives (Morsink, 2018). 
Similarly, Typhoon Bopha (2000) also known as Typhoon Pablo, a Category 5 typhoon 
interacted with Super-typhoon Saomai (2000).  Their movement was masked by each 
other causing fatalities of more than 1,000 lives from Typhoon Bopha. The Super-
Typhoon Saomai was also a Category 5 typhoon but resulted in 28 deaths (Wu et al., 
2003).  
The interaction between a weakening previous cyclone followed by a strengthening 
succeeding cyclone or vice versa may result in producing a major hurricane which may 
further amplify the underlying risk of storm surges (National Weather Service, n.d.). In 
some rare situations, both the cyclone can maintain the same strength and both the cyclone 
may result in significant damage from both hurricanes and storm surges.  
2.3.5 Wind damage vs Water damage  
Land falling tropical cyclones not only produce strong winds that can damage the coasts 
but, also result in extreme coastal flooding such as coastal surges. Storm surges are 
abnormal rise in sea levels, which occurs from low barometric pressure and the cyclone’s 
sustained strong winds which pushes the water towards the coast. According to Muis et 
al., (2016), storm surges triggered by tropical cyclones (TC) can produce larger waves 
than extra-tropical cyclones (ETC) or any other low-pressure weather system. 
Nevertheless, extra-tropical cyclones were also capable of producing high surge levels 
like TC’s when combined with high astronomical tides.   
A cyclone does not always result in bringing a storm surge to the coast. Precise conditions 
are required to produce the surges (NHC, n.d.). To study the precise conditions and to 
identify the blind spot understanding the link between the tropical cyclone and storm 
surges and the factors influencing the storm surge characteristics needs to be studied. 
Evolution of innovative technologies has minimized this uncertainty to a degree, but not 
to the entirety.  
Also, understanding the hurricane’s potential and their intricacies such as the intensity 
prediction remain critical within hurricane monitoring and forecast (Horn, 2015). 
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According to Hansom et al., (2015), the limitations in prediction is not only due to the 
uncertainty in hurricane intensities but also due to the interference of various external 
factors and the dynamics around the tropical cyclones which are largely impacted by the 
storm surge (Hansom et al., 2015). 
2.4 Storm surge characteristics  
Of all the geophysical risks, storm surges are unique, due to their characteristics of being 
highly sensitive to any minor change in the storm parameters. Figure 2.8 shows the 
cyclone parameters which influences the storm surge.  
 
 
Figure 2.8 Storm surge characteristics influenced by the storm parameters 
Decoding the dynamics between storm surge and storm parameters continue to have 
potential gaps which is also why it is challenging to minimise the substantial loss of lives 
and property damage (Ellis & Sherman, 2015). Therefore, understanding the storm surge 
characteristics is the key to enhance the awareness. This is one of the important factors 
that led to the thinking if a framework would possibly create this awareness in 
understanding storm surge. 
2.4.1 Cyclone forwarding speed  
The forwarding speed of a cyclone is observed as one of the vital parameters that impacts 
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shallow waters, they tend to create significant storm surge levels.  Long surface waves 
are examined often, but short surface waves, which move faster enhancing the surge 
levels, were often overlooked. These overlooked short surface waves when matching with 
the local bathymetry ends in bring large surge waves to the coast (Rego & Li, 2009). The 
critical forwarding speed of the hurricanes is observed to have the highest possible surge 
levels. As cyclone speed plays a key role, stalled or slow-moving storms were observed 
to prolong the storm surge inundations or inland flooding from continuous heavy rainfall. 
Hurricane Isaac (2012) and Harvey (2017) are perfect examples of fast and slow-moving 
hurricanes which resulted in significant surge inundations with former, and 60-inch 
record rainfall for the later (Dolce, 2018; Emanuel, 2017).  
2.4.2 Angle of approach  
The cyclone’s angle towards the coast determines the storm surge inundation location 
(Drews & Galarneau Jr, 2015). It becomes essential to observe the hurricane mechanism 
to further understand the storm surge characteristics and predict storm surge location. 
Various observation of part cyclone events and their movement mechanisms has led to a 
conclusion that the wind-driven surges are high on the right side of the hurricane (Drews 
& Galarneau Jr, 2015).  
 
Figure 2.9 Cyclone Vardah during landfall at Chennai, India on 11 December 2016                                                
captured by NASA Suomi NPP- VIRUS) [source:(NASA, 2016)] 
Figure 2.9 shows the movement of Cyclone Vardah towards the south-eastern coast of 
India showing the inward wind on to cyclones left-hand side and outwards winds on to 
their right-hand side where wind-driven surges were produced. This is due to the 
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counterclockwise rotary motion of the hurricanes. The hurricanes engulf the winds 
towards their left-hand side pulling the winds inward and pushing the wind outwards on 
their right-hand side as it was moving forward (Emanuel, 1991).   
During the landfall of Hurricane Katrina (2005) at the Louisiana/Mississippi border, it 
was concluded from the observations that storm surge would come from the southern 
direction of Louisiana coast as the hurricane’s eye was moving southwards. 
 
Figure 2.10 Image showing the breached levees in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina 
[source:(Google Earth)] 
However, the adjacent flood walls were breached from the north, impacting the southern 
parts of Lake Pontchartrain as shown in Figure 2.10 leaving 80% of the city of New 
Orleans to be flooded by storm surge (Drews & Galarneau Jr, 2015). A similar scenario 
also occurred in Tacloban during Typhoon Haiyan (2013). Higher storm surge levels of 
22.9 ft (7m) measured at Tacloban, some 23 km north of Typhoon Haiyan’s track (Soria 
& Switzer, 2016).  Though the theoretical angle of approach and the general hurricane 
direction mechanisms suggest the approximate location, the practical estimation of storm 
surge continues to be critical.  
2.4.3 Continental shelf  
Enhanced propagation or counterbalanced action to the dynamics of the storm surge 
depends on the interaction of surges with the slope of the continental shelf, and width of 
the shelf. Surges tend to propagate on gentle and shallow slopes and the effect is lowered 
on steep and narrow slopes (NHC, n.d.).  For example, the Floridan Peninsula has a 
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steeper shelf as illustrated in Figure 2.11(b). Therefore, the typical surge would find it 
hard to propagate unless the maximum levels are exceeded. However, the Gulf Coast of 
Louisiana or Mississippi is shallow as illustrated in Figure 2.11(a) and can easily be 
inundated with higher surges. 
     
Figure 2.11(a) Storm surge in a gentle slope(left) (b) Storm surge in a steep slope (right) [source: (NHC)] 
 
2.4.4 Influence of coastal bathymetry 
Shallow water and coastal bathymetry can influence the storm surge. Exceptionally steep 
waves may form at shallow waters near the coast (Hansom et al., 2015). Along the east 
Asian coastline, typhoons have caused significant waves that are above the observed 
storm surge levels. This is observed as the influence of the bathymetry near the coastline 
which accelerates the wave energy as it approaches the coast. The developing tropical 
surges resulting from the typhoons increases the surging water levels to a higher 
magnitude. The wave energy which is maintained throughout the approach is doubled just 
before the landfall (Needham et al., 2015).  
2.4.5 The complexity of storm surge and inundation levels 
The variation in storm surge heights and inundation levels depends on various factors. 
The low atmospheric pressure, the forward speed, the radius of maximum winds, angle 
of approach of the storm towards the coast, onshore and offshore coastal bathymetry, 
continental shelf, and the shape of the coastline are the factors.  Under optimal conditions, 
a typical storm surge can exceed 22 ft (7m) in height (Nott, 2015). Estuaries and bays 
tend to funnell the effect of storm surges by pushing the water further inland. Typhoon 
Haiyan (2013) is such an example of a typical typhoon which flooded the city of Tacloban 
with a 20 ft (6.096 m) storm surge under optimal condition (Hernandez et al., 2015). The 
1997 Typhoon Linda which occurred in Mekong Delta triggered a storm surge inundating 
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80 km inland from the river mouth up to the region’s capital city Can Tho (Takagi, 2017) 
as shown in Figure 2.12. These were the examples of an amplified destruction resulted 
from the funnelled effect of storm surges. 
    
                Figure 2.12 Funnell effect of storm surge in the Mekong River Delta [source: (Google Earth)] 
2.4.6 Land subsidence, soil and draining water on storm surge 
Land subsidence and loss of wetlands increases the vulnerability of existing coastal lands 
(Henson, 2008). Land subsidence can further build up the risk of coastal flooding and 
storm surge by weakening the flood control structures. Continuous subsidence leads to 
altered floodplains and submerged wetlands (Miller & Shirzaei, 2019).   
                      
          Figure 2.13 Sinking river deltas, Irrawaddy River, NASA satellite image [source: (space 
shuttle - SRTM)] 
In other words, lands subsidence and submerged wetland can determine the level of 
inundations and impending effect to occur from storm surges. Figure 2.13 is an elevation 
map, made by Shuttle Radar Topography Mission with high-elevations in white and low-
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elevation is in green of the Irrawaddy River delta region in Burma (Myanmar). It is clear 
much of the delta region is below the elevation level (Simmon & Allen, 2009). The 
combined effect of sinking coastal lands or deltas, together with the rising sea -levels 
become the perfect base for future storm surges to propagate inland farther from estimated 
ranges (Syvitski et al., 2009).  
2.5  Reverse or Negative storm surge 
Hurricane Irma (2017) exhibited a negative storm surge effect. In Florida, a rare reverse 
surge or negative surge was witnessed in the dry land and receded high water levels were 
observed far behind as shown in Figure 2.14(a) whilst, passing through Tampa,  
(Borenstein & Galofaro, 2017). This phenomenon of seawater covering the low coastal 
zones receding inwards (an effect like the foreword occurrence of the tsunami) and away 
from the shore uncovering or leaving the land below normal level or in a dry state is 
known as reverse storm surge. Preliminary estimations suggested that Tampa Bay, 
Florida would be inundated with at least 10ft of water. 
 
Figure 2.14 (a) Old Tampa Bay, in Tampa Florida during Hurricane Irma (2017) on 10 Sept. 2017 (b) 
People observed to be walking on Old Tampa Bay, Florida during a reverse storm surge [source: 
Borenstein et al., (2017)] 
However, the highest water level was experienced in areas which are miles away from 
Florida whilst near coasts were observed dry (Borenstein & Galofaro, 2017). Coastal 
residents of Tampa Bay, Florida were observed walking on the bay as shown in Figure 
2.14(b) to witness this rare effect, highlighting lack of hazard awareness. The absence of 
the receding water or ‘negative storm surge’ effect is addressed as Positive storm surge.  
2.6 Storm Surge measurement methods  
2.6.1 Tidal stations  
As tidal cycles are predictable, all the water level above the predicted astronomical tide 
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and increased water levels (NHC, n.d.). NOAA has deployed around 300 tidal stations 
along the US coastlines and can provide real-time information on water levels every 6 
minutes (NOAA, 2018). But in most developing and underdeveloped countries, these tide 
gauge stations are scarce and are usually distributed far and wide-ranging intervals to 
capture the accurate peak level (Needham et al., 2015; NHC, n.d.). Furthermore, storm 
surges with higher magnitude often destroy or damage the gauges resulting in system 
malfunctioning thereby causing data loss (NHC, n.d.). A complete tropical surge database 
has not been developed yet to aggregate the global surge database. As surge 
characteristics are very regional and are influenced mostly by local parameters, global 
storm surge measurements are limited. 
2.6.2 High Water Marks  
The identification and recovery of marks showing the highest elevation of floodwaters 
post-hurricane or flood events are termed as high-water marks (HWM) (Koenig et al., 
2016). Some common HWM’s are as follows: 
• Mud lines (as shown in figure 2.15 (a)) 
• Rafted debris lines  
• Scars on trees (as shown in figure 2.15 (b)) 
• Wash lines 
• Eroded banks (The Associate of State Floodplain Managers, 2014) 
These HWM’s were perceived as valuable data to understand recent and past flood events 
(The Associate of State Floodplain Managers, 2014). The observed HWM’s at a particular 
location is useful to determine flood’s return frequency, wave propagation and in basic 
comparison analysis (The Associate of State Floodplain Managers, 2014).  
It is the second most-accurate method for storm surges measurement after tide gauges. 
HWM’s are useful alternatives where the real-time monitoring equipment does not exist 
or in case of malfunction or before being damaged by coastal surge.   
The only limitation of HWM’s is the flood data can only be collected where available and 
possible chances are more to be mixed up with wave run-up or set-up (NHC, n.d.). For 
example, Post-typhoon Haiyan, eyewitnesses were used to gain insight where HWM’s 
could not be concluded from a storm surge or wave run-ups. The U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS) maintains a database which includes the HWM’s for storm surge and other flood 
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events (Koenig et al., 2016). Figure 2.15(a) shows the USGS surveyor measuring the 
HWM post a hurricane.  
       
 
Post-Hurricane Sandy (2012), FEMA and NFIP initiated an HWM initiative project as 
shown in Figure 2.15(c) to create awareness of flood risk as an action of mitigation 
(FEMA, 2018). Although, in developing and underdeveloped countries storm surge 
measurement is carried out from HWM’s, they are measured only for official purposes. 
Lack of funded community initiatives which creates public awareness was not observed. 
The limitation of HWM’s in storm surge measurement is the confidence in differentiating 
between a surge water elevation and a possible wave run-up.  
2.6.3 Pressure sensors  
The pressure sensors measure the barometric pressure to calculate the storm surge 
duration, estimated time of arrival at a point, retrieval time and their depths. These are 
temporary solutions and are usually installed around the structures before the arrival of 
the hurricanes (NHC, n.d.). However, these systems record the data at a point of a given 
time and are not real-time (NHC, n.d.).  
2.6.4 Saffir Simpson Wind Hurricane Scale (SSWHS) and storm surge 
Tropical cyclones are categorized on a scale of 1 to 5 based on their sustained wind speed. 
This scale is known as the Saffir-Simpson Wind Hurricane Scale (SSWHS). This scale 
gives an estimated relative wind speed and their potential property damage (Schott et al., 
2019) as shown in Table 2.2.  
Figure2.15(a) USGS 
Surveyor measuring a high-
water mark (HWM) [source: 
USGS] 
Figure 2.15(b) HWM of 
saturated water from trees 
[source: The Associate of 
State Floodplain Managers( 
2014)]    
Figure 2.15(c) HWM 
project initiative post-
hurricane Sandy [source: 
FEMA(2018)] 
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Table 2.2 Hurricane categorisation according to Saffir-Simpson Wind Hurricane Scale with their 
corresponding wind speed and potential property damage [source: (NHC, n.d.)] 
 
The scale was originally developed in the year 1969 by wind engineer Herbert Saffir and 
meteorologist Robert Simpson, who was the then director of National Hurricane Centre 
and was named the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale (Schott et al., 2019). The original 
scale developed in 1969, included details of storm surge, rainfall reading which was later 
removed by NHC in the year 2009. The scale was then tailored to reveal hurricane 
intensity estimate and called as SSWHS.  
Significant events such as the Hurricane Charley (2004), Hurricane Katrina (2005), 
Hurricane Ike (2008) had various contradictions concerning the SSWHS. Hurricane 
Katrina (2005) made landfall in Louisiana as a Category 3 hurricane. According to the 
older version of SSWHS, the corresponding storm surge that was related with Category 
3 hurricane should have likely produced a maximum of 11.8 ft (3.6 m). However, 
Hurricane Katrina triggered a 27.8 ft (8.47 m) storm surge (NHC, n.d.). Similarly, 
Hurricane Charley (2004) which was a Category 4 produced a 6-8ft (1.8-2.4 m) and 
Hurricane Ike (2008) which was a Category 2 produced a 20 ft (6.1 m) storm surge. 
Summarising from these understandings that hurricane wind intensity does not have any 
impact on the storm surges and the level of storm surges have various exemptions 
included within the scale. Therefore, in 2009, the NHC decided to tailor the SSWHS by 
removing the storm surge scale (NHC, n.d.; NHC, n.d.).  








Category 1 74-95 119-153 3.9- 4.9 (1.2-1.5) Very dangerous winds 
will produce some 
damage 
Category 2 96-110 154-177 5.9-7.9 (1.8-2.4) Extremely dangerous 
winds will cause 
extensive damage 
Category 3 111-129 178-208 8.9- 11.8 (2.7-3.6) Devastating damage 
will occur 




Category 5 >157 >252 >17.7 (5.4) Catastrophic damage 
will occur 
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The NHC had concluded on various exemptions, that the storm surge levels were not 
affected by the hurricane’s intensity and their categories. The primary focus of this 
research is not to recommend the addition of storm surge levels with the current SSWHS 
scale. However, the researcher considers that including the storm surge readings could be 
provisional (not accurate) to create a basic awareness. Figure 2.16 shows the pictorial 
view of the estimated property damage which corresponds with the hurricane category 
and their respective sustained wind speed. This version is adapted to visually show the 
impact from the hurricane’s heavy winds. The visual representation, however, does not 
seem to represent the underlying storm surge which can potentially inundate the 
properties. But certainly, this reveals how the hurricane’s heavy winds alone can produce 
significant damage.  
 
Figure 2.16 Visualisation of hurricane categories and their intensities [Image Source: The Comet 
program/MetEd] 
A typical Category 2 hurricane which can blow off roofs, exposing the property for further 
coastal flooding. Flying debris could result in causing moderate to serious damages to 
people, pets, and livestock and in worst-case resulting in deaths.  
The following were observed as the limitation of the SSWHS.  
• The scale relates only to the maximum sustained surface wind speed. The 
observations of significant events using this scale only communicates the 
maximum sustained winds experienced at a particular location and do not 
communicate the peak intensity reached by the tropical cyclone in its lifetime 
(Schott et al., 2019). This leaves the underestimation of the real potential of the 
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• The scale does not reveal on the associated impacts such as storm surge, rainfall, 
or tornado data (Schott et al., 2019). This is key to the early warning system. 
Having the storm surge reading within the hurricane category scale (though it 
is not related to the wind speed) immediately identifies that storm surges are 
associated perils of hurricanes and could be predictable during the 
dissemination of storm surge warning. The SSWHS scale without the storm 
surge readings may now project storm surge and hurricanes as two different 
phenomena and not related to each other. This is another motivation for the 
framework to create prerequisite awareness in addition to the current existing 
hurricanes scale.  
• Although, this scale defines the estimated property damage from their 
corresponding hurricane category, the scale does not define the other factors 
such as change of wind direction, age of the structure and high winds (Schott et 
al., 2019).  
 
2.7 Existing coastal protection methods  
2.7.1 Engineered coastal defence  
Storm surge barriers, sea walls and flood walls are the best examples of engineered coastal 
defence. Storm surge barriers were considered as the most successful mitigation 
technique with the Netherlands (Deltawerken Online, 2004). A significant part of the 
Netherlands was below sea level and continuous exposure to storm surge flooding due to 
their intricate water channels and estuaries connecting to the North Sea. The Netherlands 
suffers from various hazards such as rising sea levels, storm surges, storms and is also 
below the sea level with high subsidence rates as a continuous threat for the country 
(Rijkswaterstaat: Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, n.d.).  
The North Sea Flood of 1953 impacted the delta region of the Netherlands killing more 
than 2,000 and flooding 150,000 hectares of farmlands (Deltawerken Online, 2004). To 
mitigate against these flooding events and the prolonged exposure of vulnerable 
communities and infrastructure resulted in the investment of storm surge barrier called 
‘Delta works’ (Rijkswaterstaat: Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, n.d.). 
Although, plans were made to construct the delta work post-1953 storm surge event, the 
actual works began in 1959 following the implementation of the ‘delta law’ which was 
passed in 1959 after which the organisation of the construction of the dams were 
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determined (Deltawerken Online, 2004). The country has deployed flood defences for 
more than 3,700 km as shown in Figure 2.17.  
 
 
Figure 2.17. The Delta region of the Netherlands protected by various coastal barriers (storm 
surge barriers, sluices, dams) [source: Deltawerken Online (2004)] 
 
The delta works consists of dams, sluices, dykes, levees and storm surge barriers to 
enhance the flood protection along the coasts of Netherlands and Zeeland. The delta 
works project which includes three locks, six dams and five storm surge barriers was 
completed in 1997 (Rijkswaterstaat: Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, 
n.d.). Figure 2.17 shows the cluster of flood barriers that has remarkably proven to be 
successful in mitigating storm surge and coastal flooding in the Netherlands 
(Rijkswaterstaat: Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, n.d.). Due to the 
innovation in flood mitigation, the delta works is considered as one of the most innovative 
and sustainable solutions was also included in the wonders of the world (Deltawerken 
Online, 2004; Rijkswaterstaat: Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, n.d.).   
Figure 2.18 shows different flood barriers of the ‘Delta work’ project. The 
Maeslantkering or Maeslant barrier is a movable flood barrier for storm surge mitigation. 
Developed countries do not face economic difficulties. Countries with enhanced adaptive 
capacity not only encourages such coastal investment for long term solution but also 
capable of responding and deploying resources during emergencies as short-term 
solutions. The high investment cost, maintenance cost and the topographical implications 
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of constructing a storm surge barrier, may also restrict developing and under-developed 
countries from practically implementing such measures. Furthermore, the substantial time 
taken for the delta works cannot be engaged by least developed or even developing 
countries in a practical set-up.  
   
              (a)     Hartelkering dam                                               (b) Maeslantkering or Maeslant barrier 
   
               (c)The Oyster dam                                         (d) Holland Ijssel storm surge barrier 
    
        (e) The Easter Scheldt storm surge barrier                            (f) Osterschelde barrier 
 
Figure 2.18 The delta works project of the Netherlands [source: (Holland Tourism) & Deltawerken Online 
(2004)] 
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Figure 2.19 exhibits the cost of storm surge barrier built across different countries 
globally. Storm surge barriers could be a direct and immediate solution to mitigate these 
hazards. But it incurs huge construction and maintenance cost which is beyond the 
adaptive capacity of developing or underdeveloped countries. In addition to the cost, 
factors such as time, environmental impact, topography, feasible foundation conditions, 
makes the storm surge barrier as an impractical solution for many vulnerable zones. It 
also depends on the durability and sustainability of a flood barrier that could serve as a 
permanent solution for the long term.  
 
 
Figure 2.19 Global storm surge barriers and their corresponding construction costs [source: Linham & 
Nicholls (2010)] 
Even developed countries cannot opt for storm surge barriers as a solution all the times. 
The extended construction period and costs is also another factor that is challenging even 
for a developed country such as New York. The Request for Proposal (RFP) for the New 
York-New Jersey’s storm surge barrier was proposed soon after hurricane Ike in 2008. 
However, the proposal is still in the early phase of being considered for execution due to 
its high investment and its environmental impact on the Hudson River and the 
neighbourhoods (Hill et al., 2009).  
During Hurricane Katrina (2005), the losses were extensive not only because of the 
magnitude of the storm, but also due to the failure of levees of New Orleans which also 
aggravated the loss (Muis et al., 2016; Knabb et al., 2005). The rising surge waters 
engulfed the Lake Ponchartrain thereby flooding all the nearby canals and communities 
by overtopping and subsiding all flood walls as much as depths up to about 20 feet and 
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Orleans were inundated by the severely strained levee system and flood defences which 
further resulted in 1,500 deaths in Louisiana (Knabb et al., 2005). 
Many coastal cities and mega cities have already implemented flood and coastal defence 
systems as a precaution measure to reduce these risks (Horn, 2015). However, the 
upgraded flood protection measures are constantly under the risk (Tobin, 2018). This is 
due to various factors such as the changing coasts from newly built coastal developments, 
attractive coastal economy, which leads to coastal sprawl with both people and assets 
exposed. Under such circumstances, implementing a flood defence system remains 
obsolete and these coastal cities and their surrounding areas continue to be exposed to 
extreme weather events. As the safety standards of these coastal protection systems are 
expressed as the allowed probability of exceeding a certain water level as required 
protection level (Ke et al., 2018). The low safety standards of these coastal protection 
systems also increase the coastal vulnerability. Besides, the future predicted risks of rising 
sea levels, land subsidence, increasing trends of economic and population growth could 
further reduce the level of protection. Although, the level of protection could be evaluated 
by comparing the crest height of the defence system to the return period of water levels 
using the flood frequency analysis (Ke et al., 2018).  This raises a question on the 
durability of existing engineered coastal protections and their safety standards in case of 
return frequency of any such event if it is short. This also questions their sustained level 
of protection in the verge of current and increase in sea level extremities. 
2.7.2 Non-engineered coastal defence 
As outlined earlier, it is also not practically possible to build a storm surge barrier at every 
vulnerable coast. Non-engineered coastal defences are a natural way of protecting the 
coasts avoiding the construction of structures or engineering coastal defences 
(Blankespoor et al., 2017). These are preferable for hard flood defence areas as they allow 
zones near-shore to naturally adapt to the changing conditions. Such non-engineered 
natural coastal defences are beach replenishment, natural dunes, mangrove vegetation, 
and salt marshes which could act as a natural buffer in storm surge attenuation 
(Blankespoor et al., 2017). Breaches in hard engineered coastal protection such as sea 
wall or flood wall may occur during extreme surge events and in worst-case scenarios. 
For example, during Hurricane Katrina (2005), levees and flood defences along the 
coastal New Orleans communities were breached (Knabb et al., 2005).  This remains as 
a classic example where an engineered coastal defence could not serve as a reliable 
permanent and long- term solution for storm surge hazard. Whilst a country’s capability 
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may not often support a quick recovery their economic damage caused by these disasters, 
it is hardly practical for such countries to invest in building storm surge barriers and fund 
for further maintenance. Therefore, a feasible and realistic option such as non-engineered 
coastal defences should be considered as an alternative way in addition to the engineered 
structure for future storm surge and extreme scenarios.Wetland mitigation can be an 
economic option to mitigate storm surges. Bangladesh is a disaster-prone country to 
cyclones, storm surges, coastal erosion, floods, and droughts and hold a multi-hazard 
profile (Ali, 1999). The south-western part of Bangladesh is surrounded by the world’s 
largest mangrove forest popularly known as ‘Sundarbans’. Mathematical models and 
studies have shown mangrove forests have significant attenuation rate to storm surges 
(Blankespoor et al., 2017). Although, these mangrove forests cannot completely dissipate 
the energy created by storm dynamics they can certainly act as a deterrent to storm surges. 
These natural buffers when planted in the large region can diffuse the storm surge 
inundations reducing damage rate (Blankespoor et al., 2017). Despite the densely 
populated mangroves, other factors may also have an impact. Shallow, uneven 
topographical shelf, deltas with intricate creeks and channels, complex estuaries and river 
system simply multiply the exposure and vulnerability to storm surges (Ali, 1999).  
2.8 Summary  
This chapter discussed how and why storm surge is a complex phenomenon and the 
intricacies in storm parameters. A new set of data observed from 2015-2018 showed how 
the increase in the intensity and the frequency of the hurricanes could become a potential 
threat to the coastal communities. The vulnerability and exposure to storm surge is only 
expected to be amplified, with increase in ocean warming, rising sea levels and increased 
intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones. Literature in the subject field also 
highlighted the ambiguity around storm surge and how this misunderstood hazard 
remains unexplored. The incapability of the hurricane scale to associate with the storm 
surge further increase the complexity around storm surge hazard and underlines areas of 
incompetent existing measures. Furthermore, failure to address storm surges with an 
appropriate solution would result in complications in the process of mitigation even with 
a hard-engineered solution in the future. These limitations became the primary driving 
factor for innovation of the framework approach to mitigate this hazard. Especially when 
such hazards exist in the developing and the least-developed countries, where a 
framework to mitigate storm surge could be an economically efficient alternative to the 
hard-engineered structures.  






This chapter focuses on the literature by discussing and reviewing the context around 
storm surge, related challenges in adaptation and mitigation, performance of existing 
measurement and monitoring systems, and risk approaches. The review provides an 
opportunity to identify the potential gaps in cyclone-triggered storm surge adaptation and 
mitigation. The identified gaps will be investigated further through individual case study 
analysis in later chapters assisting further in the development of the framework. An 
overall view of the understanding and awareness of coastal communities and residents 
regarding storm surge during emergencies is discussed in this chapter. The review of 
previous tools, techniques, and frameworks used in storm surge measurement and their 
limitations discussed within this chapter became fundamental for the development of the 
Disaster Adaptation to Mitigate Storm Surge (DAMSS) framework. 
 
3.2 Storm Surge: a global priority  
Tropical cyclone triggered storm surges can produce catastrophic coastal flooding. 
Observational evidence of significant events highlight that storm surge is the primary 
factor which had caused significant economic damage and loss of life relatively to tropical 
cyclones (Seo & Bakkensen, 2017).  It is difficult to predict the likeliness of the 
substantial losses that will occur in terms of number of people being killed or affected, or 
the economic and infrastructure damage of any region from storm surge. This is perhaps 
because of the uncertainty of storm surge and their sensitivity of reaction to a minor 
change in any of the storm parameters. Parameters such as central pressure, storm 
intensity, and storm forward speed, angle of approach to the coast, shallow continental 
shelves and local coastal bathymetry influence the storm surge characteristics (NHC, 
2008). The funnelled effects of storm surges discussed in Chapter 2 further emphasise the 
seriousness of these hazards and their capability of inundating the cities inland by 
inducing river overtopping. 
 
Page | 35  
 
Figure 3.2 Global peak surge map [source: SURGEDAT] 
According to SURGEDAT (2015) there were more than 700 identified storm surge events 
globally since 1880 (Needham & Keim, 2012).  
 
Figure 3.1 Overview of storm surge events in various ocean basins [source: SURGEDAT] 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the vulnerability of all the ocean basins and the prospective damage to 
their adjacent coastal communities and infrastructures. The database further provides a 
probability of risk from storm surge events highlighting the vulnerability of the tropical 
region for various inundation heights. Based on the data set the following global peak 
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<1.5 m(5ft) 1.5-3.0 m (5-10ft) 3.0-4.5 m(10-15ft) 4.5-6.0 m (15-20ft) >6.0m (20ft) 
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But Jakobsen et al., (2006) stated that the North Indian Ocean especially the Bay of 
Bengal has experienced the most severe storm surge events with maximum observed 
surge levels as 39.4- 46 ft (12-14 m). The Bay of Bengal is observed to have a ‘deep layer 
of warm water’, which fuels the energy of the tropical system to quickly organise and 
develop further strengthening within a shorter period. A similar strengthening from the 
deep warm waters also occurs in the Gulf of Mexico and is reflected during the rapid 
strengthening of Hurricane Katrina (Hurricane Science, 2008). Nargis underwent rapid 
intensification from a weak Category 1 to a strong Category 4 cyclone due to the warm 
water of Bay of Bengal within a period of 24 hours (Fritz et al., 2009).  
While the Atlantic Basin and the Gulf of Mexico ranks second to experience a maximum 
surge level of 27.8 ft (8 m), during Hurricane Katrina (Knabb et al., 2005). The East Asian 
typhoons have encountered a maximum surge level were around 9.8-19.7 ft (3-6 m) (Li 
et al., 2004). The surge levels in Australia and Oceania were observed to be the same as 
the levels in the East Asia. Oceania experiences long-term impacts which include 
freshwater contamination and loss of food supply but, their maximum surge levels are 
comparatively lower than the level observed in other regions (Needham et al., 2015). 
Summarising the facts regardless of the different surge levels occurred in different ocean 
basins, it can be implied that storm surges are a global phenomenon and can be destructive 
resulting in significant damage. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Billion-dollar events and their cost of damage by disaster type from 1980-2011 
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Another study by Smith & Katz (2013), claims that tropical cyclones were responsible 
for the 47% cost of damage in the United States. The estimated cost of damages by 
disaster types from 1980-2011 is US $417.9 billion as shown in Figure 3.3. This cost 
could further be raised to US $753.9 billion if merged with the damage cost from the 
recent storms notably, the cost of the damages from Hurricane Sandy (2012) and Harvey-
Irma-Maria (2017).  
Hurricane-force winds are hazardous to coastal communities and infrastructures; however 
devastating impacts have often resulted from cyclones only when associated with storm 
surges (Seo & Bakkensen, 2017). In line with Smith’s (2013) study, Edward N. 
Rappaport, the then acting director of the US National Hurricane Centre (2017-2018), 
carried out another analysis on ‘direct deaths from Atlantic tropical cyclones’ for a given 
period of 1970-1999. His study initially recorded that most of the cyclone-related 
fatalities were associated with rainfall and were not attributed to storm surges. His results 
further claimed that, only six deaths were directly attributed to storm surges for a period 
of 30 years from 1979-1999.  However, before summarizing the results, the 2005 Atlantic 
hurricane season proved Rappaport’s claims to be incorrect. The loss of 1,833 lives from 
Hurricane Katrina (2005) challenged his claims. This demanded reassessment of the study 
period from 30 years to 50 years from 1963-2012, instead of 1970-1999 (Rappaport, 




Figure 3.4 Percentage of fatalities caused by Atlantic Ocean hurricanes and their associated                        
hazards [source: Rappaport (2014)]  
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According to the Rappaport (2014), the accumulation of new data contradicted the 
previous results. New results stated that 49% of deaths from Atlantic hurricanes are 
directly associated with storm surge as indicated in Figure 3.4. During these 50 years, 
650-700 Atlantic tropical cyclones were recorded. The extension of the study period 
emphasised the key fact that most catastrophic storms were not necessarily the strongest 
or ‘major hurricanes’ according to the SSHWS (Rappaport, 2014). The revised study and 
the findings agreed that about half of the death were caused by storm surges. Rappaport’s 
study has its exclusions such as global cyclone deaths associated with storm surges were 
not included and only certain ‘period’ was considered to conclude the results.  
 
The addition of the recent significant storms in the US cyclone history, which occurred 
from the year 2015-2018 would further influence this 49% percentage deaths statistic 
caused by storm surges. A fact to be underlined is that any period ‘without a storm surge 
event’ need not necessarily remark or conclude that the effect of storm surges was 
decreased. Rappaport, further suggests that “A call to action for the nation’s hurricane 
research and operations program to develop and implement new storm surge mitigation 
strategies” (p. 344).  
 
A recent study by Bouwer & Jonkman  (2018) claims that, the global mortality rate from 
the storm surges is decreasing. According to the measured statistics, the mortality rate of 
the global coastal storm surge events from the compiled and recorded data on loss of lives 
since 1900, has seen a consistent decrease, with an exemption of South East Asia (Bouwer 
& Jonkman, 2018). The study also states that the mortality from flash floods and river 
floods were higher than the mortality caused by storm surges. The dataset utilised by 
Bouwer & Jonkman (2018) was imported from the EM-DAT, an international database 
for global disasters.  
Bouwer & Jonkman (2018) further claims that continuous innovations in risk projections 
and forecasts have decreased the mortality rate from storm surge compared to previous 
decades, such as the 1900 Galveston storm which resulted in 8,000 deaths (Knabb et al., 
2005). As claimed by the study, it is true that the 1900 Galveston hurricane’s death rate 
has not been surpassed for many years until Cyclone Nargis (2008) which resulted in 
140,000 deaths (Fritz et al., 2009). The 6,300 deaths from Super-typhoon Haiyan (2013) 
underlines the fact, that technical advancement alone is not sufficient to mitigate the 
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effects of storm surges (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, 
2015).  
While agreeing on the fact that efficient early warning systems, advanced technologies 
and effective risk communication could reduce the higher risks imposed from these 
hazards, a previous study of Jonkman & Vrijling (2008) states that the fatality from storm 
surges was not recorded consistently in national and global level.  
The official death toll from Hurricane Maria (2017) is 65 (at the time of research) whilst 
a specific study conducted by Milken Institute School of Public Health (2018) has 
identified that the loss of 2,975 lives were associated with the event (Milken Institute 
School of Public Health, 2018). After Hurricane Katrina (2005), the major loss of lives in 
the Caribbean and US territories was caused by Hurricane Maria (DHS & FCC, 2018). 
The death toll from Maria concurs with Jonkman & Vrijling (2008) statement but 
highlights the fact that there is lack of consistency in disaster fatality record management.  
The study of Bouwer & Jonkman (2018), also exempted the South East Asian cyclones, 
an ocean basin which is highly prone to typhoons, super-typhoons and storm surges and 
focuses more on the USA. This exemption, if included would largely alter the previously 
observed results and would certainly diverge from the primary claim of mortality trend 
being decreased from storm surges. Nevertheless, Bouwer & Jonkman (2018), themselves 
have stated that the mortality rate from storm surges has not declined for southeast Asia 
and the rest of the Asian countries which majorly comprises developing and under-
developed countries.  
To answer the question that if the mortality rate of developing countries has also 
decreased, the decrease in the mortality rate from storm surges could also be ‘momentary’ 
over the observed period. Therefore, the risk imposed on the coastal communities and 
infrastructure from this hazard cannot be concluded with the observation. Also, 
decreasing death rate is also subject to change with future changes. Moreover, this study 
emphasises how these hazards should not be deviated from being considered perilous 
irrespective of the advanced monitoring systems in place. 
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        Figure 3.5. Economic losses (billion US$) by disaster type: the year 2017 compared to 2007-2016  
[source: CRED (2018)] 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the economic losses by disaster type (in billion US$) of 2017 in 
comparison with the 2007-2016 losses. The 2017 Atlantic hurricane Season is claimed to 
have been one of the significant years in the US hurricane history in term of tropical 
cyclones and storm surges (Smith et al., 2018). The observation by CRED (2018) 
highlights the significant socioeconomic damage of US$ 284.7 billion for the year 2017 
from the tropical cyclone and storm surges. It is during this year, the death toll recorded 
from a single event during Hurricane Maria (2017) was observed with 2,975 deaths 
(Milken Institute School of Public Health, 2018) in Puerto Rico. These observations 
clearly remark the changing risk and an obvious disparity to previous observations and 
claims on storm surge being as less hazardous with decreasing death rate.   
The addition of new data from 2016-2018 if integrated with existing findings, certainly 
alters the previous observations considerably. Estimated versus the actual losses from 
storm surge hazard shows that the understanding of storm surge characteristics may not 
necessarily be comprehensive. This could further result in an improper future risk 
assessment with an already miscalculated base data. This supplements the 
recommendation of review of existing approaches or a possible reassessment as they 
could result in the inappropriate analysis of storm surge characteristics and may mislead 
future risk assessment and approaches.  
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3.3 Lack of data and ambiguity in storm surge classification 
As mentioned earlier in Section 3.2, despite the occurrence of more than 700 events over 
a century, storm surge seems to remain unrecognized widely. This may be possible 
because it was considered as an associated threat from tropical cyclones.  In Figure 3.6 
the data reported to EM-DAT displays the maximum number of disasters per type has 
occurred of which, most number of disasters occurred were related to flooding with 3,148 
events followed by storm with 2,049 events (Wallemacq & Below, 2017).  
 
The Emergency Management Database (EM-DAT) is an international database for 
reported disasters. As per EM-DAT storm surge which typically takes place with the 
occurrence of the tropical cyclone was classified under ‘convective storm’ category (EM-
DAT, n.d.). This is a sub-sub-disaster type of storm. Despite the effort of the database to 




Figure 3.6 Number of disasters per type (1998-2017) [source: Wallemacq & Below (2017)] 
The word ‘convection’ from the term convective storms denotes that any property that is 
being transported through fluid movement most often associated with heat transfer. 
Severe convective storms often refer to hail, lightning, tornadoes, and straight-line winds 
(Doswell, 2001).  
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Figure 3.7. A general classification of natural disasters [source: (EM-DAT, n.d.)] 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the classification of a natural disaster, disaster sub-type and disaster 
sub-sub type labelled by EM-DAT. By categorising storm surge under ‘convective storm’ 
or grouping many disasters TC-triggered storm surge as TC’s may continue to leave this 
hazard as less estimated or known hazard. Also, storm surge is a type of coastal flooding 
it is further conjectured that storm surge may also be classified and reported in various 
situations as coastal flooding. This classification is observed to show that there is no direct 
association of storm surge with a tropical or extra-tropical storm from which 
predominantly storm surge occurs. Further, storm surges which can induce river 
overtopping in the lands in estuaries and the classification does not show any connection 
with storm surge. Coastal flooding, which usually occurs from high tide or storm surge is 
also recorded individually remarking that this to be a separate event from storm surges.   
 
Lack of data continues to prevail especially for this hazard. This may further mean as 
incorrect hazard classification obscuring the underlying actual risk of storm surges. The 
inaccurate data may further amplify the ambiguity of understanding the actual estimation 
of loss of lives and damage statistics. This may also result in over-estimation or under-
estimation of the actual risk thereby, misleading the future adaptation and mitigation 
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Although, storm surge is generated predominantly from tropical cyclones, yet not all 
cyclones result in generating a storm surge. This not only increases the ‘uncertainty’ 
attributed to storm surge but also highlights the lack of possible data and emphasise the 
need to understand storm surges. When classifying the damage caused by a storm surge, 
the observations must be measured and recorded in a useful and understandable manner. 
This could be suggested as one of the future recommendations for storm surge data 
collection and monitoring. 
3.4 Awareness and risk communication of storm surge 
An interview given by the then director of National Hurricane Centre to the National 
Public Radio in 2018 stated that “Most of the fatalities from these tropical systems is from 
water” (NPR, 2018). 
Storm surges are a complex seaborne hazard originating predominantly from key weather 
events such as tropical cyclones. But also, their sensitivity to react to the slightest change 
in the storm parameters retains its ‘uncertainty factor’ regarding why all hurricanes do 
not result in a storm surge and why some storm surges are anomalous to coast (NHC: 
NOAA, n.d.). Communication plays a critical role throughout the different phases of a 
disaster such as pre-disaster, during and post-disaster emergencies (Neussner, 2014; 
Jibiki, 2016). Cyclone Nargis was the first to make landfall in Ayeyarwady delta, the 
people from the Ayeyarwady delta had little or no awareness about the cyclones or storm 
surges (Fritz et al., 2009). The super-typhoon Haiyan brought a 20-ft (6.1 m) storm surge 
and caused a significant death toll of more than 6,300 people in the Philippines and the 
primary factor behind the loss of lives was inadequate storm surge communication and 
awareness (NDRRMC, 2015). The residents who on average experience 18-20 typhoons 
annually, suffered catastrophic damage and loss of lives because the residents were not 
communicated or interpreted regarding ‘storm surge’ and its effects and influences 
(Hernandez et al., 2015; Neussner, 2014).  Many hospitals moved their patients to 
basements, had known little about the 20ft storm surge (Jibiki, 2016; Hernandez et al., 
2015).  
Typhoon Linda which made landfall in Can Tho, Mekong Delta in the year 1997 was a 
significant event of all the 228 storms which made landfall in the same location (Takagi 
et al., 2017). Regardless of the mangrove forest, the 6.56-ft (2.0 m) storm surge was able 
to inundate the city of Can Tho. According to Takagi et al., (2017), despite Typhoon 
Linda left a ‘storm-memory’ to the delta residents, only a few studies have been 
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conducted on the storm surges in Vietnam. Fritz et al., (2019) underlines an article from 
The Washington Post, how a local county officer of Florida during Hurricane Florence 
(2018), mentioned that “A lot of people did stay because the storm went down from 
Category 4 to a Category 2 and they think of that number as being the end-all”. This 
statement demonstrates the general awareness of tropical cyclone warning systems and 
storm surge awareness in developed countries like the USA.  
Establishing accurate death and damage statistics from disaster events are often critical 
for governments and their authorities (Guha-Sapir D, 2018). The previous Section 3.2 
discussed how the NHC’s tropical cyclone report of Hurricane Maria (2017), stated the 
death toll as 65 that varied largely with the observed death toll from the study done by 
Milken Institute of Public Health -George Washington University. The new death toll 
which is 2,975 identified by the Milken Institute School of Public Health (2018) is 46 
times greater than the number declared previously by the federal government of the USA.  
The new statistics obtained were based on verified death certificates, clarifying the 
accuracy and precise death count from Hurricane Maria (Milken Institute School of 
Public Health, 2018). Despite the verified data, the federal agency has not considered 
revising the death toll. The observed variation between the earlier reports versus the new 
death statistics clearly shows the possibility of how inaccurate data is fed within disaster 
record management. This should be viewed as an action described by Guha-Sapir (2018) 
on how increased death or damage may expose the inefficiencies of the country’s poor 
infrastructure or inadequate preparedness and responses to extreme weather events These 
inaccurate data may further lead to miscalculation of socioeconomic damage thereby 
resulting in underestimation of actual risk from storm surges for future mitigation.  
According to the Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2016, the collective data as shown 
in Figure 3.8 indicates that every year from 2006 to 2015, the hydrological (flood) 
disasters have contributed to most disasters with around 177 events. Followed by this, the 
meteorological disasters (cyclones and storms) were identified with 96 events (Guha-
Sapir et al., 2017). It is not clear on whether these flooding were caused by cyclones, 
storm surges, extreme rogue waves/high tides, or heavy downpours.  
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Figure 3.8. Annual Disaster Review 2016: statistics and trends for 2006-2015 [source: Guha-Sapir D 
(2017)] 
 
Based on the indications from Figure 3.8 the number of reported hydrological and 
meteorological events is greater than that of climatological events. This implies the 
possibility that, storm surge events may have occurred under both these classifications. 
That is the hydrological disasters induced by meteorological events triggering storm 
surges inundating the city with coastal and induced river flooding.  
 In an interview to the NPR in 2018, a local resident said that, “I have been living down 
here for a long time, so this one is OK”. The resident was identified to be in the path of 
Hurricane Florence (2018) and further added that the decision to stay back was based on 
the alert issued by NHC that the hurricane has now weakened (NPR, 2018). Despite 
NHC’s alerts regarding possible storm surge inundations, the resident chose to stay back 
in a mandatory evacuation warned zone (NPR, 2018). As possibility is that the resident 
may have seen many hurricanes which had not brought any coastal storm surge in the 
past. This may have led to her decision to stay back. However, the then potential 
Hurricane Florence (2018) may or may not bring a storm surge which was unpredictable. 
The contradictory behaviour in coastal resident’s decision to stay-back subsequently after 
the evacuation order, should be observed as ‘lack of clarity’ in emergency communication 
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on behalf of the authorities or shallow understanding of storm surge threat on behalf of 
the resident. 
During cyclone Nargis (2008), the death of 140,000 people was reported due to the failure 
of the early warnings and public awareness of the storm surge hazard (Fritz et al., 2009). 
The perilous condition post-cyclone Nargis made the country to be overwhelmed by the 
storm surge impact resulting in call for humanitarian assistance request (Guha-Sapir, 
2018). Though communication has seen extensive improvements with the support of 
technology in developed countries, the performance of early warning system and risk 
communication significantly differ with developing and under-developed countries. 
The general understanding and awareness of storm surge among different countries are 
observed to have considerable variations. These observed variations may be due to social 
inequalities between developed and developing countries. It also may depend on the 
economic capacity under which a country’s exposure and their ability to cope under 
vulnerable conditions is also a determining factor. Lessons learnt from past events, and 
most-recent events highlight the significant gaps such as lack of implementation of the 
lesson learnt and lack of invest in protective infrastructure and resilience measures. In 
some developed countries, despite their adaptive capabilities to mitigate and cope with 
the risk, the countries continue to suffer the impacts that abounds with storm surge.  
 
3.5 Storm surge measurement and current adaptation measures in practice 
The first satellite images of the Atlantic tropical cyclones became active to forecasters in 
the year 1966. It is in this same year, the first observation and numerical tropical cyclone 
forecast models were introduced (Rappaport, 2014). National Hurricane Centre, the 
formerly known as Miami Weather Bureau communicated the information about 
hurricane Betsy (1965) to the public using television as the communication medium 
(Rappaport, 2014).  
 
However, present-day weather prediction has improved considerably. The weather 
prediction models of National Hurricane Center (NHC) such as the Sea, Lake, Ocean, and 
Hurricane (SLOSH) and the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting 
(ECMRW) were recognized for their accuracy in plotting the likelihood of the impending 
tropical cyclones. The NHC’s SLOSH model simulates using 27 ocean basins along the 
U.S. east coast and Gulf coasts to predict the worst-case scenarios for every potential 
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hurricane. The result of a sample simulation of SLOSH models suggest that is if a storm 
surge occurs with the highest category 5 hurricane, according to Saffir-Simpson 
Hurricane Wind Scale (SSWHS), over 16,000 km of evacuation route and at least 22 
million people could be at severe risk and affected by storm surge and coastal flooding. 
As stated in the NHC’s report of SLOSH model, it is identified that Maine, Massachusetts, 
New York, and New Hampshire do not have the FEMA recommended official evacuation 
routes (Zachry et al., 2015). Despite the results, suggested by the simulation states 
identified with no evacuation routes exposes the vulnerability of population directly 
leading to risk.  
 
The track or the path of the tropical cyclone is termed as the ‘cone of uncertainty’, which 
is predicted five days in advance utilising the technical advancements and innovations in 
hurricane forecasting and hindcasting systems (NHC, n.d.). Due to this advancement in 
hurricane prediction, pre-planned and organised evacuations can be advised earlier 
protecting loss of lives. Although, the technical advancement may seem to benefit in 
decreasing the death toll in developed countries, but this can also aid to an overlooked 
effect as it is the only solution to mitigate this hazard. Also, the technical advancement 
and their results which may be achievable in developed countries may not be feasible in 
all the countries and the achievement of similar results could be lower in developing 
countries and even lesser for least developed countries (Bouwer & Jonkman, 2018).  
 
Post-hurricane Katrina the storm surge measurement was removed from the SSWHS 
scale due to various criteria that contradicted the storm surge and hurricane is removed 
from this scale. In 2016, NHC issued the first storm surge flood hazard map and the first 
storm surge watch-warning was issued prior to Hurricane Matthew. The introduction of 
the ‘storm surge watch-warnings’ and the ‘flood hazard maps’ were issued to create 
awareness and understanding of storm surge. The risk hazard maps issued in the best 
interest to create awareness however it was issued only to certain locations to test the 
procedure. Other exclusions are levees, embankments, seawalls were excluded from the 
mappings due to their complexity in calculating the flooding and over topping levels. For 
locations with such a situation, the community residents were requested to check with 
local officials (NHC, 2016). Contemplating on the recurrence of Hurricane Katrina, and 
how levee failure resulted in catastrophic damage, the current flood hazard map estimated 
with levee exclusion, only highlights the increased likelihood of experiencing similar 
damage of Katrina.  
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Coastal Zoning is one of the popular systems in place to categories the coastal properties 
and communities according to low, medium, and high-risk zones. Most developed and 
some developing countries whose coastal communities and infrastructures exposed to 
hazards have ‘coastal zoning’ systems already in place as a step towards mitigating storm 
surge hazard. Nevertheless, even the low-risk coastal zones were trespassed by coastal 
surges. Inundations from storm surges and coastal flooding are identified continuously 
even during the most recent Harvey (2017) and Michael (2018).  
Overriding of zoned systems, beyond their mapped areas shows the gap between mapping 
methods and actual observation post-surge events.  This could be mainly from issues like 
the use of outdated maps, decades of gap in updated census records but also the sensitivity 
of storm surge to additional variants before landfall affecting mapped location (Bathi & 
Das, 2016).  In early 2015, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical 
Services Administration (PAGASA) introduced colour code storm surge warnings 
(Flores, 2015). This type of colour-coded early warning system is introduced due to the 
result of damage incurred by Typhoon Haiyan (2013).  
 
3.6 Challenges in storm surge tools, techniques, and existing gaps 
Technical advancement has certainly improved hurricane forecasting and hind casting 
techniques to a high degree (NHC, n.d.). With the present-day forecasting techniques, 
situations like the 1900 Galveston hurricane which struck the Texas coast without any 
official warnings has been almost diminishing even in developing countries. However, 
certain factors such as hurricane intensity (Seo & Bakkensen, 2017), rapid intensification 
and re-intensification (Nguyen & Molinari, 2012), the size of the storm that influences 
the storm surge (Irish et al., 2008) calculations remain critical.   
Hurricane intensity is one of the biggest challenges for the forecast and monitoring 
agencies like NHC. As the intensity of any hurricane is measured as highest sustained 
wind speed, and this measurement does not include information on storm surge or 
precipitation-based flooding. Both hazards are predominantly hazardous than the primary 
hazard which is the tropical cyclone themselves (Folger, 2018).  
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3.6.1 Traditional Methods 
 
Figure 3.9 Illustration of storm surge measuring methods 
Traditional storm surge measurement includes observations from the tidal station, high 
watermarks and pressure sensors as shown in Figure 3.9 (NHC, 2008). Storm surge 
recordings from tide stations are most accurate information, however, their distribution 
along the coastline is considered uneven (NHC, 2008). Also, the poor adequacy in the 
number of tidal stations limits the real-time validation of storm surges in most vulnerable 
areas. Moreover, majority of these tidal stations were being situated in North America 
and Europe further restricts the broad-scale global assessment of accurate storm surge 
measurement (Wahl, 2017). In line with Wahl’s statement, the Asian countries observed 
with shortage of tidal stations, underlines lack of storm surge measurement implements 
in developing countries.  
Storm surge data has also been recorded using static Global Positioning System (GPS). 
Recording data by this method requires areas with no trees to return the accurate results 
and excluding the tress only compromises the accuracy of such systems and subjected to 
questioning. Although, these data are close to the accuracy they may lead to an 
underestimation or over-estimation of storm surge risks. After every hurricane event, the 
storm surge inundation levels and heights were measured for future reference. During 
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such attempts, possible misinterpretations have and could occur. For instance, wave run-
up or wave height or river flooding may have been captured instead of storm surge.  
Another critical factor which affects storm surges is the cyclone intensity. Although, the 
expected track ‘cone of uncertainty’ (NHC, n.d.) is calculated with possible hurricane 
category, calculating the rapid intensification, or weakening of tropical cyclones remains 
critical still today (Nguyen & Molinari, 2012). The rapid intensification of the storms 
influences storm surge considerably. Understanding the factors that contribute to the 
sudden change in the strength or weakening of cyclones, characteristics of rapid 
intensification and re-intensification are crucial. In general, predicting the accuracy of 
intensification of cyclones and their re-intensification less than 24 hours is much more 
challenging than predicting their path. It is these dynamics which alter the storm surge 
characteristics significantly, yet a large portion of this area is yet to be investigated more 
(Nguyen, 2012; Irish et al., 2008). 
 
3.6.2 Numerical methods 
As discussed previously in Section 3.5, storm surges are currently estimated using the 
computational numerical models such as the SLOSH with 20% accuracy (NHC, n.d.) and 
ADvanced CIRCulation (ADCIRC) models in support of enhancing effective evacuation 
decision-making. Both ADCIRC and SLOSH models are water-surface outputs (Allen et 
al., 2013). Although, the NHC’s SLOSH model simulates 27 basins along the U.S. east 
coast and Gulf coasts, it also has its limitation such as wave impacts, astronomical tide 
data, river flow data which are not fed into these models thereby limiting their accuracy. 
However, this is considered as one of the reliable methods by the NHC in storm surge 
prediction (NHC, n.d.). The ADCIRC model is considered as a better-quality model 
compared to SLOSH, as external factors such as winds, atmospheric pressure, tides, 
circulation of the basin, external terrestrial obstruction, were included within the 
simulation for improved results (Allen et al., 2013). The ADCIRC model greatly benefits 
by providing coordinated outputs from varied factors. However, ADCIRC model also has 
its limitation such as (i) dependency on former outputs for increased accuracy (ii) 
requirement of expert-level knowledge (iii) coordinated outputs of more than one 
modelling applications. In addition to this lack of water-level data in the selected area 
may also influence the accuracy of the results obtained (Allen et al., 2013). 
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Reiterating the discussion in Section 3.5, SLOSH model that has identified impact of the 
worst-case storm surge scenario with a possible category 5 hurricane according to the 
SSWHS, that could affect at least 22 million people and yet some evacuation routes were 
yet not determined. Maine, Massachusetts, New York, and New Hampshire not 
identifying a recommended evacuation routes in case of emergency leaves such 
innovation and its efforts ineffective (Zachry et al., 2015). Moreover, New York and 
Maine did not have their official recommended evacuation routes already-in-place, since 
the landfall of Hurricane Sandy (2012) further highlights lack of implementation of the 
lessons learnt, and poor usage of available resources. It is more likely that these cities 
would endure the same consequences faced during Hurricane Sandy’s in case if the same 
is repeated in the future.   
Satellite altimetry measurements is the more advanced technique used to explore the 
ocean dynamics, and changes in global sea-levels (Cipollini et al., 2017). However, these 
types of data monitoring and measurement that supports the estimation of storm surge are 
still in the development stage and require complex sequence of processing. Contributions 
to enhance and improve the altimeter data in understanding the ocean and the sea-level 
variability are in progress. Although, this is a welcoming effort, could not be considered 
for an immediate adaption and mitigation for storm surges, until fully studied (Cipollini 
et al., 2017).   
 
3.6.3 Saffir-Simpson Wind Hurricane Scale  
Tropical cyclones wind speed and their intensities are generally measured along the 
Saffir-Simpson Wind hurricane Scale (SSWHS) on a scale of 1 to 5. This scale is 
primarily used to estimate the level of property damage that can be caused by a potential 
hurricane (NHC, n.d.). Although, this scale provides the information of sustained winds 
speed, it does not provide any information about the storm surge associated with the 
cyclones (NHC, 2008). For example, a Category 1 hurricane does not disclose the details 
of the equivalent storm surge height or their inundation levels (NHC, 2008).  
According to the National Hurricane Centre (NHC), the SSWHS included the hurricane 
and storm surge inundation levels and later the storm surge inundation height scale was 
removed from the original version (NHC, n.d.). This is due to the exemptions identified 
from various events which do not emphasise the requirement of storm surge scale to be 
correlated with hurricane scale. For instance, Hurricane Charley (2005), a Category 4 
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hurricane from SSWHS produced a storm surge of 6-8 ft (1.8- 2.4 m) and Hurricane Ike 
(2008), a Category 2 hurricane from the same scale produced 20 ft (6.1 m) storm surge 
(NHC, 2008). Although, NHC’s viewpoint on removing the storm surge inundation levels 
was based on its non-correlation with the hurricane scale, the inclusion may rather have 
provided the likelihood of the inundation levels to a certain extent.  
 
AccuWeather, a weather media company remarked that “The current hurricane scale 
does not reflect the real impact of hurricanes” (AccuWeather, 2019). The company 
contributes by maintaining a weather-related database and providing critical information 
on weather-related emergencies. To support the hurricane understanding, the 
AccuWeather RealImpactTM scale for hurricanes was introduced in January 2019. The 
scale categorizes hurricanes on a six-point scale (AccuWeather, 2019). The new scale is 
said to have considered several other factors such as storm surges, flooding rain, high 
winds, total damage, and economic impact from the storm. The scale further remarks that 
SSWHS has categorized the hurricanes primarily based on the wind and does not include 
any factors  (AccuWeather, 2019).  The RI scale highlights how the Category 2 Hurricane 
Sandy would have been rated as RI5 and the how Tropical Storm Allison which did not 
have a hurricane status as per SSWHS would have been rated RI5 based on the additional 
factors (AccuWeather, 2019).  The rating of the new Real Impact hurricane scale 
emphasises on the revision and reconsideration of the SSWHS according to the changing 
hurricane intensity and including additional influencing factors underlining that fact that 
the SSWHS does not wholly comprehend the severity of potential storms.     
 
3.6.4 Return frequency analysis  
Frequency analysis is often conducted to understand the return period of storm surges on 
the coast. Extreme sea levels with a certain probability of occurrence or how often an 
event is expected on average are calculated. This is estimated through an equation, by 
inputting the annual maximum water levels (AMWL) to estimate the likelihoods 
(Paprotny, 2014). This is termed the ‘1% annual chance flood’ i.e., the level that is 
exceeded at this rate at a given point. If this level exceeds once in 100 years, then it is 
called the 100-year flood (FEMA, 2004).  
The return frequency calculations are observed to have drawbacks. The primary drawback 
is that the 1% annual chance flood is not attributed to any specific event. The assumptions 
highlight that the AMWL produced can be from a similar wave or flood producing 
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mechanisms such as a tsunami or a more intense storm located at a far distance can 
produce the same flood levels (Paprotny, 2014; FEMA, 2004). 
 
3.7 Preliminary gaps from stakeholder’s perspective  
3.7.1 Insurance  
Insurance being a key stakeholder in disaster risk management, they play a vital role in 
the response and the recovery phase of DRM during emergencies. The role of isnurance 
is also well-recognised for reuction of future risks. More than insurance pay-outs and 
financial restoration, their contributions by effectively coordinating the flood risk zones 
and possibly assessing the risk by catastrophic risk modelling support the government is 
observed in developed countries (RMS, 2015). In the USA, general home insurance does 
not cover the flood or wind damage created by a tropical cyclone. The 2017 Atlantic 
hurricane season left the country with various insurance related issues, especially during 
Hurricane Harvey. A Dutch-Texan team reported that Hurricane Harvey (2017) had 
flooded areas that were not within FEMA’s mapped high-risk zones and most fatalities 
were recorded in these areas. As these were beyond the flood insurance covered and 
mapped zones, FEMA could not provide disaster aid, and no insurance claims could be 
processed through FEMA’s NFIP (Science Daily, 2018). 
The USA’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is one for the strongest insurance 
providers for natural disasters particularly related to hurricanes and flooding. The NFIP 
which operates under the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) 
mandates all the properties within the Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA’s) must have 
flood insurance (FEMA, 2004). The SFHA is mapped together with the Flood Insurance 
Rate Map (FIRM’s) (Horn & Webel, 2019). FEMA through the NFIP provides the flood 
cover for properties in a 100-year flood plain which is referred by FEMA as Special Flood 
Hazard Area (SFHA) and it is mandatory for the homeowner residing to register under 
this program (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006).  
The insurance pay-out litigation and disputes in flood-insurance post-Hurricane Katrina 
and Hurricane Sandy underline how the insurance sector in developed countries suffers 
potential gap within (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006; 
FEMA, 2017). Especially, Hurricane Sandy experienced significant litigation under the 
Write Your Own (WYO) insurance companies, which was contracted by NFIP under 
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FEMA. It was reported that Sandy’s litigation costs were higher than the actual insured 
losses (FEMA, 2017).  
Standardized insurance programs or policies were either not popular or not being 
commonly practised in few developing countries such as India, China, Philippines, and 
many in least-developed countries such as Haiti, Myanmar, Bangladesh (Ali, 1999) 
whose delta region is highly vulnerable to storm surge hazard. These countries after 
having faced significant cyclone events have not mandated individual flood cover or 
property cover to those residing in coastal flood risk zones (Wallemacq & Below, 2017). 
High population, lack of adopting protocols or procedures in creating stipulated flood 
insurance, illiteracy rates of these developing or underdeveloped countries could be a 
hindering factor in assessing individual property damage and insurance pay-out 
(Wallemacq & Below, 2017; Henson, 2008). Due to these drawbacks, developing and 
under-developed countries were often paid via general national disaster relief funds that 
cover only the basic emergency needs post hurricanes (CRED, 2018). In general, the 
USA’s insurance policies do not appear to have incorporated the future forecasted sea-
level rise ‘the year 2100 scenario’, further escalating gap in policies (FEMA, 2017). 
3.7.2 Construction and housing  
Private housing in most urban areas along the coasts and rivers was identified as most 
vulnerable, facing flood risk-prone future. Especially, the US was identified to have 
settled as multi-dwelling units (MDU) along the eastern shoreline. Figure 3.10 shows the 
most vulnerable cities of the USA and their exposed coastal population. 
 
Figure 3.10 Most vulnerable cities of the USA and their exposed coastal properties [source: Smith & 
R.Katz (2013)] 
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In New York, above 70% of the multi-dwelling units were situated in floodplains and are 
already vulnerable to the 100-year floods1. Moreover, above 90% of those buildings were 
built before 1983, when the city’s first floodplain map was introduced. Some cities which 
have never seen storm surges in the past were also counted as risk zone and expected to 
storm surges in the future due to the increasing sea-level rise.  
This is also due to the change in coastal hydrography in recent years which tends to 
welcome inundation from future surges and the sea-level rise which sets a new baseline 
for storm surges (RMS, 2015; Smith & Katz, 2013).   
3.7.3 Media participation in disasters management 
Technology in media including electronic media (radio, television) or print media 
(newspapers, journals) play a prominent role in the acquisition and dissemination of 
emergency disaster information (Dave, n.d.). With the availability of the possible 
hurricane path or track from the weather prediction centres (NHC, n.d.), media play a 
vital role in creating the attention and significant storm surge awareness amongst the 
public (Dave, n.d.). The recent approaches of emphasizing the damage through before 
and after images, aerial view images and videos of overall damages have certainly 
improved the visualisation of the hazard and their impacts (BBC News, 2012). This also 
helps to visualize the socioeconomic damage and where does the country stand in hazard 
mitigation.   
 In addition to this, the usage of social media pages has changed the way risk is being 
communicated. They equally play a significant role in reaching the donors for funding 
globally (PEJ New Media Index, 2010). On the contrary, they also seem to have their own 
implications such as false news being circulated and spread, old news may still be 
circulating and all these may lead to unnecessary confusions (Wang & Zhuang, 2018). 
Persuasive attention from international media agencies such as BBC, CNN, The 
Guardian, Associated Press, Rigour, The Times were some of the trusted sources of web-
based information which have drawn significant attention regarding the landfalling 
cyclones and their associated hazards (BBC News; Ofcom; Bakamo, 2019). 
Media’s prominence not only ends with the tasks of boosting the awareness but also 
supports the victims by gaining international attention (Dave, n.d.) and drawing requests 
from international humanitarian organization and their participation to instigate further 
 
1 The 100-year flood plain is the area in the plain at risk for the one percent chance of flood.  
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relief funds (Fritz et al., 2009). On the contrary, the media’s interpretation can also lead 
to a deviation from the actual understanding of the problem (Searles, 2016). During 
Hurricane Katrina (2005), the significant socio-economic damage was primarily caused 
from storm surges straining the critical levee system (Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, 2006). Even the USA’s Department of Defence (DOD) relied 
on media for initial reports on the levee breaches in various areas (Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). However, the media’s entire 
attention highlighted in showing the storm hit areas and failed to focus on the federal 
failures. Moreover, the failure of the federal government in decision-making and 
evacuation of an ethnic minority were not highlighted by the local media and were only 
left for criticism (Holliday, 2006).  
According to a study by Five Thirty-Eight’s Dhrumil Mehta, published on 28 September 
2017, it is observed that Hurricane Maria received less media attention relative to the 
previous hurricanes such as the Harvey and Irma which had its landfall in the US 
mainland (Centro, 2018).  The Louisiana floods which occurred in 2016 was a ‘1000-
year-flood-event’ over two days and was officially recorded as the costliest disaster after 
Hurricane Sandy (2012) (Searles, 2016). Although, NOAA’s weather prediction centre 
called it ‘inland sheared tropical depression’, which was less than a tropical depression 
status, a record 24+ inch rainfall was observed across various locations in Louisiana. 
While the world’s media were focusing on the Rio summer Olympics (2016), and the 
national media were focusing on the 2016 US Presidential election. Little or no attention 
was given to the Louisiana floods which shows the priority of communications (Searles, 
2016).  
 
3.8 Global disaster frameworks, protocols, and agreements 
According to Neal (1997) studies on various phases of disasters were originated, since 
the 1930’s. The earliest disaster management cycle as proposed by Baird et al., (1975). 
Theoretical development of disaster research and the frameworks were essential to 
understand and organise the key findings (Neal, 1997).  To address the existing climate-
related risk and in support of future disaster risk reduction, an initial discussion of the 
protocol was held during the 1992 ‘Earth Summit’ and the protocol was finalized in 1997 
(Henson, 2008). The Kyoto Protocol emerged from the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a contribution towards reducing the 
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climate change impact through reduced global warming (UNFCCC, n.d.). The framework 
was designed to stabilize the rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Henson, 2008).  
The USA is one of those industrialized countries whose GHG emissions were also 
identified as high from 1990-2012, denied their ratification and participated merely as an 
observing country. Due to this, there was a delay in the ratification process from the USA, 
which made the initially proposed Kyoto Protocol to be finalised in 1997 and the first 
commitment period started from 2008-2015 (Henson, 2008). Despite being a developed 
country, the USA’s decision to not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol should be observed as a 
‘negligence of participation’ from a stakeholder perspective. This may further lead to a 
non-cooperative behaviour from developing and underdeveloped countries towards a 
future initiation to mitigate climate-related consequences. This further leads to the key 
question on cross-country participation to address the present and future disasters and 
changing risks.  
 
“The starting point for reducing disaster risk… lies in the knowledge of the hazards and 
the physical, social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities ...and of how hazards 
and vulnerabilities are changing in the short and long term, followed by action taken 
based on that knowledge”. 
- Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (UNDP, 2010, p. 1).   
 
In 2005, around 168 countries agreed to adopt a 10-year plan focusing on reducing the 
disaster risk and it is the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) with a goal period from 
2005-2015 (PreventionWeb, n.d.). The framework was aimed at reducing the 
socioeconomic and environmental losses from natural disasters (UNISDR, 2007). Hare 
et al., (2013), highlighted “The HFA prompted considerable progress towards a more 
proactive and holistic approach to DRR. Nonetheless, achievements are patchy across 
regions and unevenly distributed among the five priorities for action”, (p. 23).  
“While the Hyogo Framework for Action is drawing to an end, having spurred some 
progress but unable to stop the rising trend of disaster losses and associated hardships, a 
renewed commitment is needed to drive international efforts in disaster risk reduction” 
(Hare et al., 2013, p. 23). In March 2015, the third UN world conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction (DRR) held in Sendai, Japan. The framework is called the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) (Mysiak et al., 2016). This framework is the 
successor of the previous Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). The SFDRR was aimed 
to insist the countries to develop plans for existing and new disasters through a strong 
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commitment from participating countries. The aim of the framework is to achieve the 
seven global targets through four main priorities (United Nations, 2015). Although, the 
SFDRR is a successor of the HFA it under-utilizes the lessons learnt from HFA’s and 
rather it proposes a new set of targets and priorities (Oxley, 2015). One of the primary 
limitations of these frameworks is their non-binding agreement, which does not mandate 
the participating countries to implement the Priorities for Action (PFA) instead, it 
encourages voluntary implementation. Issues in implementing the DRR starts at this point 
where the priority is shifted from ‘mandatory’ to ‘voluntary’. The other major drawback 
of these frameworks or approaches considered by the author is the ‘time’ and the hazards 
are imprecise or generalized approach to disaster risk reduction. Hazards such as climate 
change and sea-level rise take its course over a period, these frameworks are more suitable 
for the long-term hazards whose effects are not imminent and certainly inadequate for 
short term hazards. 
Although, these global frameworks have certain disadvantages, the step to mitigate the 
DRM and DRR issues and achieving progress is very important. Every step-change in 
disaster risk reduction either becomes fundamental towards a successful future adaptation 
and resilience or predecessor of future DRR frameworks. Despite the availability of 
various international protocols, frameworks, and federated emergency management 
plans, the limitation of these global frameworks may provide insights into the future 
possible lessons learnt of the existing lessons learnt.  
3.9 The Call for an action to mitigate storm surge 
The IPCC in its annual report 5 (AR5) has stated that for a 2 degree Celsius of global 
warming the following impacts were observed: 
• Sea level rise, 
• The intensity of the tropical cyclone with a likely increase of 1-10%, 
• The proportion of tropical cyclone with Category 4-5 will increase likely most 
likely.   
The Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (2019) emphasises the relationship of the 
increase in the intensity of hurricanes with the observation issued by the IPCC AR5. 
According to Bhatta (2010), the increase in urban development within coastal zones has 
increased the vulnerability and risk of exposure to coastal hazards. Sea level rise (SLR) 
is one of the direct consequences of climate change impacts and can alter the current and 
future storm surge hazard significantly (Wahl, 2017). NASA (2018) highlights the rising 
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Figure 3.11 Satellite sea level observations from 1993- Q1 2019 [source: NASA (2018)] 
The consequences from rising sea levels were not expected to be imminent rather, their 
increase will be gradual over a period. However, the gradual increase is projected to act 
as an ‘elevated base’ for extreme sea levels such as storm surges (Wahl, 2017). A further 
detailed discussion of the relationship between sea-level rise and storm surge is 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
As highlighted by the (IPCC, 2015), the global warming contributes to ocean warming 
which further leads to the formation of tropical depressions and into hurricanes. Henson 
(2008, p. 145) stated that “warm ocean waters help give birth to tropical cyclones and 
provide the fuel they need to grow”. The formation of a tropical depression in the warm 
ocean has more likelihood to be developed as a tropical storm thereby developing into a 
potential tropical cyclone (Henson, 2011).  
The third most important factor is the increasing frequency of tropical cyclones. The 
recent Atlantic cyclones from 2016 to 2018 which includes storms such as Hurricanes 
Matthew (2016), Harvey, Irma, Maria (2017), Florence, Michael (2018) are notable 
events in the US hurricane history, particularly the year 2017 which involved a ‘cluster 
of storms’ (Faust & Boce, 2017). Figure 3.12 shows the socioeconomic damage of past 
significant events and their corresponding variations between economic damage and 
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casualties. Figure 3.12 is compiled using the cyclone reports available from official 
government websites.  
 
Figure 3.12 Socioeconomic damage of past significant events 
The awareness of the storm surge impacts could also be understood from the point that, 
the adaptive capacity to disasters of the developing countries is comparatively less than 
the developed countries. All these storms which occurred in the Atlantic Ocean were 
major Category 3 and above storms with hurricane-force winds greater than 115 mph in 
SSWHS. The observation of recent hurricanes from 2016 to 2019 reveals the increase in 
the intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones.  
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Figure 3.13 shows the relationship between ocean warming, increasing sea-levels and 
tropical cyclones how they directly and indirectly result in bringing storm surge hazard. 
With a clear indication of various direct and indirect triggers of storm surge hazard, it is 
important to highlight that globally 2.4 billion people live within 100 km of the coastline 
and over 600 million people live within less than 10m above sea level (UNISDR, 2017).  
Significant weather events such as the Bathurst Bay Cyclone,1899 (Australia), the 1900 
Galveston (USA), the 1953 Bristol storm surge (UK), the 1970 cyclone Bhola (India), to 
the 2019 cyclone Idai (Mozambique), emphasises on how storm surges are a constant 
hazard and their potential to occur in any of the tropical ocean basins. Also, the loss of 
8,000 lives from the 1900 Galveston (NHC, 2008); 300,000 lives from the 1970 cyclone 
Bhola; 140,000 lives from the cyclone Nargis (Guha-Sapir, 2018) and 6,000 lives lost 
from typhoon Haiyan (Hernandez et al., 2015) indicate the severity of storm surge hazard. 
These events also prove how a storm surge (single event) can produce significant damage 
to coastal communities and infrastructure thereby directly impacting a country’s 
socioeconomic growth.  
It is also equally important to understand the changing risk from a tropical cyclone, and 
sea-level rise on storm surges as storm surges have a greater impact than the tropical 
cyclone or sea-level rise. An interconnected global approach is required to address the 
problem for the long-term. It is also essential to reassess the risks, changing risks, and 
vulnerabilities to develop innovative approaches, emphasizing adaptation and resilience 
with continuous development as a key priority (Wilson & Fischetti, 2010). 
3.10 The requirement of a framework approach to mitigate storm surge hazard 
According to Horn (2015), the physical causes of storm surges are well-known, and the 
models are increasingly effective in storm surge prediction associated with certain 
cyclone conditions. Despite this, the loss of life from storm surges remains critical. The 
reason for this being inadequate mitigation actions to reduce storm surge severity and 
adaptive capacity to storm surge risks (Ellis & Sherman, 2015). The continuous migration 
of people and coastal investments within LECZ’s or cyclone-prone zones not only 
amplifies the vulnerability and risk of exposure but, also necessitates continuous 
monitoring and reassessment of risk (Bathi & Das, 2016). This instigates the continuity 
of research addressing increasing coastal extremities and analysis of strategies to mitigate 
future disaster risk.  
The identification of the preliminary gaps in storm surge measurement within the current 
approaches, modelling techniques and with the uncertainty around the hurricane 
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intensities amplifies the underlying storm surge risk from the tropical cyclone. It is 
important ‘to know’ what is being done in the past and present to determine what ‘to do’ 
for the future, and to fix the gap (Peffer & Sutton, 1999). It is, necessary to understand 
the key factors affecting vulnerability assessment, resilience, and adaptive measurements 
for re-assessment of existing technology and new findings. Assessing risk of a country to 
increase the adaptive capabilities and resiliency to EWE’s is strategically important not 
only to a country’s government but also to all the stakeholders involved.  
The discussion and review of the identified gaps in the Chapters 2 and 3, not only 
highlight the gaps but also underline the critical importance of storm surge and the need 
to develop a fully operational framework to help mitigate storm surge within low elevated 
coastal zones (LECZ’s). Being technically robust is not sufficient for the future adaptation 
and mitigation in the face of the predicted increase in sea-levels, extreme weather events 
and change in climatic conditions. 
3.11 Summary 
This chapter has explored previous publications, reports, approaches and media 
communications to understand the current background and approaches to understanding 
the importance and significance of storm surge. The findings from the previous papers 
such as by Bouwer & Jonkman (2018) and Rappaport (2014) have limitations and 
exclusions. Understanding the importance of storm surge is increasing following post-
disaster reviews from Katrina and Sandy which have illustrated its significance. The 
literature review has identified a lack of data, reports, and publications in the subject field, 
especially in developing countries. The increased adaptive capacities observed in 
developed countries and their approaches may not be adaptable in the same way by the 
developing countries due to its limitations in resources and economic capacity. This 
chapter also identified gaps in the mitigation approaches and understandings of existing 
approaches and the requirement to create public awareness in all countries (with low 
elevated coastal zones) addressing the effects and the influences of storm surge. To fulfil 
these identified gaps and raise awareness, a non-structural or a non-engineered solution 
that is cost-efficient and cost-effective is considered. Such a solution only leads to a 
framework approach which can support the government and the communities for a long-
term to mitigate and adapt to these hazards.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodology underpinning the research, 
explaining the philosophies, strategies, analysis techniques and the procedures used to 
justify the research methodology and choices of methods adopted.  
4.1 Research purpose: introduction 
Creswell (2009) claims that qualitative research is a way of exploring and understanding 
the research problem. To retain the logic throughout this study, investigate and understand 
the research problem in-depth, this research follows the qualitative research design. 
According to Yin (2003), a case study research design has the potential to link the 
collected data to the research questions. In this research, case study methodology is 
applied to explore individual events because each disaster event includes a lot of 
parameters (key activities), that will allow us to understand the meaning, differences, and 
various aspects of the event. Among the three approaches, namely, explanatory, 
descriptive and exploratory qualitative research designs (Yin, 2003) this research deploys 
exploratory approach. The exploratory design operates with the need to familiarize the 
basic facts and concerns around the subject, formulating the research questions, and 
generating hypotheses. Following which the practicality of conducting the research is 
studied, and finally, the strategies for current and future data collection were determined 
and developed (Neuman, 2014). The choice of descriptive design provides an option to 
integrate various components logically where necessary thereby the research problems 
and questions are effectively addressed Mason (2002). Because the study revolves around 
a contemporary set of events, sandwiched choice of exploratory (majorly applied) and 
descriptive (selectively applied) research design approaches were considered.  
4.2 Research design and methods 
According to Neuman (2014), case studies are pervasive in providing in-depth knowledge 
and expands the understanding of the subject within social research set-up. Bryman 
(2012) stated that case studies provide a detailed and intensive analysis of a single event. 
Patton (2002) also suggests that case studies are an alternative method, that allows 
connecting with the decisions made in day-to-day life. This research incorporates study 
methodology to create coherence to the research subject and utilised the advantages listed 
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by Patton (2002), Bryman (2012) and Neuman (2014).  While highlighting the importance 
of case studies, Neuman (2014) also says that case studies can be criticised for not 
yielding a guaranteed result unlike an experimental or a quasi-experimental research. As 
per Yin (2014), different research methods can provide different insights into research. 
Furthermore, his statement details that in certain cases, the insights are the key to 
exploring the research and need not necessarily guarantee a result. This research primarily 
adapts the social science investigation for which case studies are considered appropriate 
to understand the subject of study and how it impacts the society. For instance, Scriven 
(2009), says that the astronomy in natural science does not rely on the experimental 
method. This suggests that different research methods fill different requirements for 
investigation. However, a simple rule of thumb is that the strengths and limitations of the 
research method should complement the research such that a potential outcome is attained 
(Bryman, 2012).  
Table 4.1 Qualitative vs Quantitative research design [source: Neuman (2014) & Bryman (2012)] 
Approach Inductive deductive 
Goal Generate hypotheses Test hypotheses 
Setting Natural Experimental/quasi-experimental 
Sampling Purposive probabilistic 
Data Words Statistics 
Data collection Natural and rich Shallow and broad 
Analysis Iterative interpretation Statistical tests 
Epistemology Interpretivism Positivism 
Ontology Constructivism Objectivism 
Value Personal involvement Detached involvement 
 
Neuman (2014), states that qualitative methods are to be understood in contrast to a 
quantitative method and for this research, the qualitative method is considered as ‘data-
enhancers’. Key aspects of cases can be more clearly seen when data are enhanced. Table 
4.1 was adapted from Neuman’s and Bryman’s qualitative versus quantitative research 
design to show the different approaches and their corresponding techniques, where 
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appropriate, which fits this research method. The research emphasises more on the 
qualitative perspective to view the enhanced data to elevate the research and its scope of 
study in the subject field.  
4.3 Research philosophy  
According to Saunders et al., (2009), both qualitative and quantitative methods may 
utilize the research philosophies with the appropriate research paradigms to understand 
the research-development and for developing knowledge in the field of study.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Relationship between research philosophies [source: Neuman (2014)] 
The choice of research philosophy through their assumptions will guide the research 
underpinning the research strategy, the questions of methods, and how the collected data 
might answer the research questions (Saunders et al., 2009). Figure 4.1 shows the 
relationship between the different approaches and their assumptions in research 
philosophies and how they are influenced by practical considerations to a certain degree. 
Epistemology, ontology, and axiology are the three main ways of thinking about research 
philosophies Neuman (2014). Epistemology is, the factor considered as acceptable 
knowledge in the field of study (Bryman, 2012). Ontology is the way the nature of reality 
is considered (Saunders et al., 2009).  
According to Bryman (2012), the research process in social science set-up is greatly 
influenced by the assumptions and the research view that is to be conducted. It is these 
assumptions that allows the researcher to determine the possibilities and generate a 
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Positivism, interpretivism and realism are the three main epistemological approaches. 
Realism is further classified as direct and critical realism (Bryman, 2012). This research 
embraced ‘positivism’ to develop the knowledge in the subject while applying the 
methods of natural science to study social reality. Furthermore, the study adopted 
‘interpretivism’ when observing the social action of the individual i.e., understanding 
from the participant perspective. According to Neuman (2014), although, objectivism and 
subjectivism are the two common ontological approaches. Subjectivism can also be used 
as constructivism, which emphasises the nature of knowledge and their categories that 
are subject to constant revision or construction by their participants or social actors. This 
study embraced constructivism in the place of subjectivism to revise the subject 
constantly.   
The following epistemological assumptions which were considered for this research to 
determine the research possibilities and to generate a meaningful knowledge: 
• What are the possibilities to be studied to further understand storm surge 
phenomenon to adapt the best practices in disaster risk reduction? 
• How a meaningful knowledge can be generated from the theoretical design of 
storm surge framework?  
In line with Patton’s statement that the epistemology and the ontology were designed in 
a way such that it justifies each other while maintaining harmony with axiology and 
defining the achievable, and this research follows the same strategy.  
4.4 Theory development 
Hamel et al., (1993) claimed that all social science research is expected to have a baseline 
theory and a theory validation of the study against the original propositions. According 
to Eisenhardt (1989), research is a process which can be based on theory development or 
a theory-testing process. Creswell (2009) claimed that theory within research is an 
‘orienting lens’ that shapes the research questions informing how the research data should 
be collected and analysed towards the development of an action or change. Although, all 
these statements imply the importance of theory in research, these statements are very 
much applicable for quantitative approach and need not necessarily be followed by a 
qualitative research.   
Yin (2003) argues that it is essential to strengthen the research design which is even more 
critical when conducting a case study research to determine what is being studied and 
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what is to be studied. According to Bryman (2012), a deductive theory as shown in Figure 
4.2 in which the theory guides the research, and an ‘inductive theory’ is the bottom-up 







Locke (2007) references how Sir Isaac Newton rationally used the inductive theory by 
explaining how all the previously prevailing theory of white lights were false, but only as 
a by-product of showing his experiment on white lights. In other words, Newton proposed 
his findings and observations by proposing a new theory of white lights. This bottom-up 
approach is called an inductive theory. The reference of Sir Isaac Newton suggests the 
relation between the theory and research is carried out by obtaining the theory (if any) as 
an outcome of the research. 
According to Charmaz (2006), except for occasional studies, quantified theories were 
generally preferred before Glaser and Strauss (1967). Qualitative research and theories 
were relegated and were considered only as a precursor to rigorous quantitative research 
(Charmaz, 2006). It is Glaser and Strauss (1967) who argued how qualitative research 
could be viewed as science on its own and capable to generate theories and highlighted 
how theory and research can be two different pursuits Charmaz (2006). Creswell (2009) 
also reflected his thoughts that the process of qualitative research largely follows the 
inductive theory in which the researcher or inquirer tries to generate the meaning from 
the data collected in the field of study. Reflecting on Charmaz (2006) views about Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) that research and theory could be two different pursuits and research 
need not necessarily generate a theory, this exploratory research focuses on the research 
part as science on its own. Also, by following Locke’s reference of Newton’s approach, 
and Creswell (2009) this research will take up inductive approach with a literature search 
and data collection or observations available in the related topic as a foundation to explore 
if a theory is possible at the end of the research. 
 





subject and finding 
Deductive 
        Inductive 
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To elaborate this, the implementation of storm surge framework within DRM would 
require data around existing early warning systems, emergency communication, 
infrastructure adapted accordingly. The initial reflections were given as the potential gaps 
within the current disaster risk governance in different countries was highlighted in 
Chapter 2, Literature review. According to Yin (2014), generalization from case studies 
supports in the cross-case analysis. The reflection from the literature review, 
generalizations from case studies, findings from the cross-case analysis is expected to 
allow the researcher to identify if a theory is possible (Walker & Myrick, 2006).  
4.5 Multiple case study design 
Multiple-case studies are considered for this research. According to Bryman (2012), a 
single case study analysis although, could be effective in a different set-up, could provide 
a tunnelled vision in this research. Yin (2003) also states that multiple cases strengthen 
the findings from more than one case study. Therefore, the advantages of a multiple case 
study design are adopted for this research. Figure 4.3 shows the flow of multiple case 
study design.  
 
Figure 4.3 Multiple case study designs adapted from Yin (2014) 
To highlight the seriousness of storm surge, it is essential to derive the output from a 
sequence of specific major storm surge events. Each case has its own set of information 
but consists of significant evidence of their effectiveness from storm surge damage, but 
also widely varied in their focus. This is mainly due to the different protocols such as the 
early warning systems, emergency communication, and evacuation techniques varies for 
country-to-country. Furthermore, multiple-case studies could provide a broadened vision 
to the series of events discussed (Yin, 2014). The rationale for a multiple-case study is to 
cover different cases which could be useful to draw a collective conclusion during the 
cross-case analysis. Therefore, multiple-case studies were considered as a suitable choice 
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to gain the benefit of collective conclusion from various situations. The choice of multiple 
case studies also gave the convenience of generalizing different outcome from various 
cases and compare the same factor under different conditions, which provided in-depth 
understanding benefiting from the perspective of comparative advantage. This approach 
is ‘analytic generalization’ (Yin, 2003).  
4.6 Initial population and sampling process 
Unlike quantitative experiments, the ‘sampling’ process in qualitative research is not done 
with numbers and therefore, sampling in qualitative experiments is not straightforward. 
Furthermore, qualitative research needs a careful choice of sampling from the research 
population (Mason, 2002). This research mainly considered storm surges as primary 
focus, though they are the secondary hazard which cause more damage than the tropical 
cyclones, the primary hazard (Smith & Katz, 2013). All the ‘cyclone triggered storm 
surge events’ which had significant socioeconomic damage is the total research 
population. Sampling in this research is the process of selection of the ‘case to be studied’ 
further. According to Patton (2002) a purposive or purposeful (non-probability based) 
sampling is when a case or cases that are either selective or subjective to information-rich 
where possible or most effective where resources are limited or scarce. The sampling is 
done based on the choice of disaster events from different countries which are significant 
storm surge events. Creswell (2009) states that ‘representative sample’ which is a sample 
preferred more likely over another sample simply because, the preferred sample is a 
representative of the other similar sample. Such strategy stated by Creswell (2009) is also 
used in this research to choose the best-of-all sample from the total research population.  
Appendix A includes the initial research population which includes list of tropical cyclone 
events across the Atlantic, Pacific and the Indian Ocean and details of profiled countries 
from which the following sampling criteria are applied to choose the required cases for 
this study.   
- The first criterion is to identify the significant tropical cyclone-triggered-storm 
surge events from total tropical cyclone events (as highlighted in Chapter 2, not 
all tropical cyclones triggers storm surges). In other words, water-driven events 
were selected as a sample over an entirely wind-driven event. In some cases, both 
water and wind-driven were considered where the damage from the event is 
primarily from the water-driven event. For example, Hurricane Harvey (2017) 
was the second costliest tropical cyclone in the US history (NHC, n.d.). Though 
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this is a significant event and triggered a 10 ft (3 m) storm surge, the primary 
damage was mainly due to heavy rainfall up to 60.58 inches and not due to the 
storm surge (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018). Therefore, this event is not considered for 
the case study. 
- The second criterion is the time frame. The chosen sample should fall within the 
sampling time frame i.e., the tropical cyclone-triggered-storm surge event should 
have taken place or occurred between 2000 and 2017. This filter is applied with a 
notion to see the change in disaster management strategies and their adaptation 
over the given period. For instance, significant events which occurred before the 
year 2000, such as the 1953 North Sea great storm surge, 1970 cyclone Bhola, 
1900 Galveston hurricanes were not included within the research population.  
- The third criterion is the technique of filtering of the research sample based on 
being a representative case. The filtered sample is not necessarily an extreme or 
unique event rather it is filtered because it is an epitome of a broader category. 
For example, in the year 2017 Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, Jose were all 
significant events of the year. However, one significant event (in this research 
Hurricane Maria is chosen) which is a representative case over other similar 
events. 
- The fourth criterion is to rely on choosing the ‘most suitable case’ which could 
provide and serve in achieving the research objectives.  
Once the sampling is carried out, the cases chosen for the study have one factor in 
common which is all the samples are tropical-cyclone-triggered storm surge events. 
Additional factors that are considered during the sampling process particularly on the 
fourth criterion which is the choice of ‘most suitable case’ is the hazard, vulnerability and 
risk are considered as shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 Selection criteria of ‘most suitable cases’ for study 
Hazard
•Storm surge triggered 








•Slow recovery from 
impact
Risk
•Low capacity to resist
•Low income countries
•Developing countries 
with low coastal 
investment 
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According to the UNDRR terminology, a hazard means a process, phenomenon or human 
activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social 
and economic disruption, or environmental degradation. A country may even be subjected 
to multi-hazard situations i.e., cascaded, or cumulative hazardous events may occur 
simultaneously or sequentially (PreventionWeb, 2017). However, in this research hazard 
is typically tropical cyclone-triggered-storm surge event. Vulnerability is the 
susceptibility of an individual, a community asset, or systems to the impact of hazard 
(PreventionWeb, 2017). Country profiling is carried out from the research sampling. 
While carrying out the sampling, countries were profiled based on the selected case 
studies, and not vice versa.  
The sampled case studies were further filtered based on their hazard, vulnerability, and 
risk exposure. The risk of exposure also considers population, economic costs of coastal 
assets and infrastructures exposed to storm surge hazard. Final criteria for the choice of 
case studies rely on the socioeconomic impact created by the hazard. The adaptive 
capacity of the country was also included while considering the vulnerability. For 
instance, the capability of a developing country (e.g., The Philippines) will vary with the 
capability of a developed country (e.g., The USA). The choice of considering different 
events from different countries provided further support during the cross-case analysis 
and further comparisons.   
4.7 Identifying the causes and designing the case study   
Yin (2014) says that a unit of analysis is defined as a major entity that is analysed in 
research which provides a boundary for the research. For this study, the unit of analysis 
is the ‘events’ which are catastrophic storm surge events triggered by tropical cyclones 
or hurricanes or typhoons. Variations in case studies were considered during cross-case 
analysis to derive the required outcome (Yin & Davis, 2007). According to Yin (2014) a 
case study research includes five components which are (i) a case study question (ii) the 
plan (iii) unit analysis (iv) the link between the data to the plan and (v) interpretation of 
the findings.  
Although, the cases were not explicitly grouped, the cases were chosen to study the 
response of a developed, developing and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to storm 
surge events which occurred between 2005 and 2017. Each significant events and case 
study chapters are supported by facts and figures. Each case studies indicates the various 
phases of disaster risk management implemented by the country, and the country’s 
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resilience measure taken post-event as an adaptation for future storm surge scenario. The 
following sub-criteria permitted the researcher to refine the sampling further narrowing 
down to the actual case study events. Those sub-criteria were as follows: 
• significant death rate because of the event 
• significant economic damage cost by the event 
• Failure of national or regional governance pre-event, during and post-event 
Table 4.2 shows the list of case study events chosen for study after applying sampling 
from the total research population.  
Table 4.2 Selection of case studies after sampling 
 
 
4.8 Pilot case study  
From the sampled case studies, as shown in Table 4.2, a single case is chosen as a ‘pilot-
case’ is further chosen to determine the structure of the case. The chosen pilot-case is 
information-rich, allowing the researcher to design the case study structure and its 
Event Year Location Selection criteria 
Hurricane 
Katrina 
2005 USA • 1,800 Loss of lives  
• economic damage worth US$ 160 billion 
• failure of the levee system, infrastructure  
Cyclone Nargis 2008 Myanmar • 140,000 deaths  
• failure of disaster governance 
Hurricane Sandy 2012 USA • economic damage (Closure of New York 





• 6,900 significant death, lack of storm 
communication, early warning system 
• failure of disaster governance 
Hurricane 
Matthew 
2016 Haiti • 1,000 significant death, lack of 
 communication 
• failure of governance 
Hurricane Maria 2017 Puerto Rico • 2,900 deaths 
• Power outage for more than 7 months 
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protocol to be applied for the remaining cases. The protocol developed for the pilot-case 
with variable and themes is applied in a similar format for all the remaining case studies. 
Yin (2014) states that, when the same structure is followed for all the other cases, then 
this supports the cross-case syntheses with an opportunity of a comparing or even in some 
cases, possible pattern-matching. In this research, ‘Hurricane Katrina’ is chosen as pilot-
case. This is because of the chronological year of occurrence is 2005, therefore, the event 
is an information-rich case in comparison with the other recent cases. This step was 
greatly beneficial in designing the structure of the case and further supporting the case 
study analysis, reporting and even during interpretation.  
4.9 Case study structure 
Every case study in this research followed identical structure so that similarities and 
differences across the case study events which took place in a different period are 
observed.  By following a structure, the process of identifying the similarities and 
differences further supported during the cross-case analysis and generalisation from the 
analysis and the findings.  The following case structure was adapted:  
1. Origin and background of the case: this section describes the synopsis of the 
tropical cyclone’s origin, landfall details, forecasted track, and timeline with key 
changes in the cyclone’s structure.  
2. The disaster phases of the case x: this section demonstrates the four main phases 
of the disaster management cycle.  
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Figure 4.5 is a typical disaster management cycle with the four main phases adapted 
according to the earliest version of disaster management cycle proposed by Baird et al., 
(1975) which was revised by Neal in 1997.  The four main phases of a typical disaster 
management cycle are (i) Phase 1: Preparedness (ii) Phase 2- Response (iii) Phase 3- 
Recovery (iv) Phase 4- Mitigation. A colour coded scheme is used as shown in Table 4.3 
to differentiate each key theme.  
  Table 4.3 Key themes and their colour code 










Within each disaster phase, their corresponding list of key activities as shown in Figure 
4.6 is identified both through coding search in the documents using Atlas.ti software and 
using the case study discussion. A possible set of predefined activities corresponding to 
the four phases of the disaster management cycle were listed in Figure 4.6. 
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The list of key activities corresponding to their disaster management phases was compiled 
using the case study events, data collected from various sources listed in Table 4.4. This 
process of filtering the key activities helped in reducing the deviated or raw data related 
to the documents.  
3. Summary of key activities: The list of key activities observed in the four main 
phases of the DRM cycle are summarized based on the activities achieved or 
unachieved. 
4. Physical damage and loss statistics: the overall losses and damages incurred from 
both the hurricanes cyclonic winds and storm surge flooding are discussed under 
this section.  
5. Impact of storm surge: the effects and influences of the storm surge identified 
during the event occurrence are discussed in this section.  
6. Adaptive measures taken post-event. 
The above-mentioned structure is followed for all the six cases to maintain consistency 
and homogeneity. According to Scriven (2009), applying uniformity in structure, for all 
the cases, supports the identification of variations and commonalities which is also 
applied to the case studies.  
4.9.1 Data collection techniques (Sources of evidence) 
The research principally relied on the secondary data. Bryman (2012) claims that, the 
cost, time, and quality of the data are the prime benefits of secondary data. In addition to 
the benefit of secondary data illustrated by Bryman (2012) the advantage of using various 
sources of evidence is considered as a major strength of case study data collection and 
the same is followed in this research.   
Yin (2014) outlines that data collected for any research follows four basic principles.  
Principle 1: Pre-requisite for using multiple sources of evidence  
Principle 2: Create a case study database. 
Principle 3: Maintain a chain of evidence 
Principle 4: Exercise care when using data from electronic sources 
This research incorporates the four principles and the data for the research is collected 
through the following resources.  
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• Source 1: archived governmental documents and records  
Reliable data is collected mainly from the government websites such as the federal, state, 
and local governments, were retrieved from their database, and from the document 
sections. Table 4.4. shows some of the government websites accessed for data collection.  
Table 4.4 List of government websites used for secondary data collection. 
Country Government website 
USA National Weather Service (NWS), National Hurricane Centre 
(NHC), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
The Philippines The Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical 
Services Administration (PAGASA) 
Haiti Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency 
(CDEMA) 
 
Government documents were considered as an unobtrusive stable document and for broad 
coverage of the disaster for longer years particularly for disaster, events as the data are 
continuously reviewed and updated. Tropical cyclone report, case study reports were 
considered as a prime source of governmental documents.  
In addition to the reports, emergency evacuation advisories, declaration of emergencies 
were also considered. Maps, before and after images, cyclone tracks and paths, hurricanes 
and storm surge watch-warnings, and all other emergency communication listed in the 
government websites were considered as the support source of evidence. Some 
government websites consist of disaster data however these data were available only in 
regional language which is one of the limitations within archived documents.  
• Source 2: organizational reports  
Individual reports of events, risk assessment reports, case studies observed by NGO’s and 
private organisations, participant-observations and surveys from private, public, and non-
profit organisations were also considered as a source of evidence to build the case studies. 
Special reports such as surveys, focus groups collected by NGO’s were also used as 
secondary data for this research to develop rigorous cases. Neuman (2014) remarks that 
the ‘quality of data is high’ in archived documents and provides a peer-reviewed style 
when used as a secondary data set. This is also reflected by Bryman (2012), who claims 
that company reports, documentation and archived records were the effective sources to 
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develop the case study data. In this study, these types of reports and archived records were 
considered as quality and verified sources of evidence reflecting the key points stated by 
Bryman (2012) and Neuman (2014).  
• Source 3: media sources  
During the occurrence of natural disasters, media plays a critical role in spreading the 
communication from authorities and emergency responders to local communities. 
Various media sources include news articles, photographs, before and after pictures, 
observations, interviews, and documentaries (Bryman, 2012). Online news from verified 
websites, are chosen as one of the sources of evidence for this research. Media broadcasts 
of catastrophic events, and their related articles have served as a link to objectify the event 
during the time of occurrence versus the government observed data (Newman, 2011).  
- BBC 
- Associated Press 
- The Economist 
- NPR (National Public Radio) 
- Reuters 
- The Wall Street Journal 
Data relevant to case studies were carefully filtered using one or all the online sources 
where applicable. 
• Source 4: Data from an electronic source  
According to Yin (2014), using data from social media and other open sources falls within 
the sources of evidence. He further claims that for some case studies the actual subject of 
study may even be an electronic source itself. As the acceptance of electronic source 
provided the liberty, this research considered a broad array of electronic sources. This 
includes contemporary electronic media, archived open-source documents of previous 
studies, reports, thesis, research, verified websites and web pages as electronic source of 
data collection. 
Once various sources of case study data are collected, before proceeding, all the data were 
categorized and grouped for further cross-checking. For this, the case study protocol and 
annotated bibliography were carried out. When the collected sources are within the case 
study protocol and set limits, the final step of ‘convergence’ is carried. Because case study 
data encourages the usage of multiple sources of evidence, the case is now supported by 
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more than a single source of evidence. The rationale for triangulation is that converging 
multiple sources of evidence which may lead to a unified conclusion from more than a 
single source (Bryman, 2012). It is to be noted that, when such multiple sources were 
analysed separately as a single source of evidence then the conclusion is not unanimous. 
Rather, it is the conclusion of separate sources denoting that no triangulation is carried 
out (Yin, 2014).   
During data collection, access to data was limited in some situations. For instance, few 
government documents were in regional languages and no translated scripts were 
available to extract data. Also, collecting the same set of data that is required for all the 
cases was challenging as they have been also subject to changes and limitation. As such 
this this was observed as a limitation. Lack of disaster data may be a major limitation not 
just for data collection, but this may further pave way for underestimation or 
overestimation, of the underlying actual risk from storm surges. Therefore, in situations 
where no data is available, related data is considered i.e., ‘some data’ is better than ‘no 
data’ (Neuman, 2014).  
 
4.9.2 Data analysis of case study evidence  
Detailed analysis is discussed in Chapter 8, which examines the multiple case studies 
through the cross-case analysis to draw further conclusions. In this part, the secondary 
data is analysed using qualitative analysis techniques to effectively address the initial 
proposition of the research. The preliminary findings from the literature review that led 
to the identification of gaps further led to the proposition of inductive theoretical 
approach.  Taking this approach on account, the data collection related to storm surge, 
focusing on case study data was carried out. Following the design of the case studies, the 
cross-case analysis is aimed to support the development of the DAMSS framework 
working on the case study data from ‘bottom-up’. The analysis and interpretation of the 
data highlights on the implications that if a framework is not in place within DRR or 
DRM to address the future storm surge hazard. 
The most important analytic technique utilized is ‘cross-case synthesis’. According to 
Bryman (2012), multiple cases aid in comparative advantage and convergence of 
individual case study leading to the conclusion. Similarly, in this research, the display of 
data collected from each case study according to the same uniform activities lead to the 
comparison of individual processes. This further enabled the study, to draw cross-case 
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conclusions about the events and their possible outcomes. At this stage, the analysis 
probed whether different countries adopted the same approach in addressing the 
emergencies highlighting the similarities and differences. Such observation raised the 
understanding of the ‘typology’ of individual cases, which was insightful. This approach 
allowed the research to cover issues on a broader perspective (Yin, 2003).  
Repeated observation of same variables was an additional opportunity to the cross-
sectional analysis in support of yielding the expected outcome. That is during the cross-
case different events with the same characteristics over the period is analysed. As claimed 
by Hamel et al., (1993) the iterative nature of these two techniques for each case provided 
an opportunity to identify if there is any possible pattern by comparing the cases.  
 
4.9.3 Coding  
Coding is used as a part of this research analysis process and Atlas.ti (version 8) software 
is applied for a web-based qualitative data analysis experience. The software is equipped 
with the search tool that allowed systematic keyword search. The Coding (by activity) 
provided the opportunity to identify keywords or phrases which have appeared within 
storm reports, and other media to visualise and understand the modus operandi of how 
they operated and communicated information to communities and residents.  
The following actions were carried out in determining the coding:  
- Taking the DRM cycle as shown in Figure 4.5, a possible collection of key 
activity which is grouped under the four colour coded key themes as shown 
in Table 4.3 is identified. Each key activity identified from multiple data 
sources is coding. The identified set of key activities need not necessarily be 
the action that is carried out under four key themes. However, they are 
identified in many of the actions executed in these four phases within a 
typical DRM cycle.  
- Around 300 documents were run with the keyword (key activity) search.  In 
a situation, where the corresponding key activity is not identified in the 
document an alternative close-to-accurate keyword (by activity) is used for 
information searching from the data sources.  
-  Each identified key activity is assigned as coding and once all the possible 
coding was identified, they were grouped using ‘code group’ option available 
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in Atlas.ti (Refer Appendix C which shows how multiple codes were 
grouped under a key theme’.  
Therefore, in further chapters when the term ‘coding’ is used it refers to a single activity 
listed in Figure 4.6. Furthermore, to the existing list of codes (activity), additional codes 
were also included for few cases. This action is apparent where the code is relevant and 
supported during the designing of the framework. A sample code report and key functions 
of the how the coding (key activities) identified during the cases in all the source 
documents and how it is utilised for this research is separately shown in Appendix C.  
4.10 Data Interpretation  
Interpretation of data means reporting the case study, its results, and the findings to 
closure. According to Yin (2014) reporting the case studies indirectly supports the process 
of creating a communication between the case studies. The case studies were reported in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7. All the cases were reported, to create communication within and 
across the cases. Reporting the case studies supported data interpretation by 
communicating research-centred information about the phenomenon. In this case storm 
surge awareness, their disaster risk governance, adaptation, and mitigation strategies 
followed in different countries were cross communicated. In addition to this, the coding 
also supported during the data interpretation, not by directly suggesting the interpretations 
but by developing the interpretation using extrapolated information without losing the 
data to be interpreted. Chapter 8 (Table 8.1) is a cross-case synthesis which is extrapolated 
using both the case study reports and the grouped coding and their cross-tabulations. It is 
from this cross-tabulations, many layers of writing and thinking aided the interpretation 
outlined in Chapters 8 and 9 supporting towards the development of the DAMSS 
framework and the guidelines as best practices.   
4.10.1 Structure of case studies  
The case study primarily is grouped as events that took place in the Atlantic Ocean, Indian 
Ocean and in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The case study period is from 2005-
2017 covering the events chosen for the case study. As shown in Figure 4.5, the structure 
of the case studies was categorised as four key themes. This has an advantage where the 
structure allows to understand them before the occurrence of the event (early), during the 
event (middle) and post-event (late) phases of the disaster. This structure type further 
promoted the understanding of the overall knowledge regarding the evolution of disaster 
management over the given period for a specific country or within cross-countries. And 
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because, this research is exploratory, the structure of the case studies led to the 
identification of the pre-requites of a storm surge framework with the final step discussing 
the value of further investigation required for this research.  
 
4.10.2 A critical review of the methodology  
The literature review in the subject field is limited in two contexts. For instance, the 
literature on hurricanes and storm surge modelling is vastly available over storm surge 
awareness and communication. According to Crotty (1998), in qualitative research, the 
sample size is determined based on the information and not on the statistics. This made 
the sampling of the research to be carried with six cases. Data saturation was considered 
to have an impact on the case studies of recent events. Past events were found to be 
information-rich compared to the most recent events. However, considering that the most 
recent events allow us to understand the progression within the DRM and the DRR 
strategies. Therefore, a mix-match of yesteryear’s and the most recent year’s significant 
events were chosen. Besides, lack of data also limited the access to the resources in some 
profiled countries. The other limitations identified while using the case study strategy is 
restrictions of languages between the event and context which was not uniform or 
contained information instantly. This was commonly observed in the Asian countries 
where different structures and styles were adopted in reporting a disaster event. 
According to Neuman (2014), the two forms of knowledge which the social researchers 
produce are instrumental and reflexive. This research aimed to provide an instrumental 
knowledge in two approaches. One is by providing a new framework for the academic 
audience and accumulate new information on recent events. The other is through policies 
and general interests for a non-academic audience. However, gaining reflexive 
knowledge became unavoidable for the research as it is inclined towards value-oriented 
knowledge, reflecting the moral commitment of achieving results and improving the 
process of knowledge created.  
Bryman (2012) says that ethnographies and participant observations usually require long 
periods of observations and requires significant investment in the field and those 
approached were considered as a substantial level of efforts. In other words, even if these 
approaches were adopted, still the potential scope of work will be considered only as a 
regional observation and incorporating global approaches are time-consuming. Therefore, 
a valid case study which does not solely depend on the participant or ethnographic data 
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is considered as the best suitable approach for the research. To conclude, case study 
research may also be readily utilized to complement future quantitative, qualitative, and 
statistical methods.   
 
4.11 Summary  
In brief, this chapter provided the methods, approaches and techniques used to design the 
case study to make the choices, assumptions, and considerations coherent with the 
research. Beyond all the research dichotomies this research design and the methodology 
is developed based on (i) the knowledge the study creates (ii) the range of audience to 
whom this research is and will be useful (iii) who initiates policies, puts theory into 
practice and finally (iv) future researchers to whom the finding may provide additional 
support. Underlining the acute need of the research in developing a structured framework 
in the subject field, and from the literature review, it is hoped that similar research in 
developing a framework for storm surge in future particularly in qualitative standpoints 














Page | 83  
 
CHAPTER 5 
SIGNIFICANT ATLANTIC OCEAN STORM SURGE 
EVENTS 
Case Studies: Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the two major events Hurricane Katrina (2005) and Hurricane 
Sandy (2012) both of which occurred during their corresponding Atlantic hurricane 
seasons. This chapter focuses on the disaster phases and protocols followed during the 
emergency by their corresponding authorities and governments.   
5.2 Hurricane Katrina: origin and background 
Hurricane Katrina was the twelfth tropical depression of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane 
season. The depression originated from the west coast of Africa on 11 August 2005. The 
depression slowly merged with the remnants of a previous tropical depression known as 
the ‘Tropical Depression Ten’ (Knabb et al., 2005). On 23 August 2005, 1800 UTC, 
Katrina changed its course and directed towards the south-eastern Bahamas. By 24 
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Figure 5.1 Timeline of Hurricane Katrina (11-31 August 2005) [source: Knabb et al., 2005] 
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The storm attained hurricane status as shown in Figure 5.1 on 25 August 2005, at 1200 
UTC in less than two hours before its centre made landfall on the south-eastern coast of 
Florida. A convective asymmetric pattern in the system was detected when it crossed over 
southern Florida. Despite being asymmetric, Katrina sustained its field with the strongest 
winds causing heavy rains south and east of the centre in Miami–Dade County (Knabb et 
al., 2005).   
Figure 5.2 shows the hurricane Katrina’s projected path or track with colour coded 
hurricane categories. This version is adapted by the researcher using the original latitude-
longitudinal data from NHC (Knabb et al., 2005). A further detailed structural change 
data of Hurricane Katrina, the projected pathway, and the hurricane watch-warnings 
issued by the NHC is included in Appendix B. These warnings included air pressure, wind 














Figure 5.2 Hurricane Katrina’s projected path with colour coded themes for different hurricane categories 
(version adapted by the author using Google Map) 
 
After entering the Gulf of Mexico on 26 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina began to 
dominate the entire Gulf coast, undergoing two periods of rapid intensification, shown in 
Figure 5.2. Between these two intensifications, the size of Hurricane Katrina doubled on 
the 27 August (Knabb et al., 2005). Table 5.1 shows the landfall synopsis of Hurricane 
Katrina. 
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According to Knabb et al., (2005), Hurricane Katrina holds the status of being one of the 
costliest hurricanes to-date, in US hurricane history with estimated economic damage of 
US$160 billion (inflation corrected to 2017 US$) with 1,833 deaths.  
5.3 The disaster phases of Hurricane Katrina 
5.3.1 Preparedness within the USA 
During the monitoring of the approaching Hurricane Katrina, the risk was identified at an 
earlier stage by 11 August 2005. However, the early warnings were issued only after the 
23 August 2005 in the USA twelve days later, followed by the warnings issued by the 
Bahamas (Moynihan, 2009). The dynamics of the storm was rapid, as hurricane status 
was attained quickly and made landfall in the USA on 25 August 2005. This allowed only 
two-days of preparation and evacuation time before landfall (Select Bipartisan 
Committee, 2005). The National Hurricane Centre (NHC) and National Weather Service 
(NWS) communicated the threat to FEMA, and their corresponding hierarchies, regarding 
the approaching hazard. NHC and NWS also warned that Hurricane Katrina may not be 
a ‘typical’ hurricane communicating the impending risks (Bea et al., 2006).   
The State of Louisiana initiated the preparation by calling the National Guard troops on-
duty ensuring the necessity of twice the workforce required in preparation for a significant 
evacuation within the shortest period (Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2006). The City of New Orleans deployed its resources, Coast 
Guards were alerted on standby for a rapid search and rescue operation (Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006).  
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In Louisiana, the declaration of emergency was issued on 28 August 2005, which was 24 
hours before the landfall (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006; Moynihan, 2009). 
Moreover, this step was done only because of the then President Bush requested Governor 
Blanco to instigate a ‘mandatory evacuation’ in the Gulf Coast before landfall 
(Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). Political let-downs 
such as lack of authority, negligence of responsibilities and lack of decision-making were 
exhibited during and post event.  
Accuweather Inc, a private company, who issued a hurricane warning 12 hours before the 
NHC’s first warning was issued (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2005). The delay in the 
issuance of early warning by NHC was criticised by the company, highlighting how 
vulnerable population were in the path of the storm without being warned earlier. The 
company further remarked that the warning would have aided timely evacuation in-
advance prior to the landfall minimising the occurred loss of lives. According to post-
disaster assessment report of Select Bipartisan Committee (2006), the close to accurate 
timelines of Hurricane’s eye and its further forecasting and monitoring by the NHC and 
NWS were said to have prevented the extensive loss of lives (Moynihan, 2009). In 
contrary, the post-disaster report is inclined towards the achievement of some key 
activities while essentially ignoring the overall federal failures. Although, the failure of 
internal communication within the authorities was visible from the report, the failure of 
awareness regardless of assessing the risk should also be underlined.  
While NHC was issuing hurricane watch-warnings and the advisories stated only minor 
changes in the pathway, intensity forecasters already warned that Katrina will be 
potentially a major hurricane at landfall (The US Department of Commerce, 2006).  The 
Select Bipartisan Committee (2006) report states, that the lessons learnt were not reflected 
during Hurricane Katrina. The report discussed how the earlier experiences from previous 
hurricanes were not considered for evaluation and assessment, indicating the preparation 
for Katrina was inadequate (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006). Learning the lessons 
from previous experiences is vital for future adaptation and mitigation of any hazard. This 
means a feedback loop of previous lessons learnt is essential to improve and create 
awareness and it is important that this feedback loop should also be continuously 
assessed. The outcome of this research partly creates such a feedback loop of the lessons 
learnt from the six different case studies to improve and create storm surge awareness.  
The city of New Orleans is protected by a 350 miles of levee system due to large area of 
the city being below the sea level. It is to be noted that the levees and the flood walls 
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designed by the Army Corps of Engineer were built to withstand a maximum of Category 
3 hurricanes wind force (Seed et al., 2008; Marsh, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Aerial view of breached levees in New Orleans, during Hurricane Katrina (Source: NOAA 
Lib) 
The flood walls along the Lake Pontchartrain were already identified with a crack from 
the force of the surging water which was a pre-existing condition before the landfall of 
Hurricane Katrina. This pre-existing condition caused two reactions which are (i) 
weakened the levee protection system and allowed the surging water to ‘overtop’ the 
levee and (ii) shallow landscape over which the levee was build caused subsidence of the 
levees as shown in Figure 5.3 (Risk Management Solution, 2005). A prior leak at two 
sites particularly in east and west bank crossing CSX rail line of the IHNC waterway was 
addressed previously during Hurricane Betsy in 1965. It was these same sites which were 
again breached during Hurricane Katrina. Though the storm surge from the Lake Borgne 
was responsible for the over topping of the water, the ignored previous crack in the levee 
protection indicates weak coastal protection system and failure of preparedness (Seed et 
al., 2008).  
The USA, whose adaptive capabilities were higher than most of the developed countries 
faced criticism post-Hurricane Katrina. Few of the factors criticised includes delayed 
declaration of emergency, deployment of resources and evacuation, decision-making 
capacity that resulted in the loss of 1,800 lives and with an economic loss US $108 billion 
(2005) (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). The pre-
existing conditions, and the levee cracks, evidently remark that the city has not rectified 
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or repaired the coastal protection system and eventually confirms that the neither the 
federal nor the state government were prepared for the hurricane and failed to learn from 
previous storm surge experiences. 
5.3.2 Response within the USA 
As Katrina was approaching, watch-warnings for the hurricane were issued with a lead 
time of 20 to 32 hours in Florida, and 32 to 44 hours in Louisiana. As per Louisiana’s 
Emergency Management team, the average evacuation time for the vulnerable residents 
in the coastal communities is typically 48 to 72 hours (The US Department of Commerce, 
2006). The US Department of Commerce (2006) states that the national and local 
responders were neither prepared nor pre-planned, which further highlights the level of 
response followed during Hurricane Katrina.  
The breach in the levee system which occurred from both overtopping water and 
subsidence of the levees continued, increasing the number of breaches at various 
locations. The breaches notably occurred on location such as the Industrial Canal (Inner 
Harbour Navigational Canal), 17th Canal Street, (Knabb et al., 2005) which are highly 
populated. Flooding from the storm surge inundated both the west and east sides of the 
canals faster than expected (Nelson, 2015). Moreover, the flood gates failed to work at 
the Industrial Canal, weakened the entire coastal protection system leaving the responders 
to rely on sandbags to seal the flood walls (Nelson, 2015). This observation exhibits poor 
planning and preparation executed by the state and federal governments relying on 
meagre measures as a response. 
According to Neuman (2015), around 25,000 residents were identified as non-evacuees 
even after FEMA’s official evacuation ordered was issued. Due to the swift dynamics of 
the storm surge, the non-evacuees were forced to resort to sheltering in their attics and 
rooftops and during the search and rescue operation, most non-evacuees were rescued 
from these locations. (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
2006). The post-disaster analysis stated that the people who did not evacuate lived close 
to the Lake Pontchartrain and the canals in more deprived housing. Besides, many of 
these people did not have a vehicle or transport available to evacuate.  
A key housing design and architectural technology consideration (whether for retrofit or 
new build) was the lack of attic roof light windows or roof hatches to exit from the attic 
zones. This led to delays in rescue but also tragically led to people drowning within their 
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roof space or being trapped unable to leave or exit, waiting several days for waters to 
recede. 
During a previous Hurricane Ivan (2004) a similar situation of non-evacuees was 
observed. Vulnerable residents such as elderly and disabled people stated that, the 
officials requested the people to evacuate but, they never instructed on the evacuation 
shelter locations or transport modes and routes. Many disabled and elderly residents stated 
that, they were issued with evacuation advisories, but they were not guided with the plan 
or procedures to follow. These were the observed as resident’s opinion after Hurricane 
Ivan (2004) a year before Hurricane Katrina (Litman, 2006). The resident’s opinion 
reflected on how key lesson learnt from the previous Hurricane Ivan was not reflected 
during Hurricane Katrina. Despite, being already aware of this prevailing situation of 
poverty and non-evacuation scenario in New Orleans, the officials continued to follow 
the same protocol, and no additional response were carried out. 
 
Figure 5.4 Residents gathered in front of the Superdome emergency shelter after the landfall of Hurricane 
Katrina [source: Select Bipartisan Committee  (2005)] 
On identification of a large part of the population have not been evacuated, a make-shift 
response plan to set up Superdome as an emergency shelter was put-forth. When the storm 
made landfall at 6.00 am on 29 August 2005, the Superdome had already been set-up as 
‘shelter of last resort’ for thousands of people, as shown in Figure 5.4. This clearly is a 
failure of planning and evacuation; however, this also showed failure to understand the 
emergency management process, and the roles and the responsibilities of the emergency 
responders within this process. The search and rescue operation further added tens of 
thousands of people into the process of moving them to safe grounds (Select Bipartisan 
Page | 90  
 
Committee, 2006). Airports in New Orleans were closed by 30 August 2005 and bridges 
of Interstate-10 (city’s exit route) was destroyed impeding the already overdue 
evacuation. (Waple, 2005). The Louisiana Department of Transportation and 
Development’s (DOTD) response during the evacuation was observed to be inadequate 
mainly due to the lack of prior transportation and evacuation plans which led to gridlock 
in many interstates entirely hampering the efforts (Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2006).  
Failure of evacuation, further led to extensive search and rescue operations, involving 
support from the army and many rescue operations were carried out by airlifting the 
victims. The US Coast Guard rescued around 30,000 local people, while the army 
supported airborne search and rescue (Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2006). Volunteers joined the forces at a local and national level. 
Private organisations like Walmart assisted with their logistics and efficiency in getting 
the supplies into New Orleans days in advance to FEMA was an appreciated effort from 
ad-hoc stakeholder perspective (Birdsall, 2009).  
 
Figure 5.5 Before (right) and after (left) image of the Superdome of Downtown, New Orleans post-
Katrina [image source: AP Photo/David J Phillip, Gerald Herbert] 
By 30 August 2005, 80% of the New Orleans city was underwater. All the locations at 
the 17th Street Canal which were protected by sandbags failed to prevent the flood waters. 
The Superdome which was set-up as a makeshift emergency shelter was ordered to be re-
evacuated again by 30 August 2005 (Bugliarello, 2006). Figure 5.5 shows the ripped-off 
rooftop of the Superdome which was built to withstand the wind force of the Category 3 
and above hurricanes. Moreover, the hospitals in Louisiana were forced to evacuate after 
landfall, at very short notice due to the loss of power (Bugliarello, 2006). This step of re-
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evacuation at various locations was regarded as a clear indication of inadequate response 
plan exhibited during Katrina. 
Around 2.5 million people were impacted with power outage in Florida (Energy.gov, n.d.) 
and 3 million affected from disconnected phone lines (Marsh, 2015). It took almost twelve 
days to restore the electric services (Bugliarello, 2006), resulting in an adverse impact of 
telecommunication lines.   
The overwhelming impact of Hurricane Katrina with a massive 27 ft storm surge 
breaching the levees, affected the communication and coordination delaying the overall 
response. At this stage, the response of Hurricane Katrina was observed to be beyond 
what was planned by the federal, state, and local officials. FEMA’s response to Hurricane 
Katrina was widely criticised particularly on the key areas such as the deployment of 
responders, communications, inefficient planning, ordering mandatory evacuations and 
search and rescue operations (Moynihan, 2009). The most efficient pumping system of 
the New Orleans, which could drain 300 million gallons of water a day, was submerged 
by the storm surge flooding. The primary motors and the power unit of the pumping 
system, which was located at the ground level, were fully inundated by surge water 
making the system inoperable and eventually leaving the city to remain flooded for more 
than two weeks (Schleifstein, 2015).  
All these critical factors during the response stage led to the socioeconomic losses to 
exceed the actual loss imposed by Katrina individually (Neumann et al., 2015). The 
former 9/11 public disclosure project panel members criticized that “failure in 
communication and lack of coordination costed lives” thereby giving ‘a failing grade’ for 
US federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina (Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006, p. 21). Lack of implementation of previous 
lessons and failure of adaptation of evacuation plans to the current scenario was 
identified. Despite of early identification of hazard, inadequacy in decision-making for 
effective pre-emptive preparedness was observed.  
5.3.3 Recovery within the USA 
The officials from different emergency response departments from Louisiana and 
Mississippi collaborated and coordinated during the incident recovery phases and were 
identified to have coordination concerns. The lack of communication and coordination 
did not favour the situation and only prolonged the process of recovery phase (Select 
Bipartisan Committee, 2005). This was further confirmed from the post-disaster analysis 
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report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2006). Their 
analysis states that the search and rescue operations were successfully carried out in many 
areas while the coordination and communication between different teams lacked 
coherence. Many public services such as police stations and hospital were affected. Key 
workers and first responders themselves were found as victims further extending and 
delaying the recovery period for this major disaster (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2005). 
Prior to the damage of the Superdome’s roof as shown in Figure 5.5, mass medical relief 
support was provided in the Superdome as shown in Figure 5.6 (Rare News, 2015). 
Various health-related issues, sanitary concerns and increasing temperature inside the 
emergency shelter due to large population created further deterioration in public health. 
The shelter was identified as unorganised and further led to law-and-order issues. Medical 
facilities and personnel were deployed in delay and were generally considered to be only 
reacting to recover from the situation and were not pre-planned or pre-deployed 
(Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). 
 
Figure 5.6 Sheltering and mass care in the Superdome before re-evacuation                                                                   
[source: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2006)] 
As the homes became uninhabitable, the American Red Cross deployed state emergency 
shelters and provided food, shelter and supplies to 146,292 people (Moynihan, 2009). The 
Department of Defence (DoD) remarked that Katrina’s recovery phase was supplied with 
major military deployment not seen, since the civil war. In addition to the DoD, the Red 
Cross also provided services 20 times more than any of its previous missions during the 
recovery phase (Moynihan, 2009). Undoubtedly, these excess deployments of resources 
remark that the response exhibited was beyond the capacity of federal and state teams 
which complicated many of the activities of the recovery phase. According to the Federal 
Urban’s search and rescue teams who had a previous experience during the 9/11 
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operations, and the California earthquake stated that, Katrina’s response and recovery 
were beyond the expertise of even the knowledgeable professionals in term of managing 
the disaster (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). It took 
six months to recover the severely damaged Gulf Coast and the interstate bridges to 
become fully operational. Access to the I-10 Twin Span Bridge was limited even after 
two months, since Hurricane Katrina’s landfall (Grenzback & Lukmann, n.d.).   
According to the report of Marsh (2015), the insurance sector faced a crucial criticism 
during the recovery phase. Private insurance industries in the Bahamas, suffered a 
significant impact, as the state government did not support the private insurance 
companies. Insurers withdrew their protection cover for some of the areas, resulting in 
homeowners to self-insure or limiting the premium with exclusions. Eventually, this 
resulted in the property being abandoned and loss of mortgages. Problems were also 
identified during the damage assessment of these abandoned properties due to the 
disconnected coordination between state and local authorities (Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006; Marsh, 2015).  
According to Towers Watson (2005) assessment report, ambiguity in assessing the wind- 
damage and water-damage from storm surge was identified during the recovery Phase. 
The US homeowner’s policies covered the damage from wind and rain (wind-driven), but 
not from flooding (wind-driven) i.e., storm surge flooding was not covered. Because 
storm surge was classified as flooding, most of the claims were denied. Unless the 
homeowners had bought flood insurance in addition to their property insurance, they were 
generally not covered (Towers Watson, 2005). Once again, the limitations in insurance 
imply the poor assessment of the hazard which is one of the important key activities 
belonging to phase-1 preparedness but then impacting the phase-3 recovery stage.  
5.3.4 Mitigation within the USA 
The Red Cross, which worked closely with FEMA, acknowledged that ‘it was not easy 
to coordinate with FEMA’ emphasizing the issues faced in communication and 
coordination. They further highlighted situations where the Red Cross’s request for food 
supplies on 1 September 2005 was cancelled by FEMA initially. The request was 
redelivered finally on 8 October 2005, delaying the pace of recovery, and challenged 
incident stabilization (Moynihan, 2009).  
The levee protection system which was initially made up of the I-walls were reconstructed 
with T-Walls for future mitigation of storm surge or any other flooding hazard. Nearly 
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after a decade, in 2015 reconstruction slowly kicked in the Lower 9th ward that is just in 
front where the levees were breached (Nelson, 2015). Criticism from various sectors 
urged FEMA to deploy the Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT) to investigate the 
performance of all the coastal buildings, infrastructures and re-evaluate the construction 
practices (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 5.7 Comparison of base flood elevation level (BFE) designated by FEMA and actual flood level 
observed during Hurricane Katrina [source: Select Bipartisan Committee (2006)] 
 
According to MAT’s report, the advisory base flood elevation (BFE) maps issued were 
identified with buildings elevated as per the BFE levels but suffered storm surge 
inundation directly shown in Figure 5.7.  
This observation led the assessment team to suggest a 1-foot freeboard i.e., a vertical step 
increase of 30 cm approx. above the standard BFE, for all buildings in hazard-prone areas 
(V, VE, V1-V302 zones) or LECZ’s. However, looking at the BFE level and the actual 
flood level, as highlighted in Figure 5.7, clearly indicates that the 1-foot freeboard above 
the BFE is an inadequate mitigation mechanism. Post-hurricane Katrina, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) and the US Department of Transportation (USDOT) 
conducted a nationwide assessment of emergency preparedness. The findings stated that 
 
2 According to Flood Insurance Rate Map, flood hazard areas are referred as Special Flood Hazard 
Area (SFHA), and residential housing were labelled as Zone A, Zone AO, Zone AH, Zone A1-
A30, Zone AE, Zone A99, Zone AR, Zone AR/AE, Zone AR/AO, Zone AR/A1-30, Zone AR/A, 
Zone V, Zone VE, Zone V1-30. 
 Actual Flood Level 
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the emergency preparedness plan for urban areas was partially sufficient in terms of 
specific and measurable requirements for a successful evacuation (Bea et al., 2006; 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). 
Hurricane Katrina’s key lessons showed lack of understanding and the dispersion of role 
and responsibilities of various national and international actors. Capacity building 
became crucial when, FEMA failed to recruit and train enough personnel for operational 
tasks (Litman, 2006). Whilst they were senior decision-makers based within the 
authorities, staffing (such as field workers) was insufficient to execute the decisions and 
plans were insufficient. Integrating the response and recovery both effectively and 
efficiently for future disasters and emergencies also remained a critical factor of 
mitigation (Litman, 2006). 
5.3.5 Summary of key activities and disaster phases during Hurricane Katrina 
Summarising all the key activities observed in the four main phases of the DRM cycle, 
the following table 5.2 has been developed. The table provides an overall summary of all 
the actions as key activities measured both from coding and from the document sources.  
Table 5.2 Summary of the key activities and their achievements observed from Case Study Katrina  
 













































































While observing the key activities, the following timeline gap was also observed as shown 
in Table 5.3. Between the first day of the risk identification and issuance of the first 
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official warning, eleven days of an inactive period occurred, during which no 
preparedness activities were carried out. This suggests that if the key activities and the 
corresponding phases were initiated during this period, the possibility of the reduced 
deaths and economic damage may have been recognized.  
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5.4 Physical damage and loss statistics  
According to NHC, Hurricane Katrina remains the most significant event in the US 
hurricane history and continues to an exemplar case providing lessons particularly for 
future mitigation and adaptation (Marsh, 2015). The physical damage from Hurricane 
Katrina includes infrastructure damage, schools and hospitals, business interruptions, 
destroyed ports and cruise berths, and debris deposited on rooftops of single-story homes. 
The hurricane resulted in around 300,000 homes being uninhabitable (Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006) and around 2,000 cell phone sites 
damaged and lost services (Moynihan, 2009). More than 1,833 deaths were officially 
reported (Knabb et al., 2005). Table 5.4 lists the state-wise death toll from storm surge.  
Table 5.4 Causalities from Hurricane Katrina [source: Knabb et al., (2005)] 







Modern engineered infrastructures built to withstand hurricane’s heavy winds were 
observed to have failed to sustain the magnitude of the storm surge. Some infrastructures 
even failed to sustain Category 3 and above hurricane wind-speed and became a 
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noticeable engineering failure (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006). The US Army Corps 
engineered levee system; the Louisiana Superdome; i-10 Twin Span Bridge and the New 
Orleans pumping station were among those infrastructures (Moynihan, 2009). 
The damage of the oil and gas refineries stopped the production of 91% of the domestic 
crude and 83% of the domestic natural gas production in southeast Louisiana and 
Mississippi (Risk Management Solution, 2005). Further, the delivery services were halted 
for several months resulting in a shortage of fuels affecting the economy (Risk 
Management Solution, 2005). Katrina’s damage also included damage to the university, 
college, and private research centres, which prevented the continuation of further research 
and global investment and contracts being terminated or withdrawn (The US Department 
of Commerce, 2006).  
According to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs’ (2006) 
report, the overall damage in all the oil and gas refineries resulted in 24% of oil supplies 
being shut and 18% for gas production. Apart from the country’s infrastructure damage, 
private housing, critical buildings, business firms and farmlands along the coastline 
suffered serious impact agitating the nation’s economy (Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). Several businesses were lost in Port 
Louisiana, New Orleans, and Mississippi because of major damage which impacted 
logistics. Furthermore, restoration and refurbishment cost in switching back to business 
was imposed (Grenzback & Lukmann, n.d.). Disruption in most of the public services not 
only impacted the population but also affected the environment, economy, and 
government function, ultimately delaying the process of recovery from the catastrophic 
damage. It took from several months to few years, for the residents to recover completely 
(Litman, 2006). 
5.5  Impact of storm surge within the USA  
According to the estimated storm surge levels observed by the NOC tide gauge and the 
USGS high watermarks, Hurricane Katrina was recorded with a 24-28ft storm surge along 
the coast of Mississippi as shown in Figure 5.8 (Knabb et al., 2005). 
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Figure 5.8 Storm surge inundation levels observed by USGS and NOS tide gauges [source: Knabb et al., 
(2005)] 
 
The Gulf Port to Pascagoula, the eastern half of Mississippi coast was observed with a 
17-22ft storm surge. However, as per the high-water marks, the maximum inundation was 
recorded as 27.8 ft at Pass Christian, east of St Louis Bay, Gulf Coast. Katrina was one 
of the highest recorded storm surges in US history above means sea level (Knabb et al., 
2005). According to Knabb et al., (2005), the significance of this event relies on the factor 
that 51% of the City of New Orleans was already below 2 ft of mean sea level.  
 
               Figure 5.9 Storm surge from the Lake Pontchartrain breaching the levee in the City of New 
Orleans [Image source: Google Earth] 
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The report further adds that the poorly managed levees failed to withstand the magnitude 
of the storm surge directly contributing to the loss of lives. The levees were over topped 
from the funnel-effect of the storm surge from Lake Borgne and the Mississippi River 
Gulf Outlet reaching up to 15 ft above sea level. The storm surge triggered by the 
hurricane, forced the rivers and the canals breaching through the flood protecting levees 
as shown in Figure 5.9.  
The Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT), assessed the post-event situation, 
reported that critical errors led to the levee failure, but the Inter-agency Performance 
Evaluation Task Force (IPET) strongly claimed that the force of the storm surge breached 
the levees causing catastrophic damage (Nelson, 2015). The debris from the storm surge 
inundation was observed for 90,000 square miles inland, which in comparison is the size 
of the United Kingdom (Grenzback & Lukmann, n.d.). The storm surge triggered by 
Hurricane Katrina was responsible for at least 10 oil spills, which was more than two-
thirds the amount lost in various other oil-spills in the history of US disasters. Storm surge 
was directly responsible for the damage of 466 chemical facilities, destroyed around 170 
drinking water facilities and wastewater treatment facilities, 31 hazardous waste 
production sites and 16 toxic waste sites (Birdsall, 2009). 
5.6 Adaptive measures taken over post-Katrina  
In 2014, the US Census Bureau estimated that population recovery in New Orleans has 
reached 79% of its 2000 population, particularly the urban population has increased by 
94% of its 2000 population. However, areas directly impacted to the magnitude of the 
storm surge like Lower Ninth Ward were still recovering (The House Financial Services 
Committee's Democratic Staff, n.d.).  
Despite, the criticism of the local and the coast guard teams were positively acclaimed 
for their response, the federal and the national response to Hurricane Katrina received 
wide criticism  (Birdsall, 2009).  This criticism eventually led from minor to major 
changes within several sectors including construction, insurance, and transportation. The 
National Weather Service (NWS) assembled a Service Assessment Team (SAT) to assess 
the performance of NWS and suggested identifying the best practices for future 
adaptation and mitigation to hazards (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2006).  
The hurricane’s aftermath also led to major policy changes (Bea et al., 2006). Post-
Katrina Act was initiated to engage the changes in leadership roles and responsibilities 
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within FEMA. The act further brought alterations in various components within the 
national emergency preparedness.  
Some key mitigation actions and acts initiated were listed as follows: 
• The Post –Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (in short Post 
Katrina Act) 
• The security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2005 (SAFE Port Act) 
• The Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act of 2005 
• The Pets Evacuation and Transportation Act of 2006 
• Louisiana Recovery Act 2005  (Venson, 2007) 
• The Student Grant Hurricane and Disaster Relief Act  
• The John Warner National Defence Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2007 
(Bea et al., 2006) 
• H.R. 1227 the Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery Act of 2007 (The House Financial 
Services Committee's Democratic Staff, n.d.). 
 
5.7 Hurricane Sandy: origin and background 
Hurricane Sandy was a late-season hurricane which originated as a tropical wave in the 
west coast of Africa on 11 October 2012. The tropical wave travelled towards the 
southwestern Caribbean Sea and became a tropical depression on 22 October 2012, 1200 
UTC. The depression further became a tropical storm within the next 6 hours duration 
(Blake et al., 2013). Hurricane Sandy, unofficially referred to as ‘Superstorm’ Sandy or 
‘Frankenstorm’ Sandy was the eighteenth named Tropical Storm (Sopkin et al., 2014), 
which gradually became a fully developed hurricane on 24 October 2012, 1200 UTC 
exactly within 48 hours (NHC, 2012). 
The storm made its first landfall in Jamaica as Category 1 on the 24 October 2012 as 
illustrated in the timeline shown in Figure 5.10. The structure of Sandy’s underwent a 
complex evolution and grew considerably in size over the Bahamas and continued to grow 















The storm was extraordinarily large as shown in Figure 5.11, a version adapted by the 
author using data collated from different sources such as NHC, NOAA, NASA and 
‘Weather underground’ showing the comparison of Hurricane Sandy’s radius with 
previous significant hurricanes in US history.  
 
Figure 5.11 Comparison of Hurricane Sandy's radius with previous hurricanes [source: Blake et al., 
(2013)] 
The storm continued to grow after crossing the Bahamas and until its final landfall as an 
extra-tropical cyclone along the mid-Atlantic coast. The change in its hurricane size (in 
radius) began to increase between 25-26 October over the Bahamas resulting in Sandy 
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of the storm was quite unusual compared to other hurricanes. The size of the ‘Superstorm’ 
Sandy’s wind field was a thousand miles end-to-end (NHC, 2012) and the interaction of 
Sandy with the northeaster or nor’easters (winds) before the landfall time which 
combined with the high tides to produce significant damage. Figure 5.11 also shows the 
size of Hurricane Sandy radius as a comparison percentage of scale relative to previous 












Figure 5.12 The hurricane path or track with colour coded themes for various hurricane categories 
(version adapted by the author using Google Map) 
It is interesting to note that Sandy had a considerably larger radius than Katrina, but both 
hurricanes still resulted in considerable damage. In relative terms, the radius and the 
intensity of storm were key factors as Katrina was Category 4, but a smaller radius and 
Sandy was a tropical storm but with larger radius. Figure 5.12 shows how Sandy was 
travelling in parallel to the east coast of the USA and the sudden track change in the 
storm’s path, moving towards the coast of New York and New Jersey. Hurricane Sandy 
affected the east coast of the USA from Florida to Maine making its final and primary 
landfall in New Jersey and the densely populated New York City (FEMA, 2013). The 
extra-tropical hurricane not only produced a storm surge of 12ft in various locations but 
also created a significant direct and indirect socioeconomic impact (Blake et al., 2013; 
NHC, 2013). Appendix B includes the author’s version of the summary of Hurricane 
Sandy’s predicted or forecasted pathway and the hurricane watch-warnings as issued by 
the NHC. These warnings include air pressure, wind field and strengthening or weakening 
of hurricane structure. 
  Tropical Depression 
  Tropical storm 
  Category 1 
  Category 2 
  Category 3 
  Category 4 
  Category 5 
  Extra-tropical  
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According to Blake et al., (2013), the number of direct fatalities from Hurricane Sandy 
was 147. However, a total of 233 fatalities were related with Hurricane Sandy in eight 
countries including Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, USA, Canada, Bahamas, Puerto Rico, 
Dominican Republic (Diakakis et al., 2015).  
The storm took the status of being the second-costliest hurricane with an estimated 
economic damage of US$ 71 billion (inflation corrected to 2017 US$) until 2017, which 
was replaced by Hurricane Harvey amounting to US$ 125 billion (NOAA Office for 
Coastal Management, 2019). It is to be noted that Hurricane Harvey was not a storm surge 
event, and the major loss was due to the heavy rain downpours. In terms of storm damage, 
and especially from the viewpoint of this research, Hurricane Sandy should be the second 
costliest hurricane in the US history excluding Hurricane Harvey as a rainfall event. The 
storm size was broad, being 1000-miles wide from end-to-end and when it made landfall 
near Brigantine, NJ was when Hurricane Sandy was a post-tropical cyclone (NYC, 2013). 
 

















24-Oct 1900 Bull Bay Jamaica 1 75 86.4 971  
25-Oct 0525 10 nautical mi  Cuba 3 100 115.2 954  
29-Oct 2330 Brigantine New 
Jersey 
1 70 80.64 945  
                   
Table 5.5 shows the landfall history of hurricane Sandy with its maximum wind speed 
(mph) and minimum millibar pressure (mb) during its landfall. The wind speed during 
the final landfall was 70 knots (80 mph) but it is to be noted that the minimum pressure 
sustained was close to a Category 3 hurricane (FEMA-MAT, 2013). So, whilst Sandy was 
reported as an extra-tropical storm relative to the wind speed its sustained minimum 
pressure was equivalent of a Category 3 hurricane in the SSWHS.  
 
Page | 104  
 
5.8 The disaster phases of Hurricane Sandy 
5.8.1 Preparedness within the USA 
The lessons from the previous Hurricane Katrina were implemented during the response 
of Hurricane Sandy. The NHC’s forecasters monitored the hurricane and the path called 
the ‘cone of uncertainty’ (Blake et al., 2013) and further provided earlier warnings about 
Hurricane Sandy’s track change towards New York and New Jersey. Storm preparation 
protocols and emergency planning were initiated ahead. According to the Hurricane 
Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, (2013) the deployment of resources began corresponding 
to the emergency plans, setting up the emergency shelters, aerial patrols, qualified 
personnel, and field resources called on-duty and remained on standby to respond. The 
coastal power generating stations were shut-down as a precaution to avoid capacities-at-
risk. More than 1,500 personnel from FEMA were called on-duty to be on standby along 
the East Coast (Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 2013). 
By Monday 29 October 2012, despite ‘Superstorm’ Sandy having lost its hurricane status 
the collision with another weather system the nor’easters made it unprecedented and 
increased the complexity (Blake et al., 2013). Continuous monitoring did provide 
opportunities for forecasters to provide early warnings to coastal communities. Most 
importantly forecasters warned communities that the potential hazard from Hurricane 
Sandy has not lessened, even though it was no longer holding a ‘hurricane’ status. They 
further warned regarding the possibility of life-threatening storm surges approaching 
towards the coastal communities of New York and New Jersey (BBC News, 2012).   
According to BBC News (2012), the New York city’s authorities did consider the high 
tide and the combination of the approaching storm which could result in storm surges and 
storm tide flooding the Lower Manhattan and possibly flooding the city’s underground 
transport system (BBC News, 2012). Around 6,700 National Coast Guards were made 
available on-duty to respond to the approaching landfall from Hurricane Sandy and 
around 140 helicopters were on standby to initiate the search and rescue operation as soon 
as landfall occurred (BBC News, 2012). The city of New York (NYC) and New Jersey 
provided the communities with hurricane watch-warnings along with the storm surge 
warning and ordered mandatory evacuation twice to the coastal communities 
communicating the approaching hazards. The NYC further deployed around 73 shelters 
throughout the five boroughs to host evacuees (NYC data, 2013). The general 
transportation services were halted and most of the subway stations were barricaded 
before the storm’s landfall. New York City housing authority (NYCHA) liaised with 
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19,000 members to communicate and coordinate the response and prepare for the 
emergency (NYC, 2013). 
As the storm was 800 miles from the coast for landfall and approaching with a wind speed 
of 90 mph, an estimated 50 million people were exposed or vulnerable to the storm with 
rain and wind.  Most airline services were cancelled in preparation for the emergency by 
then (BBC News, 2012). The overall preparedness of Hurricane Sandy was observed to 
have implemented effective EWS, evacuation, deploying the resources with prior 
planning. This may also be observed as the implementation of lessons learnt from the 
previous Hurricane Katrina (2005).  
5.8.2 Response within the USA 
The federal response to Hurricane Sandy was activated even during the preparedness 
period. Hurricane Sandy affected 24 states across the northeast to the Mid-Atlantic. The 
potential physical damage from Sandy’s landfall highlighted the city’s vulnerability to 
storm surge flooding (Abramson & Redlener, 2013).  The New York City hospitals 
moved their generators to higher grounds. Concreted walls protecting fuel pumps at 
ground level and response measures taken by health sectors to protect and prevent loss of 
lives during the approaching emergency. Benchmarked safety standards of the hospital 
and other key health-related fields were outdated which was observed and a reason to the 
failure of the federal and state government’s response to Hurricane Sandy (Abramson & 
Redlener, 2013).   
The city had restored wetlands and even had buildings elevated above the BFE levels 
mandated by FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) mapped with Flood 
Insurance Risk Map (FIRM) (FEMA, 2013).  According to authorities of New York city 
certain resilience measures that had been invested to mitigate coastal flooding scenario, 
indeed performed well during Hurricane Sandy’s response. It was the mechanical, 
electrical, and plumbing (MEP) systems which were situated on ground level not being 
elevated above the flood levels became a major disadvantage that was threatened by the 
storm’s magnitude (NYC, 2013). In response to Superstorm Sandy, around 375,000 
residents were evacuated and from the Lower Manhattan and other neighbourhoods in the 
New York and were safely moved to emergency shelters. In Delaware, around 50,000 
were ordered to evacuate (BBC News, 2012). 
New York city’s oldest and well-interconnected power and utilities system faced a 
significant impact. The City of New York further found power outage was critical during 
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the landfall of Hurricane Sandy (NYC, 2018).  The power loss compromised the life 
support, heating systems, and various other critical systems resulting in a challenging 
situation (Abramson & Redlener, 2013). Although, the overall response was well-planned 
and organised during the beginning, the magnitude of the storm gradually deteriorated 
the systems consecutively resulting in substantial economic damage.  
5.8.3 Recovery within the USA 
Despite implementing the lessons learnt from the previous hurricanes and storm surge 
events, the efforts undertaken and, the process of response and recovery, were affected 
by various critical elements:  
- While the recovery efforts were being initiated post-landfall, initial steps were 
significantly impacted by storm surge flooding and unavailability of roads for 
transportation and logistics of resources (NERC, 2014). 
- The storm surge which flooded the New York’s subway tunnels became a 
significant obstacle delaying the recovery, disconnecting the transportation and 
transits in the 100-year history since, built (Taylor, 2012). 
- In some instances, e.g., where a substation exploded, restoration of power and 
recovery of utilities took longer than expected. It took 31 days for the restoration 
and recovery of power and utilities (NERC, 2014). However, it was also reported 
that some communities, which were severely impacted by the storm surge took 
months to recover from the lack of power (NYC data, 2013). 
 
Figure 5.13 Oceanfront house in Rockaway NY, damaged during Hurricane Sandy [source: FEMA 
(2013)] 
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Coastline infrastructures and oceanfront buildings faced severe impact from the 12 ft 
storm surge as shown in Figure 5.13 (FEMA, 2013). The recovery of floating 
infrastructure was not as extensive as the fixed non-movable infrastructures (NYC, 2013). 
95% of the New York City homeowners had home insurance, however, it was identified 
post-Sandy during its recovery phase that the majority did not have flood insurance 
(IBHS, 2012). As a result, thousands of properties were not covered by flood damage. 
Also, it was estimated that only 20% of the residential buildings were covered by NFIP 
(NYC, 2013). A similar ‘ambiguity in insurance claims’ was observed during Hurricane 
Katrina (2005) in Louisiana, was also identified during Sandy implying that lessons learnt 
from the insurance point of view were not implemented. In New York City, 70 % of the 
housing units in the flood plains were multi-dwelling units (MDU) which were built 
before 1983. Therefore, they were not covered by NFIP (NYU Furman Center, 2015; 
Furman Center & Moelis Institute, 2013).  
During Hurricane Sandy, despite some properties being well elevated above the base 
flood elevation (BFE) levels, their MEP systems were still severely impacted. As per the 
estimation of the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), loss from storm surge 
not only included the property being damaged or destroyed but also included loss of MEP 
systems. Hurricane Sandy also damaged NYCHA’s thirty-five multi-housing 
developments which were in the process (at that time) of receiving resiliency funding 
from FEMA (NYC, n.d.). Although, the developments were compensated, the recovery 
took seven years. This is a factor that is suggested to be minimised in the future.   
5.8.4 Mitigation the USA 
The NYHCA has 176,066 public housing units in 326 developments throughout the five 
boroughs which are Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, The Bronx, and Staten Island. These 
locations were the most severely damaged locations during Hurricane Sandy. Around 700 
apartments in the Bond Street had their MEP systems severely impacted due to Sandy.  
More than 200 developments and around 60,000 houses were damaged and were without 
power for more than two weeks. However, only immediate repair works were done post-
Sandy, and the actual resilience works did not begin until late 2016 (NYCHA, 2017). 
Hurricane Sandy was termed as a watershed event for industries such as building, 
transportation, construction, power, and utilities (Lacey, 2014).  
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During the restoration phase flood gates were installed as shown in Figure 5.14(a) & (b) 
(WNYC, 2016) in front of the buildings to reduce flood waters damaging the power and 
utility systems as a mitigation measure future the storm surge scenario (NPR, 2017). 
  
Figure 5.14 (a) Floodwall with several 20-pound panels (left) (b) flood wall with type 2 panels covering 
the basement window(left) [source: (WNYC, 2016)] 
FEMA which operates with international Write Your Own (WYO) insurance companies, 
which are contracted under the NFIP faced litigation, post-hurricane Sandy. In 2017, 
FEMA reached out to all the 144,000 NFIP policyholders who filed insurance claims and 
requested to apply for a review if the policyholders thought they had been underpaid or 
their claim was denied previously. It was also reported that Sandy’s litigation costs were 
higher than the actual insured losses (FEMA, 2017). 
After Hurricane Sandy, the Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety (IBHS) 
examined the building codes in New York and New Jersey and outlined the critical 
situation and the vulnerability of the existing infrastructure. Their recommendations 
suggested that any habitable place and utilities should be at least 3 feet above the ‘base 
flood elevation’ (BFE) levels mandated by the National Flood Insurance Program (IBHS, 
2012), which is one of the lessons learnt from Hurricane Sandy. Their suggestions further 
mandated to increase the resilience of the buildings by highlighting the vulnerability of 
roofs observed during the debris removal post-Hurricane Sandy (IBHS, 2012). 
The Rockaway Boardwalk, which was destroyed during 2012, had their reconstruction 
work carried out and after six years, since Hurricane Sandy and was completed in 2018. 
The previously used wooden slats were replaced with concrete pilings (Rosenberg et al., 
2018). Hurricane Sandy reinforced various mitigation measures to be adopted to survive 
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a future hurricane however their sustaining capacity will only be known when faced with 
another hurricane in the future.   
5.8.5 Summary of key activities and disaster phases during Hurricane Katrina 
By reviewing all the key activities observed in the four main phases of the DRM cycle, 
the following Table 5.6 is generated. The table provides an overall summary of all the 
actions as key activities measured both from coding and from the document sources.  
Table 5.6 Summary of the key activities and their achievements observed from Case Study Sandy 
























































































As mentioned previously, although, the overall key activities were followed 
corresponding to their disaster phases, key activities could not sustain the magnitude of 
the storm surge. This implies that though protocol and procedures were followed their 
sustaining factor was underestimated paving the way to inadequacy at various levels 
particularly impacting the infrastructure and housing.  
Page | 110  
 
Table 5.7 shows the list of major activities carried out as a response during Hurricane 
Sandy. From the figure, a time delay of eleven days was observed as in-active period but, 
Sandy was relatively a slow-moving hurricane and this inactive period did not have an 
impact.   
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However, if an earlier change in the hurricane’s pathway had occurred, resulting in an 
earlier landfall, this would have reduced the inactive period (reducing warning time, 
evacuation, and readiness) could have imposed a severe impact resulting in further 
possible loss of lives. This should be considered for a future scenario for storm surge 
adaptation and mitigation. 
 
5.9 Physical damage, market uncertainty factors and loss statistics  
The high tides which combined with the extra-tropical hurricane not only produced a 
storm surge of 12 ft in various locations but also created a significant direct and indirect 
socioeconomic impact (NHC, 2013; Blake et al., 2013). Some substantial damages 
created by the storm surge triggered by Hurricane Sandy were the subway system damage 
as shown in Figure 5.15 (NHC, 2012; NHC, 2013).  
The New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq remained closed for two days. Figure 5.16 
shows the image of over a hundred homes that were destroyed by the fire from a short 
circuit in Breezy Point substation, Queens, one of the New York boroughs (NHC, 2012).  
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Significant explosions at Manhattan power plant, during Hurricane Sandy, destroyed at 
least half a dozen houses and left millions of New York residents without power (NYC, 
2013; Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 2013). Figure 5.17 shows the image 
captured during the complete ‘black-out’ of Lower Manhattan’s power outage with only 
the Empire State Building still lit at the upper floors (NHC, 2012).  
Figure 5.18 indicates the compounding multi-asset risks and damage that can occur to the 
exposed assets such as roadways which are crucial transportation routes both in terms of 
rescue and recovery (NHC, 2013).  
Figure 5.16 Fire explosion which destroyed 
houses in Breezy Point, NY [source: 
NOAA/NHC (2012)] 
 
Figure 5.15 Storm surge flooding in 
New York subway station [source: 
(NHC, n.d)] 
Figure 5.18 Damaged road on 
NC12, Rodanthe, NC [source: 
(NHC (2013)] 
 
Figure 5.17 Blackout in the Lower 
Manhattan areas of NY [source: NHC 
(2012)] 
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Figure 5.19 Power outage of homes during Hurricane Sandy (2012) estimated by AON Benfield 
Figure 5.19 shows AON Benfield’s estimation of a power outage during Hurricane Sandy 
(2012). The power outage led to 50% shutdown in New York and 80% shut down in New 
Jersey, further delaying the process of pumping out the water from the city (Plett, 2012). 
The NERC report, claims that approximately 8.35 million people were impacted by the 
power loss immediately after the landfall on 29 October 2012 (NERC, 2014) Around 
650,000 homes were damaged or destroyed (Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 
2013) and more than 23,000 businesses and 245,000 non-profit employees were affected 
by Hurricane Sandy’s flood (NYC, 2013). 
5.10 Impact of storm surge within the USA 
Hurricane Sandy was not the most expensive nor did it lead to the most fatalities in the 
US hurricane history. However, its significance relied on the convergence of various 
factors which made the hurricane an extreme weather event.  
The storm surge from Hurricane Sandy affected the U.S. coastline from northeast to Mid-
Atlantic region including North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, and 
New York. Figure 5.20 shows the maximum storm surge inundation ranges along the east 
coast of the USA (Blake et al., 2013). The coastal surge further pushed the water into 
New York Bay and up the Hudson River, causing substantial flooding in the New Jersey 






















































Power outage of homes during Hurricane Sandy
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Figure 5.20 Maximum storm surge inundation range (in ft) observed by USGS and NOS tide gauges 
[source Blake et al., (2013)] 
The flooding along the New York Bay inundated thousands of the houses across the 
boroughs of the New York leaving the city’s housing infrastructure either severely 
damaged or destroyed (Lacey, 2014). Again, residents had to take refuge in attics due to 
rising waters and insufficient exit or escape routes from attic spaces. There were no in-
built support rails or safe location zones on roofs for residents to locate to or hold onto, 
whilst waiting for rescue.  
BoatUS estimated that Sandy destroyed more than 65,000 boats and caused marine-
related damage of about $650 million to New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut 
(Leonard, 2013). Many of the coastal barrier islands further increasing the vulnerability 
of exposure to future storm surge events (Sopkin et al., 2014). Finally, the extent of the 
storm surge damage left the Federal teams with lack of capacity in resolving insurance 
claims which continued for five years after Hurricane Sandy (FEMA, 2017). 
5.11 Adaptive measures taken post-Sandy 
Post-Hurricane Sandy, the New York City authorities started to implement building and 
coastal zoning codes for many types of structures including buildings, raised mechanical-
electrical-pumping (MEP) systems, apartments, and businesses (NERC, 2014). 
Though the city is preparing for the future storm surge flooding or hurricane hazards, new 
developments were still encouraged both in Brooklyn and Manhattan (NPR, 2017).  New 
York is currently working on improving the livelihood as steps toward mitigation to future 
storm surge and general flooding scenarios (NYC, n.d.). 
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- East Side Coastal Resiliency proposed action plans and mitigation measures for 
future sea-level rise and storm surges.  
- 1,511 New Yorker’s were provided with jobs again.  
- 99% of the city-managed construction was complete (as of September 2019),  
- The Rockaway Beach boardwalk reconstructed (NYC, n.d.) 
To mitigate the future hurricanes and storm surge threat and in response to Hurricane 
Sandy, the Army Corps of Engineers considered various technical and coastal 
preventions. This includes the proposal of New York-New Jersey Harbour and Tributaries 
(NYNJHAT) coastal storm surge barrier. The construction cost is estimated at around 
US$ 10-50 billion and the maintenance cost US$ 100 million to 2.5 billion every year 
(RiverKeeper, 2018). 
The T-Groin project in Sea Gate which involved a partnership between the New York 
City and the Army Corps of Engineers with a budget of US$ 28 million was completed 
in 2016 as a protection to the Brooklyn communities, one of the five New York boroughs 
(Rosenberg et al., 2018). Several other projects have also been initiated which includes 
the ‘BIG-U’ project constituting Lower Manhattan and East Side Coastal Resiliency 
projects. Living Breakwaters an architectural design proposed to improve the resiliency 
in Staten Island. The Red Hook Integrated Flood Protection system, Hunts Point 
Lifelines, Bullet project in Midland Beach were various projects considered and proposed 
to improve the city’s resiliency toward storm surge and extreme weather events 
(Rosenberg et al., 2018).   
5.12 Additional observations  
Some additional observations made during both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy 
which is worthy of mention:   
• Design and construction technology whether of new build housing or retrofit 
measures did not cater for residents requiring exiting via attic zones due to rapidly 
rising water levels, 
• Roofs were not designed or retrofitted for ‘safe-haven’ zones whilst awaiting 
rescue or for awaiting waters to recede, 
• Building codes were insufficient both for structural requirements as resilience to 
storm surge and buildings and their roof integrity, 
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• Location of power utilities or in supporting continuity of power was insufficient 
to cope with flooding and storm surge, not only impacting during the storm but 
significantly impeding the recovery phase, 
• The design, location and construction of water treatment services did not have 
sufficient resilience to cater for flooding and storm surge and prevent 
contamination of water due to flood overflow, 
• There appears to be a dislocation between the planning and authorisation of homes 
in certain areas which could be prone to such flooding and the insurance coverage 
available. 
 
5.13 Summary  
This chapter discussed two significant events and studied various key activities 
corresponding to their disaster risk management phases. The case studies Hurricane 
Katrina and Sandy highlighted how developed countries such as the USA is not exempted 
during emergencies and exhibited basic issues such as the poor dissemination of early 
warning systems, lack of coordination and communication.  Observations during Katrina 
especially the evacuation, early warning, failure of communication and coordination 
directly resulted in the loss of 1,800 lives. Failure of the pumping station which left the 
New Orleans city being flooded was a clear outcome of poor regulation and preparedness. 
Despite the economic growth or technical resources, developed countries were not 
exempted from the overwhelming effects of storm surge damage and loss of life. Instead, 
they endured severe infrastructure damage and failed during situational awareness 
highlighting the underlying potential issues for developed countries. This emphasises 
how a framework, if put in place, could potentially have supported the scenario planning, 
ensuring stakeholders involvement including government, regulators, and communities. 
Further analysis of the key activities from coding observed is discussed in Chapter 8 
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CHAPTER 6 
SIGNIFICANT PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN  
STORM SURGE EVENTS  
Case studies: Cyclone Nargis and Typhoon Haiyan 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the disaster phases and the impacts caused by two of the most 
significant tropical cyclones which occurred in the North Indian Ocean and North West 
Pacific Ocean. The first case discusses Cyclone Nargis which occurred during the 2008 
Indian Ocean Cyclone season. The second case examines the Super-typhoon Haiyan 
regionally named as Typhoon Yolanda, which was the twenty-third officially named 
typhoon of the 2013 Pacific typhoon season. 
6.2 Cyclone Nargis (2008): origin and background 
On 27 April 2008, the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD), identified a low-
pressure system gradually forming to a tropical depression (Hurricane Science, 2008). At 
this stage, Burmese government received a weather warning from the Asian Disaster 










This warning was received in addition to the warning issued by the IMD. On 28 April 
2008, the depression was observed near the centre of Bay of Bengal and strengthened to 
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Figure 6.1 Timeline of Cyclone Nargis (27 Apr- 03 May 2008) [source: Hurricane Science (2008)] 
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(SSWHS) as shown in Figure 6.1 (Fritz et al., 2009). Despite the storm’s movement being 
almost stationary over the warm waters of the Bay of Bengal, but continued to intensify 
and by early 29 April, the storm upgraded to a Category 2 cyclone with 161 km/h (100 
mph) sustained wind speed (Hurricane Science, 2008). The first rapid intensification of 
the cyclone took place on the 01 May 2008. As the storm was heading towards the east 
of Burma, peak intensity of 217 km/h (135 mph) was reached, which is equivalent to a 
Category 4 in the SSWHS (Hurricane Science, 2008). 
The cyclone made its landfall from 02-03 May 2008, in the Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) 
delta, approximately 250 kilometres southwest of Yangon (Rangoon) as a Category 3 
cyclone (Tripartite Core Group, 2010). The cyclone then began moving inland and 
reached Yangon where the cyclone downgraded further to Category 1 after 12 hours, 
since the first landfall (Fritz et al., 2009). Final landfall at the Yangon villages as Category 















Figure 6.2 Landfall of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar [source: Relief Web (2008)] 
divisions of the Ayeyarwady delta as shown in Figure 6.2 (ReliefWeb, 2008; Martin & 
Margesson, 2008). The intensity of the storm was shown in Figure 6.2 using a colour 
coded scheme affecting various locations of Myanmar. From Figure 6.2, the impact of 
the storm surge inundation, which had reached several miles inland is noticeably 
 Limited Damage 
 Moderate Damage 
 Moderate to Extensive Damage 
 Extensive to Catastrophic Damage 
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impacting the delta regions and demonstrates their vulnerability. Appendix B includes the 
author’s summary of Cyclone Nargis’s predicted path and the structural changes of the 
cyclone.  
6.3 The disaster phases of Cyclone Nargis 
6.3.1 Preparedness within Myanmar 
International forecasters, IMD, ADPC and Joint Typhoon Warning Centre (JTWC) 
alerted Myanmar regarding the approaching storm and its development as a potential risk. 
The alerts were communicated to the Myanmar authorities a week in-advance of Cyclone 
Nargis’s landfall (Orozco, 2017). Despite being alerted by various sources of forecasters, 
no prior warnings were issued immediately by the government of Myanmar. A warning 
was finally issued in less than 24 hours before the landfall. But neither the emergency 
shelters were set-up nor instruction on moving to safe higher grounds were issued in 
preparation for the approaching hazard (Fritz et al., 2009).   
 
Figure 6.3(a) Damage in the Ayeyarwady Delta Division in Myanmar [source: Zaw (2009)] 
Due to the lack of awareness of the hazard, the coastal communities were reported to have 
ignored the final warnings issued by the officials just before the landfall (Fritz et al., 
2009).  This clearly highlights how a lack of awareness about the storm surge hazard was 
observed not only among the victims but also among the officials and emergency 
responders. Negligence of the early warning system (EWS) and evacuation to its entirety 
was observed (Orozco, 2017). As such the population in the path of the cyclone were 
highly exposed and vulnerable and the severity of the impact on these communities is 
shown by the example image as shown in Figure 6.3(a).  
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Habitat sites near the coast within low elevated coastal zones, where the landfall occurred, 
were initially observed to have fewer fatalities than that observed further inland (Fritz et 
al., 2009).  This was noted as a possible result of the ‘funnel-effect of storm surge’. As 
discussed in previous chapters the funnel-effect is caused when the storm surge enters the 
delta estuaries and rivers and with the narrowing of the river width with increasing 
distance from the coast, the storm surge increases in height, volume intensity, speed, and 
strength.  
 
Figure 6.3(b) Livestock damage from Cyclone Nargis [source: Shean (2008)] 
Figure 6.3(b) displays the impact on cattle and water buffalo deaths near internal 
townships e.g., Bogale some 30-50 km from the ocean coastline due to funnel-effect of 
the storm surge. The neighbouring region of the Irrawaddy delta were impacted by the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2005 and the aftermath of the tsunami led to the initiation of 
two emergency shelters in operation and general awareness of the coastal extremities. 
However, in the Irrawaddy delta region, Nargis was the first cyclone to make an impact 
and hence the population in this delta region had no previous experience (Suwanvanichkij 
et al., 2009). This resulted in the lack of knowledge of the potential storm surge hazard.  
It was identified that only two emergency shelters were in operation, since the previous 
tsunami impact, but these were located far from the Irrawaddy delta region.  
Telecommunications infrastructure was very limited in Myanmar even before the 
occurrence of Cyclone Nargis. The Burmese military junta had imposed strict restrictions 
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on the usage of communication devices in general and usage of satellite phones were 
considered illegal and residents were penalised for illegal possession of satellite phones. 
Additionally, the usage of mobile phones was considered as an expensive expenditure by 
most of the Burmese residents. In this manner, the residents were generally isolated from 
mobile phones and were left with limited communication options. Moreover, the delta 
region had even fewer telephone lines, and general commodities including the 
newspapers or periodicals would reach the delta town only by canoe and boats from 
Central Yangon (Mohammed, 2009; Suwanvanichkij et al., 2009). These restrictions on 
the usage of communication devices barred the flow of communication, leaving the 
residents to solely rely on a single communication mechanism from the government for 
any announcements or warnings (Suwanvanichkij et al., 2009). This situation depicts the 
pre-existing regional conditions and the limitation in the Irrawaddy delta which was 
exacerbated by the landfall of Cyclone Nargis while highlighting the absence of strategic 
emergency response plans, lack of preparedness and public awareness of such hazards.  
6.3.2 Response within Myanmar 
According to Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA), the officially confirmed death toll 
was 84,537; around 53,836 were displaced and 19,359 were injured. (Turner et al., 2008). 
Whilst the government’s negligence and lack of pre-emptive response were exhibited in 
phase one (preparedness stage), the emergency relief and recovery assistance were 
provided by the government immediately after the landfall of Nargis. The Myanmar Red 
Cross Society (MRCS) worked as auxiliary support to the government’s response teams 
(Red Cross Society, 2009).  
According to the Tripartite Core Group (2010), the degree of the impact made by Cyclone 
Nargis was beyond the adaptive capacity of Burmese government (Red Cross Society, 
2009), and therefore, a decision was made by the government towards requisition of 
international and local humanitarian assistance. Despite, the request for international 
assistance was initiated in a briefing with the United Nations on the 5 May 2008, no 
additional steps were taken to communicate or coordinate the visa procedures allowing 
the international organization to access the cyclone impacted areas. The combination of 
lack of organisational capacities within the government officials and authorities of 
Myanmar; and the lack of experience in negotiation and coordination issues with the 
international agencies complicated the Phase-3 recovery stage (Office of the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008).  
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Figure 6.4 Satellite images of Myanmar village taken in 2002 (left) and same village after the storm surge 
(7 May 2008) (right) [source: NASA's satellite image] 
Figure 6.4 shows the extent of the damage to a village within the Ayeyarwady delta in 
comparison with the previously taken image in the year 2002 before Cyclone Nargis. The 
government was overwhelmed in providing immediate assistance for the impacted 
communities.  
The international non-governmental organisations supported with 56% of aid deliveries 
and the local non-governmental organisations supported with 19% of aid deliveries to the 
affected victims. A further 16% of aid deliveries were supported by private multifaceted 
international organisations with remaining being covered by the government (Tripartite 
Core Group, 2010). The extended support from various international and local NGO’s 
and contribution of the organisations showed the capacity of stakeholder involvement and 
the benefits of establishing multi-agency approach in supporting emergency, especially 
for developing and least-developed countries (LDC).  
The City of Yangon, which is the largest city in Myanmar, was directly hit with a 200 
kph (124 mph) winds causing adverse damage such as shutting down the city’s power 
entirely, obstruction of roads and hampering the already limited telecommunication 
system. But the storm surge flooding was primarily responsible for extensive loss of lives, 
inundation of farmlands, and a further saltwater intrusion into most freshwater sources 
leaving the delta region in destruction. The debris further truncated communication and 
power lines delaying the recovery (Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
2008; IFRC, 2010). Temporary operational hubs were set-up in six of the locations 
including Yangon, to expedite the search and rescue, and communicate, coordinate the 
relief supports from various sources (Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
2008). The US Department of Defence (DOD) assisted in arranging the emergency 
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transportation and logistics of relief supplies during response and recovery phases. The 
DOD which operates aircraft between Thailand and Burma provided further emergency 
relief supplies such as food, water, and emergency shelter kits (GAO, 2011). According 
to the report of ALNAP (2008), an international humanitarian network system, the 
restriction, and limitations of access to resources existed throughout the response phase 
of Nargis. The international and local capacities who operated in the field, organising the 
resources, identified that the request for resources was scattered whilst the disbursal of 
resources was narrowed to filtered victims (ALNAP, 2008). Although, this may be an 
effect of the country’s bureaucracy and military governance, but when viewed in terms 
of incident management this indicates negligence in response.  
On 05 May 2008, the Burmese authorities announced, that the previously scheduled 
referendum would continue to take place as planned, regardless of the landfall of Cyclone 
Nargis on the 02– 03 May 2008, and amid the relief works being carried out (Martin & 
Margesson, 2008). It was observed that this referendum impacted the entry and exit to the 
region making the recovery an even more challenging process. Many international and 
national agencies who extended their support with relief-aids were stopped and, in some 
cases, were deported (Martin & Margesson, 2008; Tripartite Core Group, 2010). Media 
reporters of international news networks who were reporting the situation from the field 
were also deported (Humanity House, 2017). 
The Burmese authorities further restricted the access to international disaster assessment 
teams, including the UN relief planes which landed in Yangon. Due to these restrictions, 
the UN and other international agencies and organisations were not able to assess the 
preliminary damage to further disburse relief-aid or funds to the victims (Suwanvanichkij 
et al., 2009). The first US plane allowed was on the 11 May 2008 and even at this point, 
the US aid workers were still restricted access (Suwanvanichkij et al., 2009). The 
Ayeyarwady delta which functions as the country’s core and the rich agricultural 
economy was also considered as one of the least developed regions in Southeast Asia. 
The rich agricultural economy was damaged from the storm surge inundation and the 
recovery process of reviving from this crucial damage, improving the livelihoods, and 
rehabilitating the agricultural resources became a predominant key focus of this phase 
(ALNAP, 2008).  
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6.3.3 Recovery within Myanmar 
 
The delta region was one of the hardest-hit areas in Myanmar yet access to these areas 
was granted between 09-23 August 2008 for the detailed damage assessment. The access 
for further recovery purposes was gained only after three months, since the landfall of 
Nargis (Fritz et al., 2009). After gaining access to the delta region, the recovery and relief 
support was delivered by various local and international NGO’s (Government of 
Myanmar, IRP & ISDR, 2008).  
    
 
The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies assisted in 
various areas such as improving livelihoods, health and sanitation, psychological support 
to expedite the recovery phase. These were fulfilled through nine hubs across thirteen 
cyclone-affected townships and temporary shelters for those victims were provided by 
the IFRC (Red Cross Society, 2009) as shown in Figure 6.5(a). Figure 6.5(b) shows how 
enhanced timber used with corner-bracing (IFRC, 2011) for better building. According to 
the UN, the overall response by the government of Myanmar was observed to be slower, 
by stating that, ‘out of 2.4 million survivors only 500,000 had received the international 
assistance’ which is just one-fifth of the survivors being provided with relief (McCurry, 
2008). This was observed due to the various intervals of the restrictions imposed on both 
international and national relief workers, to assess and access the affected areas, which 
had a substantial impact on recovery phases. The Red Cross societies which provided 
immediate relief support working in correspondence with the government were restricted 
Figure 6.5(a) Temporary shelter of 16,264 houses 
built for families living in sub-standard shelter 
Photo: Yin Yin Myint MRCS [source: IFRC 
(2011)] 
 
Figure 6.5(b) Image showing timber-framed 
housing with corner-bracing [source: IFRC 
(2011)] 
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access at a later stage (Red Cross Society, 2009). As per the Red Cross, this may be 
possibly due to the attention these international organisations get from the media, who 
were reporting the field-situation of the massive death toll and the government’s response 
and recovery, which was not welcomed by the government (Red Cross Society, 2009). 
The significance of the media and their role in post-disaster communications to 
inhabitants and externals is vital and this is an area of recommendation for the future, to 
enhance the stakeholder participation of media.   
The Burmese authorities also imposed restrictions on NGO and organisations who had 
established prior relationships and access in various places within Myanmar.  This was 
experienced by an UK-based aid organisation, who had previously established 
collaborations with local authorities of Myanmar for fourteen years, were comprehended, 
that their previous associations failed to work post-cyclone Nargis (McCurry, 2008). 
Similar issues were also faced by the United Nations, who stated that ‘they did not have 
an easy-going relationship with the Government of Myanmar and their authorities. 
However, they had the advantage of being less restricted compared to other international 
organisations. In addition to the internal restrictions, the external pressure from the 
governments of western countries led to ongoing negotiations to gain access, further 
hampered the recovery activities (Fan, 2013).    
According to the report of Shelter Organisation, the participation, and the involvement of 
the communities during the recovery, reconstruction, and rebuilding phase favoured 
phase 3-recovery stage. They further participated in various upgrading projects such as 
rebuilding roads, footpaths, restoration of coastal flood protection dykes, embankments, 
and pavements. The communities together with the support of local NGO’s, constructed 
small bridges and their renovations (Shelter Org, 2010). Positively, key activities such as 
community outreach and community participation were recognized during the recovery 
phase. Community-partnered recovery efforts continued for two consecutive year 
supporting with the assistance required, while enhancing public awareness, capacity 
building and developing community resilience for a future scenario (IFRC, 2010).  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations 
Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) supported the communities affected by 
Nargis during their recovery stage (Government of Myanmar, IRP & ISDR, 2008). The 
land emergency planning experts and the land use planners together worked on with the 
UNHCR and UN-HABITAT’s joint public awareness campaigns on new settlements in 
the delta region. Around 3,000 displaced families benefited from this combined effort. 
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They further focused on the employment opportunities in the new settlement areas as a 
measure towards improving livelihoods (Government of Myanmar, IRP & ISDR, 2008).  
6.3.4 Mitigation within Myanmar 
After the landfall of Cyclone Nargis, the ASEAN communicated and coordinated the 
response and recovery between the Government of Myanmar and other international 
organisations.  The Tripartite Core Group (TCG) was developed and brought into 
enactment to follow the response of the Cyclone Nargis.  The prime aim of the TCG was 
to improve the logistics, policy, and governance of humanitarian response in the 
Ayeyarwady delta region (Kurtzer, 2009). 
Post-cyclone measures to mitigate future scenarios were carried out in the affected 
communities and villages.  The TCG observed that these communities were offered with 
training, provision of equipment such as loudspeakers and flags to raise alarm signalling 
the intensity of cyclones (Tripartite Core Group, 2010).  TCG also emphasised that, out 
of forty villages affected by the Cyclone Nargis, only six villages have been equipped 
with multi-purpose emergency shelters. These shelters were designed to operate as 
schools and clinics during non-emergency situations and act as evacuation shelters during 
emergencies. Although, the shelter set-up was considered as a step to progression, the re-
enforcing measures along the delta were less effective than required and were observed 
to be at a minimal level even after two years, since the landfall of Nargis (Tripartite Core 
Group, 2010).  
The ASEAN remarked that the humanitarian missions in Myanmar following Cyclone 
Nargis was challenging. Difficulties in liaising between the government and the ASEAN 
committee was also observed. This was especially affecting the ‘build back better’ 
scheme, which was aimed to ensure the request of developing ‘new humanitarian 
partnership models’ particularly for Southeast Asian countries which are prone to 
disasters (Fan, 2013). The US Government of Accountability Office (GAO) evaluated the 
reports of various national and international NGO’s, and the UN agencies. The outcome 
of the evaluation addressed the challenges in key thematic areas such as coordination, 
implementation, access to NGO’s, resources, and capacity building (GAO, 2011).  
The GAO (2011) further remarked, key lessons learned from Nargis should be considered 
as useful insights for future mitigation. Observing various phases of Cyclone Nargis, 
more than the existing conditions such as poor infrastructure, limited telecommunication 
services, lack of experienced professionals, those interim restrictions complicated the 
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response and recovery phases. The poor construction of the housing units across the entire 
delta region, was not only highlights the lack of protection, but also shows how debris 
from destruction of so many homes also further impacted the recovery. 
6.3.5 Summary of key activities and disaster phases during Cyclone Nargis 
Table 6.1 Summary of the key activities and their achievements observed from Case Study Nargis 
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The key activities observed in the four main phases of the DRM cycle were summarised 
based on the activities achieved and those not achieved as listed in Table 6.1. Observation 
of the key activities was derived from the coding and document sources. The key activities 
that are not achieved as shown in Table 6.1 are due to lack of early warning system, 
evacuation plans, poor communications, and unawareness of the hazard. The political 
instability and the restrictions imposed by the military Junta rule hampered many of the 
emergency management protocols from being executed. This became the primary cause 
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for the failure of many key activities from being achieved within the DRM phases. The 
key activities shown in Table 6.2 are generated to understand if there were any identified 
delays during the disaster phases. As illustrated previously in Figure 6.1, the timeline 
diagram of Nargis, it is evident that storm risk was detected eight days in-advance, and 
they only had five days between risk identification and landfall as shown in Table 6.2.  
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The dynamics and intensity of the cyclone was low-level intensity at its beginning. Within 
a very short period, the storm intensified significantly (partly due to the warm Indian 
Ocean). The intensification over the river deltas then created a strong funnel-effect which 
increased (i) the volumetric force and (ii) the velocity of the storm surge. Both the effects 
did not provide the residents with sufficient time to react. This implies that return of the 
similar cyclone in the same delta region in the future, without having mitigated the 
currently identified gaps, then the country would suffer significant impacts much worse 
than that happened during Cyclone Nargis.   
6.4 Physical damage and loss statistics within Myanmar 
The cyclone affected 2.4 million people (Government of Myanmar, IRP & ISDR, 2008)  
in Myanmar and was estimated to have caused economic damage of US$ 10 billion (2008 
USD) (Hurricane Science, 2008). According to the estimation provided by the IFRC 
Societies, referring to the data collated from various other aid organisations, the death toll 
was higher than 128,000 people. But the assessment done by the Australian Government 
(2011), estimated that at least 140,000 people along with the coastal communities 
Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) Delta and southern Yangon Division were killed. Figure 6.6 
shows the aerial view of the major agricultural damage by the 16.4 ft (5m) storm surge 
flooding.  




Figure 6.6 Agricultural damage in the Ayeyarwady delta region post-Nargis [source: Humanity House 
(2017)] 
The rapid increase in the price of water and the increase in the price of rice by 60% in 
three days from landfall are some immediate aftermath effects (ALNAP, 2008). Around 
42,194 houses in the Dedaye Township were destroyed from Cyclone Nargis (Shelter 
Org, 2010). A further 160,000 people were affected in the Dedaye Township. Roughly 
800,000 houses were either destroyed or suffered severe damage, and more than 1,400 
schools were destroyed and around 783,000 hectares of farmland was flooded 
(Government of Myanmar, IRP & ISDR, 2008).  
6.5 Impact of storm surge within Myanmar 
The storm surge of 16 ft (4.9 m) was funnelled through most of the creeks and channels 
that stretched further inland in the Ayeyarwady delta region when Cyclone Nargis made 
a landfall. The high-water marks of the storm surge in certain locations were observed to 
have surpassed even the tsunami wave run-up levels within Myanmar (Fritz et al., 2009). 
The storm surge flooding inundated the city of Yangon with an estimated range of 40-50 
km inland (Hurricane Science, 2008). Saltwater intrusion encroached around 43% of the 
freshwater bodies (Mohammed, 2009). Farmland in the coastal communities around 
38,000 hectares of natural and replanted mangroves was destroyed and around 63% of 
the paddy fields were inundated as shown in Figure 6.7.  
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Figure 6.7 Saltwater intrusion from storm surge flooding during Cyclone Nargis [image source: Evan 
Schneider] 
The structures in the low-lying delta region suffered 90-95 % of damage due to coastal 
surge (Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008). According to the Forest 
Resource Environment Development and Conservation Association (FREDA), the delta 
region was observed with 75% of loss in the mangroves, which would have possibly acted 
as a natural buffer in storm surge attenuation, before the landfall of Cyclone Nargis 
(Mohammed, 2009). The loss of mangroves observed in Myanmar emphasises the 
diminishing focus on the wetland mitigation exhibited by these developing countries. 
Despite the country’s adaptive capacity, the wetland mitigation should be considered for 
a natural and cost-effective mitigation measure for storm surge attenuation in the future. 
Moreover, public awareness on increasing the wetland mitigation for storm surge should 
also be recommended for future storm adaptation and mitigation.    
6.6  Adaptive measures taken over post-Nargis 
The Government of Myanmar through its National Disaster Preparedness Central 
 Committee (NDPCC) activated the ‘Programme for Reconstruction of areas 
affected by Cyclone Nargis. Further, the implementation plans for future preparedness 
and protection from future natural disasters were also outlined (Mohammed, 2009) The 
Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP), together with the Myanmar 
Government and the international communities issued a three-year framework to support 
the recovery efforts post Cyclone Nargis. The framework aims to cover three key themes 
mainly productive lives, healthy lives, and protective lives as a complete approach 
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towards improving livelihoods (Government of Myanmar, IRP & ISDR, 2008; 
Mohammed, 2009). 
Even after the Indian Ocean Tsunami which impacted Myanmar in 2005, the land use 
planning divisions continues to have many settlements still in the low coastal elevated 
zones (LCEZ). However, post-Cyclone Nargis and due to the extensive death toll, the 
planning division focused on building new villages, advising relocation of affected 
communities where necessary. As most of the resettlement works were regulated by the 
Government of Myanmar, they partnered with international planning agencies and 
adopted their already established plans and practices for new settlements in LCEZ’s  
(Government of Myanmar, IRP & ISDR, 2008). 
As a positive outcome, women participation was majorly observed during the recovery 
and the rebuilding phase and played a vital role in supporting restoration activities. During 
the reconstruction activities in most of the villages, the involvement of the women taking 
up various roles such as treasurer, procurement of transportation and construction 
materials, supervisor and monitoring processes, funds management were widely 
recognised by the local and international NGO’s. The combined community support 
contributed towards the improvement of livelihoods, mental health, and wellbeing of the 
communities through enhanced public participation (Shelter Org, 2010). 
6.7 Super-Typhoon Haiyan:  origin and background 
A low-pressure tropical depression originated in the Pacific Ocean, from the east of 
Micronesia on the 02 November 2013 and was confirmed by the Japan Meteorological 
Agency (JMA) on the 03 November 2013. As it approached the Philippines (NDRRMC, 
2015), on the 06 November, the storm was officially named as Typhoon Haiyan 
(regionally referred to as Typhoon Yolanda) by the Philippines Atmospheric, 
Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA). Typhoon Haiyan 
was the 23rd officially named storm of the 2013 Pacific typhoon season. On the 08 
November at 2040 UTC, the typhoon made its first landfall over Guiuan, Eastern Samar 
region. The second landfall took place over Tolosa, Leyte at 2300 UTC (NDRRMC, 
2015). The total duration of the typhoon lasted for 30 hours in the Philippines while 
making all its consecutive landfalls within short intervals. The PAGASA observed a 
maximum of 312 km/ph (194 mph) during its landfall (PAGASA, 2013). The timeline of 
Super-Typhoon Haiyan as indicated in Figure 6.8 shows the constricted rapid 
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intensification and the magnitude that was maintained during the peak four days with six 











Figure 6.9 shows the forecasted path of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines obtained from 
the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR). Table 
6.3 (a) lists the landfall history of Typhoon Haiyan. 
 
Figure 6.9 Super-Typhoon Haiyan predicted track in the PAR (2013) [source: PAGASA (2013)]    
 
The Public Storm Warning Signals (PSWS) is a scale ranging from PSWS (#1 - #4) listed 
in Table 6.3(b) and is used by PAGASA to communicate the typhoon strength and wind 
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speed. The scale is similar, like the National Hurricane Centre’s (NHCs) Saffir-Simpson 
Wind Hurricane Scale (SSWHS) (NDRRMC, 2015).  
Table 6.3(a) Landfall synopsis of Typhoon Haiyan (2013) [source: NDRRMC (2015)] 
Date Time 
(UTC) 






08 Nov  4.40 am Guiuan, eastern Samar Philippines PSWS#4  
(Cat 5) 
185 
08 Nov  7.00 am Toloso, Leyte Philippines PSWS#4  
08 Nov  9.40 am Daanbantayan, Cebu Philippines PSWS#4 165 
08 Nov  10.40 am Bantayan Island, Cebu Philippines PSWS#4  
08 Nov  12.00 pm Concepcion, Iloilo Philippines PSWS#4 155 
08 Nov  8.00 pm Busuanga, Palawan Philippines PSWS#4 145 
 
Table 6.3(b) The Public Storm Warning Signals (PSWS) scale utilised by PAGASA [source: PAGASA 
(2013)]    
Category 







before landfall  
(in hours) 
PSWS#1 30-60 18 -37 36 
PSWS#2 60-100 37-62 24 
PSWS#3 100-185 62-115 18 
PSWS#4 >185 >115 12  
Appendix B includes the author’s summary of super-typhoon Haiyan’s predicted or 
forecasted path; typhoons structure changes adapted from PAGASA’s report. As claimed 
by PAGASA, Haiyan was possibly the most powerful Category 5 typhoon in the Saffir-
Simpson Wind Hurricane Scale (SSWHS) with 251 km/h of sustained winds ever 
recorded in the Pacific region (The U.N., 2013). The Japan Meteorological Agency 
(JMA) had measured a one-minute of sustained wind speed at 315 km/h (195 mph) which 
further confirms the possibility of Haiyan being one of the most powerful storms recorded 
(Neussner, 2014; NDRRMC, 2015). 
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6.8 The disaster phases of Super-Typhoon Haiyan 
6.8.1 Preparedness within the Philippines 
The Joint Research Centre of the European Union warned PAGASA, days in-advance 
before the landfall date, 06 November 2013. Red alert status areas were monitored 
closely, and weather bulletins as early warning were issued continuously to alert the 
residents about the typhoon’s path, intensity, and predicted areas to be impacted 
(NDRRMC, 2014; PAGASA, 2013). The Philippines government’s national and local 
response teams initiated emergency protocols by taking pre-emptive measures and setting 
up 109 evacuation centers across 22 provinces. The emergency responders evacuated 
around 125,600 people to these emergency shelters which were deployed in-advance 
including relief supplies (The U.N., 2013). As Typhoon Haiyan was developing into a 
major Category 5 storm, the country’s readiness was critically challenged during the 
preparedness stage which is the initial phase within disaster management. The responders 
had to use force in some coastal communities where the residents did not follow the 
evacuation orders (NDRRMC,  2014). 
Neussner (2014) stated that the official storm surge hazard map used by PAGASA for 
forecasting, was an underestimation of the surge inundation areas.  The map further did 
not include surge heights of 22.9 ft (7 m) and therefore, correlation error occurred in the 
predicted surge levels and reliability inaccuracies were identified. As per Neussner’s 
claim, PAGASA and the NDRRMC gave greater emphasis to rainfall, flooding and 
mudslides and issued warnings correspondingly and gave lesser importance to storm 
surge warnings (Neussner, 2014). With risks being identified and analysed days in-
advance, the emergency responders failed to communicate and warn the residents about 
the magnitude of the storm surge. This may be because either the risk was underestimated, 
or it was not understood properly and interpreted to the residents in their local language 
(dialect). According to NDRRMC’s (2014) report, the team members of PAGASA and 
its emergency responders themselves did not evacuate the high-risk zones and stayed 
nearshore despite the warning and became victims themselves. Both the coastal residents 
and the emergency responders acknowledged that they were not familiar with the term 
‘storm surge’ communicated by the authorities (NDRRMC, 2015; Jibiki, 2016).   
6.8.2 Response within the Philippines 
During Typhoon Haiyan, the dynamics of the typhoon was rapid, and responders had 
limited time from the date of declaration of emergency (NDRRMC, 2015). Of the total 
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seventeen administrative regions, nine were affected which includes 12,122 villages 
known as barangays, with 44 provinces and 591 municipalities and 57 cities which were 
entirely affected by Typhoon Haiyan (CDAC, 2014).  Figure 6.10 shows the before and 
after image of the damage inflicted on the City of Tacloban and the magnitude of the 
storm surge, which affected around 3.4 million families across the 139 coastal villages 
(The U.N., 2013).                                                      








One of the key challenges that were identified was that the residents did not understand 
the term ‘storm surge’, communicated by the Philippines Weather Authority (PAGASA) 
during the preparedness stage of Super-typhoon Haiyan. Observations shows how 
residents were prepared for typhoon’s heavy winds and were least informed of the 
severity of water damage that a potential storm surge could cause (Center for Excellence 
in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, 2014). Lack of awareness of storm 
surge hazard and related communication failure resulted in many residents, to consider 
basements as their safe grounds (CDAC, 2014). The public unawareness guided the 
residents to disregard pre-emptive evacuation orders directly resulting in the significant 
death toll, displaced, and affected population (Jibiki, 2016; Hernandez Jr, 2015).  
The island of Tubabao, Eastern Samar, highly populated with farming families was 
another majorly impacted area by Typhoon Haiyan. Despite being severely impacted, 
these families received only limited assistance due to their remote location from the 
mainland. The responders found it difficult to reach these locations with relief support 
(FAO, 2015). The National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) stated that 1,959 
transmission facilities were adversely damaged by Typhoon Haiyan as of 22 November 
2013 (NDRRMC, 2014). 
    
 
 
Figure 6.10 Before and after-images of the City of Tacloban (2013) [source: (PAGASA, 2013)] 
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The devastation created by Typhoon Haiyan in five major islands demanded a major 
response and relief support. The PASAGA’s weather station was destroyed in Tolosa near 
Tacloban area during the typhoon and was later replaced with automatic weather systems 
(IRIDeS, 2016). It was beyond the National Response Team’s (NRT) incident 
management levels; thus, leading to the requisition of national and international 
humanitarian assistance by the Philippines government (Dy & Stephens, 2016). This 
emergency was communicated across 57 countries and 29 militaries globally and 
humanitarian assistance from various agencies was provided to support the emergency 
response (Tiller, 2014). The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and USAID 
responded to request by initiating their internal contingency plans. Furthermore, the team 
facilitated in clearing the transportation routes and recovering halted logistics. This was 
considered as one of the key actions of humanitarian assistance, emergency relief support 
in regaining access to the airports and roadways to speed up the process of response and 
recovery (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, 
2014). The US Department of Defense (DOD) furthermore, facilitated the response by 
providing naval, air and marine corps to the affected areas to support with search and 
rescue operations, transport relief supplies, assisting in road and debris clearance. The 
DOD personnel extended their support in assisting the situation with humanitarian 
assistance in the south of Tacloban and the Leyte Gulf areas (Lum & Margesson, 2014).  
Lack of resources and the nation’s constrained budgets resulted in significant reductions 
of prior investment in the deployment of resources, which also critically reflected the lack 
of adaptive capacity during the response phase of Haiyan (Dy & Stephens, 2016). The 
Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (LDRRMC) did not have 
enough resources or capacities for effective decision-making. Moreover, the local 
authorities, who directly liaised with the coastal community residents further lacked in 
capacity building and training on crisis management and familiarization with 
international humanitarian organizations. From 13- 18 November 2013, the national and 
international media criticized the country’s response and relief support to be observed as 
slow despite the magnitude of the destruction (Dy & Stephens, 2016). By observing how 
the risk was identified in advance, and the aftermath that it created, the risk was 
supposedly either underestimated or served with inadequate response.  
6.8.3 Recovery within the Philippines 
The infrastructure of the country was severely damaged which includes the public and 
the private buildings, transportation, seaports, airports, power and utilities, water supply 
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and drainage systems. Public buildings such as hospitals, health facilities and schools 
experienced significant damage hampering safety shelters which are alternative to 
evacuation centres (NDRRMC, 2014). Humanitarian agencies such as the International 
Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) were already grounded in the field, for the recovery of a 
previous earthquake which struck the Philippines in 2012. The existing teams were 
grouped again with new teams for phase 3- recovery of Typhoon Haiyan (IFRC, 2016). 
The Red Cross and their partnered teams activated their emergency relief support to 
respond and recover from the damage incurred. According to the IFRC, shelter repair 
assistance was provided to a total of 75,973 households (IFRC, 2016). Three months after 
the landfall of Haiyan the U.N. reported that the recovery operations were prolonged due 
to the lack of availability between the transitional and permanent shelter for both the 
evacuees and for the displaced population (USAID, 2014). This is a key area to be focused 
and included for future mitigation.  
The USAID in collaboration with the Office of the U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) initiated a team called, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The DART 
team in correspondence with the US-based Response Management Team (RMT) further 
coordinated with the Philippines government to deploy the resources. Deployment of 
resources from this collaboration commenced on the 09 November 2013. The team also 
liaised in assessing the damage, humanitarian assistance, and search and rescue post-
landfall of Typhoon Haiyan (USAID, 2014).  
The IFRC emphasised on the fact, that though the international response was quick, yet 
it experienced substantial difficulty in synchronising the transition between local 
responders and international communities. This is mainly due to the prolonged existence 
of an international emergency team in the field than the time planned by the Philippines 
government (IFRC, 2016; IRIDeS, 2016). A contradictory viewpoint during the recovery 
phase was observed by the government and the international organisations. The 
Philippines government expected the international organisations to assist with the 
response to Haiyan stating the possibility of a quick recovery. This was challenged by the 
international response communities who envisaged that recovery phase was projected to 
continue anywhere between six months to a year (Dy & Stephens, 2016). As per the 
IFRC’s report, the long-term recovery continued for 3 years till 2016. The city of 
Tacloban, whose infrastructure suffered significant damage (NDRRMC, 2014) focused 
primarily on the recovery of housing and power. The residents whose houses were 
Page | 137  
 
destroyed were moved into bunkhouses and shelters constructed by the Government of 
the Philippines (GPH) as a first stage recovery (USAID, 2014).  
 
Figure 6.11 Temporary shelters provided by NHA post-typhoon Haiyan [source: Estifania et al., (2016)] 
The National Housing Authority (NHA) further assisted the second stage recovery 
process by constructing houses for the victims who were already provided with temporary 
shelter houses as shown in Figure 6.11 (Hernandez et al., 2015). NDRRMC reported that 
by January 2014, the power supply was restored in 1,243 affected households 
(NDRRMC, 2014).  
6.8.4 Mitigation within the Philippines 
The Government of the Philippines (GPH) launched a program called Reconstruction 
Assistance in Yolanda (RAY), as a four-year programme to operate from 2013-2017. The 
primary aim of the RAY was to support rehabilitation by rebuilding the coastal 
communities and areas affected by Typhoon Haiyan (Lum & Margesson, 2014). On 04 
July 2014, the GPH declared that the humanitarian phase is over, and RAY will be 
replaced by the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP) (Shelter 
Cluster, 2016).  
To improve the lives of victims, livelihood assistance was provided to 63,221 households 
(IFRC, 2016). The temporary shelters and homes were rebuilt using alternate practices 
such as the ‘build back safer’ techniques which includes solid foundation, bracing, 
roofing, joints, and other quality local construction materials. One of the significant 
mitigation measures as observed by the IFRC was the government’s mandated the ‘no-
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build zones’ for areas vulnerable to hazard such as storm surge, coastal flooding and 
landslides (IFRC, 2016).  It is to be noted that although, the ‘build back safer’ (BBS) 
technique primarily focused on the materials, the understanding of this term is widely 
interpreted differently by different actors resulting in lack of limited expertise to 
implement the safer rebuilding techniques were observed  (Fernandez & Ahmed, 2019).  
After two years of the landfall of Haiyan, around 1,600 families were found living in 
temporary housing provided either by government or through their collaboration with 
international NGO’s (IRIDeS, 2016). The lessons learned from the devastating impacts 
of Typhoon Haiyan led the country to focus on the actions as soon as the emergency relief 
work was partially completed. However, due to various restricting factors and the 
adaptive capacity of the country the action taken was slow, relative to the catastrophic 
impact.  
6.8.5 Summary of key activities and disaster phases during Typhoon Haiyan 
The list of activities achieved and unachieved in the pre-impact, post-impact and during 
the landfall of Super-Typhoon Haiyan was summarised in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4 Summary of the key activities and their achievements observed from Case Study Haiyan 















NGO, INGO, and 
volunteers 





























































Land use planning 
 
Page | 139  
 
The table provides an overall summary of all the actions as key activities measured both 
from coding and from the document sources. Based on the initial rapid assessment of the 
damage the President served the ‘declaration of calamity’ as presidential proclamation, 
on 11 November 2013 (NDRRMC, 2014). The unachieved key activities within the DRM 
phases were mainly due to lack of awareness of the storm surge hazard by both the 
emergency responders and the authorities themselves resulting in the lack of clarity at 
various levels. Table 6.5 also emphasises the observed delay in the declaration of 
emergency and deployment of resources as one of the key factors to be considered for 
future mitigation measures. 
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6.9 Physical damage and loss statistics within the Philippines 
The final updated report of the NDRRMC, confirms that the total death toll was 6,300 
(NDRRMC, 2015). Around 16 million individual people were affected 28,689 who were 
identified as injured by Typhoon Yolanda. A further 4 million people were displaced and 
1,785 still missing. The total estimated cost of the damage was US$ 864 million 
(McPherson et al., 2015; Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian 
Assistance, 2014). The magnitude of Typhoon Haiyan resulted in a severe impact on the 
islands of the Philippines. The government of the Philippines (GPH) estimated around 
1.1 million homes were affected of which approximately 600,000 were supported by GPH 
and the remaining were requested for humanitarian assistance. The storm further 
destroyed around 100,000 small-scale fishing boats across the coastal communities, 
whose prime resources for a living was fishing (USAID, 2014).  Many critical 
infrastructures in the path of Typhoon Haiyan were damaged. This includes the 
educational facilities consisting of 3,200 schools and day-care centres which were either 
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adversely damaged or destroyed (IFRC, 2016). Around eleven weather stations, many 
meteorological instruments and buoys were damaged leaving little or no data of storm 
surge inundation and heights (Kubota et al., 2013). 
Table 6.6 shows the estimated total households recorded in 2010 versus the affected 
household in 2013 within the Cebu communities, where 90% of the households suffered 
severe damage or were destroyed completely (Marfil, 2013). 
Table 6.6 Total households versus affected households in the communities of Cebu during typhoon 
Haiyan [source: Marfil (2013)] 




Bantayan 16,258 14,632 
Madridejos 7,588 6,829  
Santa Fe 5,928 5,335  
Daanbantayan 16,282 14,654 
Medellin 10,880 9,792 
San Remegio 11,173 10,055 
Bogo city 15,198 13,678 
 
6.10 Impact of storm surge within the Philippines 
The victims and the residents addressed the storm surge flooding triggered by the Super-
Typhoon Haiyan as a tsunami or a tsunami-like event on various occasions (Morgerman, 
2014). This might be possibly due to the facts (i) that pattern of reverse storm surge 
behaviour exhibited or (ii) the rapidity and magnitude of the storm surge as experienced 
by the victims. The victims of the coastal communities who witnessed the storm surge 
reported that the water receded exhibiting a basic pattern of a tsunami. They further added 
that immediately after the ‘surge recession’ of water had taken place, the magnitude was 
sudden, and they did not have enough time to react, as the water was funnelled into the 
city’s landscape (Morgerman, 2014).  
Although, the size of the cyclone was small, the intensity of the storm surge was observed 
to be rapid (McPherson et al., 2015). As per German Aid Agency for International 
Cooperation’s (GIZ) estimation, 94 % of the causalities from Tacloban, Palo, and 
Tanauan was solely due to storm surge (Neussner, 2014). Figure 6.12 before-image shows 
the city of Tacloban, which was developed on the San Pedro bay (on the left) and an after-
image shows the city’s exposure to storm surge > 19.7 ft (6 m). 
 










The term ‘typhoon’ was never a strange word for the residents of the Philippines who are 
exposed to approximately 20 typhoons on average a year. The communities stacked their 
emergency supplies and stayed indoors knowing a typhoon would be imminent. Their 
focus was on high wind damage and flooding (from rain) and remained unaware of the 
approaching storm surge. The storm surge funnelled the water through the neck of the 
San Pedro Bay about 30 km until Leyte. The water funnelled hundreds of meters inland 
into the city and completely levelled most of the critical infrastructure situated nearshore 
(Galvin, 2014). Most of the measuring instruments were damaged directly and indirectly 
by damaging or destroying completely leaving little or no ground to be collected post-
typhoon event. In Tanauan and Palo towns within the City of Tacloban, storm surge levels 
were estimated between 7.5- 16.4 ft (2.3-5 m) (Galvin, 2014). The storm surge damaged 
the PASAGA’s monitoring systems, measuring instruments, resulting in little or no 
ground data with the telecommunication system being toppled by the storm’s magnitude.  
Table 6.7 Predicted storm surge issued by project NOAH [source: Neussner O.  (2014)] 
Province Location 
Storm surge +   
tide in ft(m)                         
Eastern Samar Matarinao Bay 17.4 (5.3) 
Biliran Poro Island, Biliran Str 15.4 (4.7) 
Leyte Tacloban, San Juanico Str 14.8 (4.5) 
Quezon Port Pusgo 14.4 (4.4) 
Eastern Samar Andis Island, Port Borongan 14.1 (4.3) 
Quezon Santa Cruz Harbour 13.8 (4.2) 
Palawan Port Barton 12.8 (3.9) 
Iloilo Banate 12.8 (3.9) 
Leyte Palompon 13 (4.0) 
Leyte Ormoc 12.5 (3.8) 






 Figure 6.12 Before and after image of the City of Tacloban post-Haiyan [source: BBC News (2013)]  
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Table 6.7 shows the storm surge prediction levels issued by the project NOAH. These 
predicted measurements were later confirmed by PAGASA as near accurate values 
(PAGASA, 2013). The predictions given by Project NOAH was considered as near 
accurate. Because PASAGA’s estimation excluded inundations beyond 22.96 ft (7 m), 
they underestimated the actual risk thereby, implying that storm surge is less severe than 
the other hazard such as rainfall and landslides. Table 6.8 shows the actual storm surge 
levels observed at three main locations severely impacted by a 16-23 ft (5-7 m) storm 
surge range. 
Table 6.8 Actual storm surge measured in mainland Philippines post-typhoon Haiyan [source: PAGASA 
(2013)] 
Location Storm surge inundation 
height in ft (m) 
Guiuan to Hernani 20-23 (6-7) 
Tacloban to Palo 16-20 (5-6) 
Basey 16-20 (5-6) 
 
The coastlines across these three main locations were completely devastated from the 
inundations, destroying most of the homes near the coast, which were built with wooded 
exterior and glass roofs (PAGASA, 2013).  
6.11 Adaptive measures taken post-Haiyan within the Philippines 
By the end of November 2013 when the disaster relief was still carried out with milestones 
to reach, the President of Philippines initiated the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation 
and Recovery (PARR) to unify rehabilitation and recovery efforts (Dy & Stephens, 2016). 
On 16 December 2013, the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) enforced 
the ‘Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda’s: Build Back Better’ guidance for 
rehabilitation plans. Followed by the guidance of the document in September 2014, 
‘Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda’s: Implementation of Results’ on reconstruction 
plans and projects which were initiated (Dy & Stephens, 2016). Many of the grounded 
National Societies, non-profit organisations and NGO’s reported that the recovery and 
rehabilitation works are expected to continue beyond 2018 (IFRC, 2016). The Office of 
Civil Defence (OCD) issued the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment in April 2014 (Dy & 
Stephens, 2016). Several international partnership agencies extended their organisational 
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capacities supporting to improve the livelihoods of the victims during the post-recovery 
and mitigation (Philippines Humanitarian Country Team, 2013). 
• The International Labour Organization 
• United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  
• United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) 
• Save the Children, Oxfam 
• United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
• International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
• UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) 
• World Food Programme (WFP) 
• World Health Organization (WHO) 
• UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)   
6.12 Summary  
The case studies of Nargis and Haiyan have highlighted the intensity of storm surge 
hazard and the relative damage that could be to their coastal communities for not knowing 
or understanding the term ‘storm surge’. Whilst new legislation and guidelines may have 
been published, since these major events, today in 2020 there is still recovery work 
ongoing, despite being 12 years and 7 years since the event occurrence. The lessons learnt 
from the case studies also provide insight into how countries like Myanmar and the 
Philippines could suffer during the recovery stages if proper adaptation plans were not in 
place. Areas inundated further inland from the coasts underlines the influences of ‘funnel-
effects’ of storm surges. Scenarios such as seeking shelter under the basement when a 20 
ft (6.1 m) storm surge is approaching the coast, not only shows the lack of hazard 
awareness but also shows the ignorance of the authorities to leave the communities at 
greatest risk to life. This chapter also highlighted how high-risk ocean basins such as the 
Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal whose deep warm waters could inflict catastrophic damage 
by becoming a rapidly intensified cyclones within a shorter span of their origin. 
Observing these case studies, it is evident how early warning systems is critical in saving 
lives during emergencies especially to those countries with the limited (restricted) 
resource. Well-planned and coordinated DRM and DRR strategies could benefit countries 
like Myanmar and the Philippines directly reducing the mortality rate. These statements 
further underline how the potential DAMSS framework approach together with the 
guidelines as best-practices could enhance the resilience of the coastal communities for 
developing countries.  
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CHAPTER 7 
ISLAND STATES AND STORM SURGE EVENTS 
Case studies: Hurricanes Matthew and Maria 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines two significant hurricanes which occurred in the Atlantic Ocean. 
The cases are perceived from the perspective of responses exhibited by Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) such as Haiti and Puerto Rico. The first case discusses 
Hurricane Matthew from the 2016 Atlantic hurricane season which made landfall in Haiti 
and the USA. However, the response is majorly discussed from Haiti’s point of view and 
discussed in comparison to the USA. The second case examines Hurricane Maria from 
the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season and the case is discussed from Puerto Rico’s 
perspective in comparison to the USA.  
7.2 Hurricane Matthew: origin and background 
Hurricane Matthew originated as a tropical depression on the west coast of Africa on 23 
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the equatorial Atlantic following which an organised pattern was confirmed on 27 
September 2016. The depression quickly picked up the storm elements becoming a 
tropical storm around 1200 UTC 28 September as shown in Figure 7.1 and gained its 
official name ‘Matthew’ (Stewart, 2017). With an unusually large wind field the storm 
moved fast over the warm Caribbean waters and rapidly intensified to reach hurricane 
status by 29 September 1800 UTC, within 24 hours after reaching storm status. Matthew 
underwent an extraordinary strengthening (over 2 days) from 75 knots to the peak 
intensity of 145 knots and became a Category 5 hurricane on the 01 October 2016, at 
0000 UTC (Stewart, 2017).  
The storm system quickly weakened back to a Category 4 hurricane in less than six hours 
and continued its course for the next two days until the first landfall occurred on 04 
October 2016, 1200 UTC at Les Anglais, Haiti as a Category 4 hurricane. Hurricane 
Matthew was the first Category 4 hurricane after Hurricane Cleo to hit Haiti since 1964 
(Hersher, 2016; Stewart, 2017). Figure 7.2 shows Hurricane Matthew’s projected path 
with colour coded hurricane categories. This version is adapted by the researcher using 






Figure 7.2 Hurricane Matthew’s projected path with colour coded themes for different hurricane 
categories (version adapted by the author using Google Map) 
A sustained wind measurement of 45 knots was reported at Toussaint Louverture 
International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. No specific wind reports were observed 
when Matthew made the landfall as a Category 4 hurricane. Table 7.1 lists the second 
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landfall occurred in Juaco, Cuba 0000 UTC on 05 October and the Bahamas on the 0000 
UTC 07 October 2016 as a Category 4 hurricane.  
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On 08 October at 1500 UTC, Matthew reached the coastline of Georgia, and then 
weakened and downgraded to a Category 2 hurricane and made its final landfall at South 
Carolina (Miller et al., 2018). The storm further weakened and became an extra-tropical 
cyclone after its final landfall, as it moved away from North Carolina as shown in Figure 
7.2. Matthew broke the records of many previous hurricanes and became the record-
breaking longest Category 4 hurricane for five continuous days in the Atlantic Ocean 
(Gilbert, 2018). A further detailed structural change assessment of data, for Hurricane 
Matthew, including its projected pathway, the hurricane watch-warnings issued by the 
NHC is included in Appendix B. These data warnings included air pressure, wind field 
and strengthening or weakening of hurricane structure. 
7.3 The disaster phases of Hurricane Matthew 
7.3.1 Preparedness within Haiti 
Haiti was in the path of Hurricane Matthew and was predicted to be the first landfall 
location of Matthew. The Haitian government in partnerships with NGO organisations 
initiated their Phase 1- preparedness by activating the emergency response plans (Miller 
et al., 2018). Factors such as the economic capacity, the country’s political instability 
together with the lack of resources majorly hindered the preparedness activities. This 
further complicated the succeeding activities and left the country exposed to the 
approaching hurricane (Howe, 2016). The country’s vulnerability to disasters was well-
interpreted from a previous earthquake event which occurred in 2010. A colour coded 
alerting system was in practice in Haiti to alert the population. On 02 October 2016, this 
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colour code was modified from orange to red indicating the increase in the hurricane’s 
strength. In Cuba, around 1,079,000 people were evacuated from six eastern provinces of 
the country (GRID, 2017). Once the storm crossed Haiti with severe damage the second 
and third landfall occurred in Cuba and in the Bahamas and advanced towards the east 
coast of the USA (Stewart, 2017). By this point of time, the USA had already initiated 
their preparedness procedures. All the residents in the predicted path of Hurricane 
Mathew along US Coastline of from Florida, Georgia, North, and South Carolina were 
ordered evacuation. In Florida, 147 shelters in 33 counties were set-up for the evacuees 
(Howe, 2016).   
Various precautionary measures were initiated parallelly. Two of the major nuclear 
reactors in Florida, which were already facing issues regarding sea encroachment, was 
anticipated in Matthew’s predicted path and flood proofing works were carried out (The 
USNRC, 2017). The authorities of the Nuclear Energy Institute ensured that ‘the reactors 
in Florida were safe, flood proofed with emergency preventions’; and all the nuclear 
plants were safe under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) new rule’. The NRC 
new rule was imposed to improve the safety standards related to decommissioning after 
the Fukushima disaster (Nunez, 2015). Nevertheless, as an added precaution both the 
power reactors were shut down with severe warnings issued by NRC during preparedness 
for Hurricane Matthew (The US NRC, 2017).  
The phase 1-preparedness between the USA and Haiti clearly shows the difference of 
approaches adopted by these two countries. While the USA had already evacuated its 
coastal residents ahead of time, Haiti had only embraced partial evacuation leaving many 
of its residents exposed. Also, being a small island state, and with restricted capabilities, 
and geographic limitations Haiti faced issues regarding availability of sheltering 
opportunities. 
In the USA, before Matthew's arrival, FEMA had 444,000 litres of water and 513,000 
meals and other supplies readily available in their support base to be mobilized to affected 
areas. Non-profit groups also volunteered during the Phase 1- preparedness stage for 
Matthew, focusing on safety efforts a day-ahead of Matthew’s arrival (Stein, 2016). North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia declared, state of emergency days ahead of storm’s 
approach as a step towards preparedness (Hersher, 2016). More than 1.5 million people 
were instructed to follow the issued mandatory evacuation orders (Domonoske, 2016). 
According to the source of the Associated Press, because of the short coastline of Georgia, 
more than 500,000 residents were asked to evacuate (Domonoske, 2016). Early 
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predictions suggested that Hurricane Matthew would deviate from the east coast however, 
the hurricane stayed along the US coast longer than expected to make its final landfall in 
South Carolina (Brouillette, 2016).   
7.3.2 Response within Haiti 
In Jérémie, Haiti, it was reported that almost all the roofs were destroyed and in many 
locations that the level of damage and destruction was not clear during the first few days. 
In Port-au-Prince, a bridge in the National Route 2 collapse, which was the main way for 
the supplies, emergency responders and relief workers to transport and communicate 
(Hersher, 2016). The residents were alerted, but without the government support and were 
left to fend for themselves with minimal resources. Therefore, coordinating these 
residents in response stage became a difficult task. In addition, the lag-in-response by the 
Haitian government was also observed (Global Philanthropy Group, 2016).  
The NGO’s with their volunteers who were already grounded for the rehabilitation of the 
2010 earthquake, paired together with the government authorities and initiated the 
response on 05 October 2016 soon after the landfall. The emergency responders faced 
extreme difficulty to reach the remote and hardest-hit areas.  
 
Figure 7.3 Hurricane Matthew catastrophic damage in Haiti [Image source:  Carlos Garcia Rawlins-
Reuters] 
The impact includes 80 % of the buildings and more than 30,000 homes destroyed in the 
City of Jérémie and its sub-provinces (Howe, 2016), as exhibited in Figure 7.3. By 08 
October, it was reported that roughly 1,000 people were killed by Hurricane Matthew in 
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Haiti alone (Alexander, 2016; Hersher, 2016). However, the official reports of NHC state 
that the death statistics in Haiti was 546 (Stewart, 2017). The variation of the death toll 
by official and unofficial sources infers that a more rigorous measure should be involved 
to record accurate disaster data.  As the hurricane continued its course in Cuba, major 
urban areas such as Guantanamo, Holguin and Las Tunas were also identified as the most 
impacted areas. (Virtual OSOCC, 2016). In Baracoa, a municipality within Guantanamo 
was reported with 90 % of the homes either having partial to major damage or destruction. 
Although no deaths were reported in Cuba, the country faced severe crop damage (FAO, 
2016).  
In St. Augustine, Jacksonville, Florida around 7,000 residents were identified as non-
evacuees despite the early warning of 8 ft (2.4 m) storm surge communicated by the local 
emergency operations centre (Johnston et al., 2016). During Hurricane Matthew (2016) 
the U.S. coastal cities were observed to be overwhelmed with information which created 
ambiguity in certain places while Haiti had limited information available about the 
hurricane (CERC, 2014). The storm reached the south-eastern coastline of USA, the storm 
had weakened to a Category 2 hurricane still produced damage and created power outage 
affecting nearly 3 million people along the coast of Florida and Carolinas (Miller et al., 
2018).  
7.3.3 Recovery within Haiti 
Due to the political instability in Haiti, the recovery and response were carried out in 
collaboration with various international organizations such as UNICEF, Office of the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), WFP (World Food Program), PAHO, 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and other volunteer NGO organizations 
(Global Philanthropy Group, 2016).  Emergency relief and recovery actions took place 
immediately after Matthew’s landfall. The US Navy shipped three vessels of emergency 
supplies as a relief and recovery to Haiti (Hersher, 2016).  
Hurricane Matthew resulted in a humanitarian crisis in Haiti, leaving the country to 
struggle during the phase-3 recovery stage. According to the UN, almost half a million 
children needed humanitarian assistance and were still identified to be in extended 
recover phase (UN News, 2016). The UN Development Programme (UNDP) reported 
that 98% of the City of Jérémie and Grand’ Anse had been destroyed (UN News, 2016; 
Jones & Holpuch, 2016) as shown in Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4 Devastation in the cities of Les Cayes and Jérémie during Hurricane Matthew [Image: 
Xinhua/Barcroft/ Ruck (2016)] 
Due to the resultant major roadways blockage, truncated bridges and critical 
infrastructures, such as the water systems being damaged or destroyed completely, 
prolonged the recovery in Haiti specifically in Grand’ Anse Department, Sud Department, 
Jérémie. Figure 7.5(a) shows the before and after-image of the collapsed bridge in Grand’ 
Anse, Haiti which truncated emergency responders and supplies and prolonged the 
recovery process.  
 
Figure 7.5(a) Collapsed bridge in Petit-Goave, Haiti post-hurricane Matthew [Image source: 
Google/Reuters] 
Efforts were undertaken on rebuilding access to the bridge in Grand’ Anse department as 
this bridge was the only possible route for the emergency responders to access the 
impacted areas (CARE, 2018). The mountainous regions of Grand’ Anse received little 
assistance and these were the hardest-hit areas, which took around five months to repair 
Page | 151  
 
and rebuild the damaged houses (GRID, 2017). Haiti’s vulnerability and poverty together 
played a critical role in delaying recovery and rehabilitation. Call for funds, donations, 
emergency supplies and assistance were pooled internationally to support and expedite 
the recovery process of the devasting situation in Haiti (CARE, 2018).  
Around three hundred schools were heavily damaged out of which around 150 schools 
were set up as emergency shelters for the evacuees were also included in the damage 
(Global Philanthropy Group, 2016; United Nations Institute for Training And Research's 
UNOSAT, 2016). Nearly half a million people of Haiti’s total population were children 
and under 18’s and were in the south-western Haiti where the hurricane severely impacted 
the country. International organizations and NGO’s were involved in various recovery 
areas of south-western Haiti. UNICEF initiated temporary learning spaces for the children 
to continue their learning and education (Global Philanthropy Group, 2016).    
After three months since the landfall of Hurricane Matthew in Haiti, 85-93% of families 
were severely affected by food insecurities (FAO, 2016). Due to the severe and extended 
food insecurity, the World Food Program (WFP) supported with food assistance for 
nearly 925,000 people until April 2017, for six months since the landfall (USAID, 2017). 
During the recovery phase even after a year, extended shelter rehabilitation works took 
place in areas which were adversely impacted. The World Vision International provided 
humanitarian assistance for around 246,000 people in the communities that was severely 
impacted (World Vision International, 2017).  
Whilst Haiti had previously received humanitarian assistance following the 2010 
earthquake, Hurricane Matthew was the first ‘cyclone’ event to request and receive 
humanitarian assistance due to the extensively affected and displaced population. The 
weather event and its significant impact left the country with key lessons to be learnt to 
adapt for a future situation. Some of the key lesson were to increase the capacity building, 
improve training of national and international actors during emergencies, understanding 
the bottleneck issues in logistics. Logistics was one of the main key lessons learned within 
logistics during the crisis, e.g., the bridge collapse hampered the primary transport route 
(Logistics Cluster, 2018). The USAID/OFDA partnered with J/P Haitian Relief 
Organisation (J/P HRO), Mercy Corps in support of covering the sheltering needs. These 
partnerships worked in providing shelter kits and liaised in providing training in support 
of enhancing the livelihood and promote more robust and resilient neighbourhoods. 
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Figure 7.5 (b) Temporary shelter (right) (USAID, 2017) built post aftermath and durable shelter(left) built 
in Haiti, post-hurricane Matthew [Image source: Habitat for Humanity] 
More than 6,000 households were furnished with shelter solutions (USAID, 2017). Figure 
7.5 (b)-(left) is a sample of 300 houses built using Habitat’s shelter materials (Habitat for 
Humanity, 2020) and Figure 7.5 (b)-(right) shows the temporary shelter solutions.  
7.3.4 Mitigation within Haiti 
Due to the extensive damage and the ongoing recovery, there have been very few (if any) 
mitigations measures applied within Haiti in preparation for any future storm. This may 
be compounded due to the lack of financial resources within Haiti for both public and 
industrial sectors. This contrasts with the very developed country such as the US (such as 
Florida, South Carolina) who have undertaken extensive reviews of the data and initiated 
mitigation or resilience measures.  
The NHC initially predicted that Hurricane Matthew would make landfall at Florida as a 
category 4 hurricane with a minimum of at least 8 ft (2.4 m) storm surge. However, this 
the surge did not produce the predicted surge levels. The forecast did not aid in assessing 
the potential impacts as the hurricane took a deviation (Stewart, 2017). The deviation of 
the actual path in comparison with the predicted path highlight how the technical aspects 
of understanding the hurricane intensity and succeeding structural change of the 
hurricanes needs to be improved further. The National Weather Service (NWS) issued a 
prototype of storm surge watch-warning during Hurricane Matthew at 2100 UTC, 04 
October 2016 the same day when the declaration of emergency was issued for 6 states 
including Florida, North and South Carolinas, Virginia, and Georgia. The watch-warning 
were however issued only for few selected areas and was remarked that residents should 
still heed to the advisories. The watch-warning are only to communicate the risk and not 
to be misunderstood as risk being mitigated (Stewart, 2017).  
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Considering the direct impact from storm surge in South Carolina, revised construction 
methods especially emphasizing the durability, efficiency and sustainability were 
considered. This was implemented for all the rehabilitated, reconstructed houses in 
addition to the new constructions ensuring mitigation measures to increase the resilience 
for future disasters (The Department of Housing and Urban Development , 2017). To 
mitigate the severe power outage faced by South Carolina the national and state-level 
power and utility organizations participated in training and exercises to strengthen their 
utility infrastructure for during future emergency responses (Florida Public Service 
Commission, 2018). 
7.3.5 Summary of key activities and disaster phases during Hurricane Matthew 
Table 7.2. Summary of the key activities and their achievements observed from Case Study Matthew 
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Table 7.2 shows the list of key activities followed while executing the four main phases 
of the DRM cycle during the lifecycle of Matthew. The listed key activities were observed 
from the document sources using coding approach. The list of unachieved key activities 
identified was mainly due to the political instability in Haiti, weak economic capacity, 
limited and restricted resources which was prevailing since the 2010 Haiti earthquake. 
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While observing the key activities the following timeline gap was also observed as shown 
in Table 7.3. Between the risk identification and issuance of the first official warning, 
only a four-day time gap was observed as an inactive period during which no 
preparedness activities were carried out. A country like Haiti, whose economic capacity 
is weak should focus more on phase-1 preparedness stage by increasing their 
organisational capacities through multi-agency approach. Even though the adaptive 
capacity is low, the country could have minimised the impact with the support of pre-
established NGO’s and their networks.  
 
7.4 Physical damage and loss statistics  
Hurricane Matthew with a sustained wind speed of 125.8 knots (145-mph) winds and 
with an 11-foot (3.4 m) storm surge together with the heavy downpours severely impacted 
the north-west, south-west and south of Haiti, particularly impacting Jérémie and Les 
Cayes (World Food Programme, 2016; PAHO/WHO, 2016). According to the Haitian 
Civil Protection Directorate (CPD) 15,623 people were displaced in Haiti and a total of 
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350,000 needed humanitarian assistance. An aerial view of the damage is shown in Figure 
7.6.  
 
Figure 7.6 Before and after-image of Jérémie, Haiti from the impact of Hurricane Matthew [Image 
source: Google/Reuters (BBC News, 2016)] 
In the Dominican Republic, 21,951 were displaced (Virtual OSOCC, 2016). As per the 
estimates of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
more than one million residents of Haiti were affected and required urgent humanitarian 
assistance (Jones & Holpuch, 2016). In Haiti, around 240,000 homes were severely 
damaged or destroyed. The economic damage in the Caribbean was estimated at US$ 5 
billion. It was reported that transportation of emergency supplies was truncated in some 
of the hardest-hit areas such as Grand’ Anse and Suds department (United Nations 
Institute for Training And Research's UNOSAT, 2016). Communication and coordination 
between emergency responders became difficult due to all the telecommunication hubs 
being disconnected and a key bridge connecting the route was cut-off (Jones & Holpuch, 
2016; DHS & FCC, 2018). 
Table 7.4 Estimated economic damage of Hurricane Matthew [source: Stewart (2017)] 
State/Province 
 





Haiti 1.9 billion 
Cuba 2.58 billion 
Bahamas 600 million 
The United States 10 billion 
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Table 7.4 displays the estimated economic damage in corresponding countries adapted 
from NHC’s report (Stewart, 2017). In Cuba, Guantanamo faced significant damage from 
the storm surge and heavy winds of Hurricane Matthew. Around 9,000 homes were 
destroyed and around 30,000 homes suffered adverse damage with an estimated economic 
cost of US$ 2.58 billion. Overall, in Cuba, the estimated damage cost was reported to be 
more than US$ 5 billion (echoCuba & Outreach Aid to the Americas (OAA), 2016). In 
addition to public infrastructures, more than 29,000 houses were severely damaged, and 
3,174 homes were destroyed completely.  A further 35,019 people were also affected in 
the Dominican Republic (PAHO/WHO, 2016). As the storm’s track was in parallel to the 
east coast of the US, and just before the landfall at South Carolina, Matthew was 
weakened to a Category 2 hurricane. So, the damage in the USA was not severe compared 
to Haiti. However, the USA suffered a substantial power outage. 
Table 7.5 Power Outage caused by Hurricane Matthew in the USA [source: Florida Public Service 
Commission, 2018] 
States (United Kingdom) Power Outage  
(No. of homes) 
Jacksonville 250,000 
Georgia 300,000 
South Carolina 800,000 
North Carolina 900,000 
Virginia 350,000 
 
Table 7.5 displays the power outage experienced in the USA and the number of homes 
affected. Despite various measures taken against strengthening the utility infrastructure 
during emergencies yet the state suffered severe power outage from the storm event 
(Florida Public Service Commission, 2018). 
7.5 Impact of storm surge  
Storm surge inundation values along the coast of Haiti were not available clearly (Stewart, 
2017), but the impact from the storm surge was described as destruction like the 2010 
earthquake (Howe, 2016). The storm surge combined with the in-land flooding from the 
heavy downpours exceeded more than 15-inches (Miller et al., 2018). In the USA, 
hurricane Matthew’s impact was observed to be severe only along the coasts of Georgia, 
North, and South Carolinas (Chappel, 2016). In South Carolina, power outages around 
437,000 were reported (Chappel, 2016). In Florida Fernandina Beach, peak surge was 
observed as 9.88 feet measured by the NOS tide gauge. While the coastal communities 
near Flagler Beach Jacksonville Beach, Palm Coast, St. Augustine were impacted by 9 ft 
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(3.0 m) storm surge (Brouillette, 2016) as shown in Figure 7.7. In Georgia, the storm 
surge from the Hurricane Matthew coupled with high tide at Ft. Pulaski just below 8 feet. 
Some of the other damages associated with storm surge were the beach erosion, extensive 
escarpment of sand-dunes and damage of the pedestrian crossover along the coast of 
Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas.  
 
Figure 7.7 A1A in Flagler Beach eroded from the storm surge of Hurricane Matthew [Image source: 
Miami Herald] 
Despite various circumstances, that the hurricane did not make a direct landfall and even 
when made landfall it was a weakened hurricane. However, the Kennedy Space Centre 
NASA’s rocket launch facility, was adversely affected by the storm surge produced in 
Florida (Brouillette, 2016). The damage from Satellite Beach to Melbourne Beach which 
damaged the dunes, berms, beach foundations in Brevard County were estimated US$ 25 
million. In Cuba, communication tower and bridge in Toa River was destroyed and the 
coastal highway along the Boca de Jauco Bridge was completely eroded (Brouillette, 
2016). 
7.6  Adaptive measures taken over post-Matthew  
The post-landfall scenario in Haiti became difficult to regain ‘back to normal’ situation, 
due to the prolonged recovery and rehabilitation process. The 2016 presidential election 
in Haiti was postponed as some of its campaign centres were also severely damaged.  A 
cholera outbreak was reported post-event occurrence. The USAID and Haiti worked on 
expanding community health services which includes creating awareness such as water, 
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sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) initiatives in Haiti after the cholera outbreak. The 
UNICEF supported rehabilitation and restoration of 50 schools to support children's 
education and learning. Due to the ongoing requirement of humanitarian assistance since 
2010 earthquake, followed by the landfall of Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and then by 
Matthew in 2016, the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
(ECHO) contributed additional US$ 37.4 million (The USAID, 2017). Reflecting on the 
current situation clearly shows that Haiti is still in the extended recovery phase of 
Hurricane Matthew. Despite the economic capacity, it is important that the country’s 
coping ability to disasters, adaptive measures were essential to endure a future disaster is 
clear from this case study.  
7.7 Hurricane Maria: origin and background 
On the 12 September 2017, a tropical depression from the west coast of Africa was 
identified. The scattered wave was later organised to become a tropical depression by 
1200 UTC 16 September 2017 about 580 n-mi east of Barbados and further strengthened 
to a tropical storm exactly six hours by 1800 UTC on the same day. Hurricane Maria was 
the thirteenth named storm of the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season. After gaining its official 
name, the Tropical Storm Maria underwent a rapid intensification and 24 hours later 
attained the hurricane status on 17 September 2017, by 1800 UTC (Pasch et al., 2017). 
The hurricane strengthened to a major Category 5 measuring in SSWHS with maximum 
winds of 145 knots (166.7 mph) and made its first landfall on 19 September 2017 by 0115 
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Due to the mountainous islands of Dominica, the hurricane lost its interaction after its 
first landfall in Dominica. The loss of synergy created by the interruption of the 
mountainous islands of Dominica weakened the system downgrading it to a Category 4 
hurricane. The storm made its second landfall near Yabucao Puerto Rico, on 20 
September at 1015 UTC with 155 mph wind speed while continuing to grow in its size. 
Maria holds the record of being the strongest hurricane to make landfall in Puerto Rico 
since Hurricane Segundo, San Felipe in 1928 (Pasch et al., 2017).  Table 7.6 shows the 
landfall history of Hurricane Maria.   
 

















19-Sep 0115 Dominica Dominica 5 145 167 922 
20-Sep 1015 Near Yabucoa Puerto Rico 5 135 156 920 
20-Sep 0300 
25 n mi. south 
of St. Croix   150 173 908 
 
The hurricane continued to gradually weaken and did not regain its peak intensity of 155 
mph but maintained the major hurricane status until 0600 UTC 24 September 2017.  
Figure 7.9 shows that neither the storm weakened nor shifted or deviated from its course 
until its three landfalls. Further, weakening to a Category 1 took place by 0600 UTC 27 
September and lost its storm elements and became a tropical storm on 28 September. The 
storm became extra-tropical by 1800 UTC 30 September. A further detailed author’s 
adapted version of structural change data, of Hurricane Maria, and the projected pathway, 
and the hurricane’s watch-warnings issued by the NHC is included in Appendix B. This 
warning includes air pressure, wind field and strengthening or weakening of hurricane 
structure. 














Figure 7.9 Hurricane Maria’s projected path with colour coded themes for different hurricane categories 
(version adapted by the author using Google Map) 
 
7.8 The disaster phases of Hurricane Maria 
7.8.1 Preparedness within Puerto Rico 
The National Hurricane Centre (NHC) provided warnings and forecasts to Puerto Rico, 
54-hours ahead of Hurricane Maris’s landfall (Folger, 2018). Around 6,200 personnel of 
the National Guard team were deployed during the preparedness phase of Maria to initiate 
various activities such as evacuation, shelter set-up, the supply of emergency kits, standby 
search and rescue teams (Inserra et al., 2018). As per the Caribbean Disaster Emergency 
Management Agency’s (CDEMA) the first situation report issued on 20 September 2017, 
a structural change in the hurricane path was anticipated by the Caribbean Institute for 
Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH). As per CIMH’s anticipation, Hurricane Maria was 
expected to weaken to a Category 4 hurricane before Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands 
(USVI) (CDEMA, 2017).  
Prior to Hurricane Maria, another Hurricane Irma was forecasted to make landfall in the 
middle of the Puerto Rican island as a major hurricane. In contrast, Hurricane Irma 
maintained its course drifting away from the north of Puerto Rico and did not make a 
landfall, as predicted, and warned by the hurricane forecasters. The early warnings and 
the preparedness for Hurricane Irma which came about two weeks earlier than Hurricane 
Maria remained stationary. This further made the Puerto Rican residents underrate the 
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  Tropical storm 
  Category 1 
  Category 2 
  Category 3 
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approaching hazard from Hurricane Maria. Because the government was prepared and 
mobilized to respond for Hurricane Irma, the officials and the residents were at the verge 
of facing Hurricane Maria with the same preparations. However, Hurricane Maria largely 
varied from the structure and pattern that were of Hurricane Irma (Rivera, 2019). This 
clearly defines how a similar type of hazard can potentially vary and largely influence the 
storm surge characteristics. This further underlines the gap in hurricane prediction and 
resultant storm surge prediction.  
According to NOAA the genesis of Hurricane Maria was not well-forecast, and this was 
attributed with the failure in hurricane monitoring and forecast. The cyclone formation 
occurred faster than the NHC’s prediction which was critical for early warning and 
preparation for emergencies (Folger, 2018).  The regional observation and early warning 
centre in St. Maarten and Puerto Rico were exposed to Hurricane Maria and the heavy 
winds of Maria damaged the observation centre as the storm approached near Puerto Rico. 
Due to the destruction of radars, the forecast was obstructed resulting in the unavailability 
of ground data impeding the issuance of early warnings to the coastal residents (World 
Meteorological Organization, 2018).  
A recent study (Rivera, 2019) stated that the Puerto Rico Emergency Management 
Administration (AEMEAD) which manages the Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, and its 
protocol was not properly followed by Puerto Rican government during Hurricane Maria. 
The report further highlights that one of the sub-plans of AEMEAD’s which is the 
‘Distribution Plan’ was awaiting approval of execution. The unapproved distribution plan 
did not give a clear answer to the first responders whether to operate or not during Maria’s 
response (Rivera, 2019).   
7.8.2 Response within Puerto Rico  
Hurricane Maria was recorded as the tenth most powerful Category 5 hurricane to hit the 
Puerto Rico region (Inserra et al., 2018).  The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) together supported during 
the response phase of Hurricane Maria through its Emergency Support Function #2 (DHS 
& FCC, 2018). The National Guard team also extended their support during the response 
phase involving activities such as transportation of medical emergencies, debris removal 
and various related key activities (Inserra et al., 2018). As Spanish was the main 
communication language in Puerto Rico, the language became a barrier for the first 
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responders from the US mainland to communicate and coordinate emergency assistance 
(CMTS & RIAT, 2018).  
Puerto Rico’s power grid was one of the critical infrastructures in the path of Maria and 
was adversely damaged by its effects (Department of Energy, 2017). According to the 
FCC during Hurricane Maria, there was no widespread reports or calls from the US Virgin 
Islands and Puerto Rico territories were recorded (DHS & FCC, 2018). This was because 
the emergency 911 call centres in both US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico were impacted 
truncating the services completely from reaching the American mainland for back up and 
support. It is to be noted that only four emergency call centres were available in Virgin 
Islands and Puerto Rico serving two each for a total of 3.4 million population (DHS & 
FCC, 2018). An incident management team which includes the Department of Homeland 
Security-led emergency support function activated the Disaster Information Reporting 
System (DIRS) and supported during Maria’s response phase (DHS & FCC, 2018). 
Even before Hurricane Maria’s landfall, around 60,000 houses were without power from 
the impact of Hurricane Irma which occurred two weeks earlier and this was an already 
existing situation in Puerto Rico (Inserra et al., 2018). With an existing critical condition 
of power infrastructure, Puerto Rico faced two hurricanes within a two-week time 
difference between them. The federal response both in-field and off-field observed by the 
US Senate was identified as inadequate. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
communicated regarding disaster information and supported with funds from the 
Presidential team. The overall crisis management of OMB under certain key contacts was 
observed to be poor (Warren, 2018). However, the Department of Energy (DoE) together 
with FEMA, and Defence Logistics Agency (DLA) partnered with other federal 
departments during the response and facilitate the necessary resources (Department of 
Energy, 2017).  
The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) reported that 80% of the island’s 
energy transmission and power distribution lines were either damaged or destroyed 
leaving most of the social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, private homes 
inaccessible and caused severe business interruptions (Inserra et al., 2018). The 
devastation of the power grid left the territories with days of power-outage and the 
response towards the restoration of the power grid became critical (Marsters & Houser, 
2017; Department of Energy, 2017). The devastation visibly highlights the vulnerability 
of power infrastructure and their significance during emergencies as a key lesson to be 
learnt.   
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In general, the shipping cost from the US to Puerto Rico was higher than shipping from 
the nearby islands (Inserra et al., 2018).  This also impacted the shipping of emergency 
supplies post-Maria. The transportation and logistics were blocked resulting in the 
breakdown of supply chain operations and management leaving the first responders to 
arrange alternate solutions for transportation and means to access the victims and carry 
out the response and recovery operations (CDEMA, 2017).  
The roadways were impacted with over 4 million cubic yards (approx. 3 million cubic 
metres) being damaged slowing the responder and the recovery process (CMTS & RIAT, 
2018). Housing was the next major infrastructure that was adversely impacted by 
Hurricane Maria. As per the rough estimate provided by the Governor of Puerto Rico, 
around 87,094 houses were destroyed and 472,000 houses suffered serious damage, and 
another 385,703 sustained major damage (Oxfam, 2018). The impact of Hurricane Maria 
also affected an estimated 70% of potable water access (Oxfam, 2018). 
The domestic shipping lines sustained the challenge of continuing the service to San Juan, 
Puerto Rico highlighting the significance of local stakeholders in disaster response and 
recovery (CMTS & RIAT, 2018). Although, the overall response was observed as beyond 
the capacity of the federal government on the plus sides Hurricane Maria’s response 
shared the lessons learned from previous hurricane Harvey and Irma. The inter-agency 
collaboration was considered a significant achievement. 
7.8.3 Recovery within Puerto Rico 
A month after the landfall of Hurricane Maria, 75% of the island’s which had 3.4 million 
residents were found with no electricity restored in St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John 
(Marsters & Houser, 2017). The government of Puerto Rico initially expected that 95% 
of the power restoration to be completed by the end of 2017. However, the restoration of 
power and potable water service was delayed longer than expected. By the end of 2017, 
only 65% of power was restored and by the end of April 2018, 97.31% of the residents 
were restored with power i.e., after seven months of restoration efforts (Centro, 2018).  
After the catastrophic impact of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, many displaced residents 
never returned and relocated to the mainland US especially to Florida, where many of the 
displaced and relocated population were reported to have welcomed (Inserra et al., 2018). 
Nearly 160,000 Puerto Ricans were reported as relocated to the US mainland (Centro, 
2018). 
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Recovery process was prolonged and delayed by various factors. The territory’s 
communication infrastructure almost froze to a static state for a few weeks after the 
landfall.  
The combined effect of lack of power supply, shortage of supplies and resources, 
adversely damaged telecommunication poles and broadcasting antennas together 
contributed to the overall damage of the country’s communication system (DHS & FCC, 
2018). By mid-June 2018, 98% of the telecommunication was re-launched i.e., after nine 
months (Centro, 2018). More than 9,600 victims were provided temporary housing in 
Puerto Rico and 38 US states which were activated by FEMA through its Transitional 
Sheltering Program (TSA) for the displaced victims by 20 December 2017 (Centro, 2018; 
FEMA, 2017).  
 
Figure 7.10 Road adversely damaged by Hurricane Maria [Image: Ricardo Arduengo /APF (BBC News, 
2018)] 
 
Figure 7.10 shows how the transportation infrastructure was severely impacted which 
further impeded the recovery. The Marine Transportation System Resilience Integrated 
Action Team (RIAT) activated by the US Committee on the Marine Transportation 
System (CMTS) claimed that Hurricane Maria left a major damage impact on the Marine 
Transportation System (MTS) (CMTS & RIAT, 2018). 
During Phase-3 recovery stage, the assessment of the damage in Puerto Rico and the US 
Virgin Islands from both Hurricane Irma and Maria was underestimated thereby leading 
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to inadequate funding requests. Although, the US House of Representatives who observed 
the magnitude of the damage and granted additional funding, this was stated by the Puerto 
Rican government as insufficient to recover from the catastrophic damage incurred by 
Hurricane Maria in both Puerto Rico and The US Virgin Islands (Warren, 2018).   
By this time, the humanitarian crisis warning was flagged by the Governor of Puerto Rico 
and additional disaster aid was raised. This was also overlooked by the federal 
government and was provided with an aid in support of all three Hurricanes (Harvey, 
Irma, and Maria) as a conjoined disaster aid to be utilised for the recovery of Texas, 
Florida, and Puerto Rico. The federal government’s response also exhibited delays in 
various situations from deploying the resources to providing disaster aid towards 
rebuilding (Oxfam, 2018). Due to these reasons, the recovery was prolonged more than 
ten months since Maria made a landfall (Warren, 2018).   
The recovery phase was anticipated to extend for longer than expected. Therefore, 
additional humanitarian support was requested by all the stakeholders which include civil 
society, faith-based organizations, churches, and university students who supported the 
local responders post-Maria. The ad-hoc stakeholder team and their involvement aided in 
debris removal, restoration of potable water, and restart services (Oxfam, 2018). This 
highlights the importance of increasing the organisational capacities among stakeholder 
and suggests the consideration of enhanced stakeholder involvement.  
7.8.4 Mitigation within Puerto Rico 
The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) awarded US$ 1.5 billion 
through the Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CBBG-DR) 
program towards the reconstruction of damaged house. The sanctioned grant was further 
utilised to cover business losses and interruptions in Puerto Rico. Hurricane Maria holds 
the record as one of the largest disaster housing missions in the US and its territories 
(Centro, 2018).  
FEMA reviewed its activities of agencies who played a critical role during Hurricane 
Maria. The review highlighted various key issues such as agencies loss of track of 
resource movement, insufficiency in stacked resources, understaffing of emergency 
responders, lack of information during preparation and response phases (FEMA, 2017; 
Warren, 2018). The review not only identified key issues but also provided insights on 
areas to improve, adapt and mitigate for future disasters and response to be delivered by 
SIDS.  
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In March 2018, the FCC allotted US$ 954 million for the restoration and expansion of 
communication infrastructure, in both Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands and the US 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) stated that additional resources to be utilised to 
restore the power (DHS & FCC, 2018; CMTS & RIAT, 2018). As of 30 September 2018, 
the US Government of Accountability Office (GAO) and FEMA assigned around US$ 4 
billion funding to Puerto Rico to mitigate the response for the 2017 Hurricanes Irma and 
Maria. A further US$ 3.63 billion was allocated for emergency measures like debris 
removal and US$ 151 million for the repair and maintenance of public infrastructure (US 
GAO, 2019).  In August 2018, Puerto Rico developed a disaster recovery plan, which was 
aimed at increasing the government’s capacity for building strengthening the 
infrastructure for future adaptation. As per the estimate total recovery cost would be US$ 
139 billion with a recovery period from 2018-2028 (US GAO, 2019). The study has 
widely captured the extended recovery and restoration of power and water and highlights 
that mitigation and adaptive measures remain critical.   
7.8.5 Summary of key activities and disaster phases during Hurricane Maria 
Table 7.7 Summary of the key activities and their achievements observed from Case Study Maria 
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Power and utility 
Wetland mitigation  
Training and exercise 
The key activities observed during the four main phases of the DRM cycle is summarized 
in Table 7.7. The key activities were extracted through both coding and document 
sources. Failure to achieve the key activities were mainly due to Puerto Rico being a non-
UN SIDS with limited resources and language barrier being a hurdle to communicate and 
request for additional support.  
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While observing the key activities the following timeline gap was also observed as shown 
in Table 7.8. The table shows the date of risk identification and issuance of the first 
official warning, between which eight days of an inactive period during which the 
preparation activities observed for Irma was continued for Maria.  
However, the change in hazard and the vulnerability was not assessed in support of the 
DRM activities. This further remark that if the key activities and their corresponding 
phases were adapted according to Maria, the possibility of the current incurred death toll 
of 2,965 could have been possibly reduced. 
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7.9 Physical damage and loss statistics  
Hurricane Maria, which made the first landfall in Dominica, killed 31 people, and resulted 
in significant structural damage (Folger, 2018). The official report from the NOAA states 
that in Puerto Rico the death toll was 64 (Pasch et al., 2017). However, this death count 
majorly differs with a study performed by George Washington University’s Milken 
Institute of Public Health. Due to various reports on unsubstantiated death counts, the 
Governor of Puerto Rico raised an assessment of actual death toll attributed to Hurricane 
Maria (Milken Institute School of Public Health, 2018). This study was based on the 
actual death certificates, which confirms that 2,975 was the precise death count associated 
with Hurricane Maria (Milken Institute School of Public Health, 2018).  
It remains debated as the indirect death need not necessarily attributed with the direct 
deaths from the hazard, which may be misunderstood (Folger, 2018) but the death toll in 
FEMA’s reports the official death toll from Maria is 65 (updated 14 Feb 2019). Despite 
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the storm surge being less than other hurricanes (i.e., > 6 ft), the recovery phases were 
particularly hampered due to the excessive wind-borne damage coupled with water 
damage (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2005) as shown in Figure 7.11. 
 
 
Figure 7.11 Aerial view of damage inflicted by Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico [Image source: FEMA/ 
Yuisa Rios] 
 
As per of NOAA's estimation the storm resulted in estimated economic damage worth 
US$ 90 billion and became the official third costliest hurricanes in the US and its 
territories after Hurricane Katrina (2005) and Hurricane Harvey (2017) which replaced 
Hurricane Sandy (2012) (Folger, 2018).  
Puerto Rico was one of the big pharmaceuticals and medicine manufacturing hubs for the 
US mainland. After the event, Puerto Rico’s sales dropped by 20.7 % versus its previous 
year’s sale. The force of Hurricane Maria resulted in the closure of factories and affected 
many production industries largely impacting the territory’s economy and exports, which 
were already enduring declining trend before the event (CMTS & RIAT, 2018).  
 
7.10 Impact of storm surge 
A maximum inundation level from 6-9 ft (1.8- 2.7) above the ground level was produced 
during Hurricane Maria as a combination of storm surge and storm tide (Pasch et al., 
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2017). These levels were observed near the coast of Humacao, Naguabo.  Figure 7.12 
shows the storm surge flooding in the San Juan, Puerto Rican communities.   
 
 
Figure 7.12 Storm surge flooding in Puerto Rico [Image source: CBS News] 
 
According to the US Geological Survey (USGS), high watermarks measured 4.9-5.1 ft 
(~1.5 m) above the ground level in Punta Santiago, Humacao. Other technical readings 
suggest that the near shoreline had surge levels as 9 ft (2.7 m) above the ground level. 
Along with south-eastern Puerto Rico, inundation levels were observed as 4-7 ft (1.2 -2.1 
m) (Pasch et al., 2017).  
 
7.11 Adaptive measures taken over post-Maria 
In early September 2017, Hurricane Irma made its landfall in the US Virgin Islands 
(USVI), then in Puerto Rico, followed by Florida (DHS & FCC, 2018). Within two weeks 
times, Hurricane Maria made its landfall in the previously hit USVI and Puerto Rico. 
Therefore, the infrastructure damage and the death toll from Hurricane Maria is viewed 
as a combined effect of a previous Hurricane Irma which made landfall in two of the same 
locations. However, Hurricane Irma did not make a direct landfall and it barely brushed 
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through the north of Puerto Rico. Hence, the magnitude of Maria’s damage must be 
assessed individually and not to be foreseen as a combined effect (CMTS & RIAT, 2018).  
Post-Hurricane Maria, the country suffered significant socioeconomic damage (Orengo-
Aguayo et al., 2019; Centro, 2018). Puerto Rico’s economy experienced a severe impact 
that the territory suffered financial bankruptcy after a year since Hurricane Maris’s 
landfall (Centro, 2018). Societal impacts were also observed higher than usual especially 
those vulnerable age group including young adults.  
Studies revealed that the residents were exposed to both direct and indirect impacts from 
Hurricane Maria by being exposed to numerous stress associated with the storm (Orengo-
Aguayo et al., 2019). The Department of Education of Puerto Rico closed around 265 
schools throughout the island (Centro, 2018). Considering the impacts from hurricane-
led storm surge impacts of Maria, adaptive measures to mitigate a future scenario is vital. 
However, the US territory is currently in the extended recovery phase and various 
measures were taken to recover from the disaster, therefore, adaptive measures were 
observed to be critical.  
7.12 Summary 
The case study of Hurricane Matthew and Maria have provided understandings and 
aspects of DRM and DRR strategies currently practised in Haiti and Puerto Rico. One of 
the key differences observed between the two storm surge events that occurred in Haiti 
and Puerto Rico is the association with the United Nations. Haiti being a UN member of 
SIDS, received support both from the UN and its partnered agencies. But Puerto Rico is 
a non-UN member of SIDS had to manage within its capacities and bounded with 
limitations. Despite having experienced storm surge impacts in the past, no major 
adaptations or preparedness were practised, resulting in the significant damage to coastal 
communities, housing, and critical buildings in Haiti and Puerto Rico. If not for the UN’s 
teams who were already based in Haiti for the recovery of the 2010 earthquake, it would 
have been a far more severe impact and longer-term recovery. Therefore, an action plan 
of enhancing the preparedness is vital for both these countries. Learning lessons from 
Haiti and Puerto Rico’s responses, countries which have a multi-hazard profile and whose 
adaptive capacity is inadequate should consider a framework approach as a step of 
preparing for the worst possible scenarios ahead of time compared to developed countries. 
It is even more critical for island countries and communities, where there may be 
insufficient geographic territory to move to and deploy for safety. Some common 
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activities exhibited from the case study observations were considered for further analysis 
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CHAPTER 8 
ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND PROPOSAL OF THE 
FRAMEWORK 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the cross-case analysis of individual cases, that were previously 
observed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. This chapter further discusses the phases of disaster risk 
management that were previously examined via the case studies, providing the 
opportunity for analysis and interpretation of the collected data. The findings, analysis 
and detailed interpretation then supported in the development and proposal of the 
DAMSS framework, and the outline of the guidelines.  
8.2 A cross-case analysis 
The case studies discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are examined further using the cross-
case synthesis. According to Yin (2014), there are no well-defined techniques in carrying 
out the analysis of case study evidence. In this study, the chain of case study evidence 
collected is displayed for further analysis and interpretations. The cross-case analysis 
allowed data comparison of individual cases, to identify patterns and then led to the 
analytic generalization of the observations. For that purpose, a combination of computer-
assisted tools, such as Atlas.ti, from which the materials, evidence, coding (by activity), 
memos, quotations generated and the findings in previous chapters were considered 
together. By listing the approaches of the phases, limitations and the key lessons from 
various events, identification of linkages (if any) is carried out. This further supported in 
interpreting the common factors versus differences, which assisted in the final findings 
leading to the proposal of the DAMSS framework. Table 8.1 shows the four key themes 
of DRM and correspondingly grouped key activities observed across the six case studies. 
The key activities are marked with a tick (✓) symbol to show that these activities were 
achieved or identified during the execution of the different phases of the DRM. The key 
activities marked with the cross () symbol to show that these activities were unachieved 
or not identified during the execution of the different phases of the DRM. The difference 
between an activity being achieved or identified can be understood via a small example 
of case study Hurricane Katrina. In Case Katrina, key activity ‘forecasting’ (preparedness 
phase) is marked as (✓) means, activity is achieved whilst the key activity ‘damage to 
telecommunication’ (response phase) marked as (✓) means, activity is identified.  
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Table 8.1 Cross-case syntheses of the four main phases of Disaster Risk Management (data compiled 
from the six cases and their activities) 





Katrina Nargis Sandy Haiyan Matthew Maria 
Preparedness 
Forecasting ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Monitoring ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Early warnings   ✓ ✓   
Execution of the 
emergency plan 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Activation of the 
response plan 
✓  ✓   ✓ 
Capacity building    ✓ ✓   
Risk identification ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Risk 
Communication 
  ✓   ✓ 
Declaration of 
Emergency 
✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Storm surge 
hazard assessment  
      
Training & 
exercise 




  ✓    
Prior deployment 
of resources 




      
Response 
Evacuation  ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Risk analysis ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Communication    ✓    




✓  ✓    
Emergency shelter ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Humanitarian 
assistance 
✓ ✓  ✓   
Humanitarian aid  ✓  ✓   
NGO, INGO's and 
volunteers 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Incident 
stabilization 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mass care ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Power outage and 
utility damage 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Search & rescue 
operation 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Rehabilitation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Restoration   ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Reconstruction   ✓ ✓   
Debris removal  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Insurance ✓     ✓ 
Improving 
livelihood 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Organisational 
capacities 
✓  ✓    
Temporary 
housing 
 ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 




✓  ✓    
Land use planning ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Technical 
prevention 
✓  ✓    
Public education 
& awareness 
✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  
Sustainable 
infrastructure 




  ✓ ✓   
Strategic alternate 
approach 
   ✓   
Environment    ✓  ✓ 
Wetland 
mitigation 
  ✓   ✓ 
Stakeholder 
involvement 
✓  ✓    
The systematic execution of the ‘filter codes’ (e.g., keywords, actions, and processes) 
across various documents as key activities are compiled as shown Table 8.1 to display 
the array of activities grouped under the four main phases of DRM.  
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Table 8.1 also shows some key activities marked with the cross () symbol across the 
case study events. This is an interesting factor that, key activities such as the ‘storm surge 
hazard assessment’, ‘training or exercise’ are not identified across all the cases. Although 
these are crucial in storm surge understanding, yet, they are not carried out as part of the 
disaster management phases. This is a clear observation of how storm surge hazard is not 
assessed across different case study events which occurred between 2005- 2017.  Key 
activities with a cross () symbol also underline that it is vital to adapt or mitigate these 
areas which is key to minimising the socioeconomic losses.  
The identification of the list of key activities in individual cases resulted in deriving one 
or more uniform activities. This process of capturing the findings from all the six cases 
was selected as commonalities and differences, and a detailed reporting is discussed 
further in section 8.2.1- 8.2.4. Within these sections, the cross-case syntheses shown in 
Table 8.1 is further discussed using the relevant coding and data obtained from the coding 
and cases while trying to answer the three key questions as follows: 
- What are the key activities that occurred during the event in each case? 
- What are the factors responsible for the occurrence of these patterns of issues and 
their connection to the key themes? 
- What is unique about these factors and their nature of repetition across more than 
one case study? 
The discussion of the critical factors which hindered the execution of DRM strategies was 
identified as commonalities framing the Disaster Adaptation and Mitigation framework 
for Storm Surge (DAMSS) resilience and future adaptation.   
8.2.1 Phase 1: Analysis of Preparedness stage  
According to UNISDR (2009), the essential dimensions required to disseminate 
meaningful warning is to enable the vulnerable communities, organisations, and any 
individuals threatened by a hazard with sufficient time to prepare and act accordingly. 
Early warnings are considered as an essential step in reducing the direct loss of lives from 
the hazard. Geographic information and related technologies have improved within 
disaster management; however, inadequate early warnings can potentially weaken such 
advancements resulting in country’s incapability to respond to such disaster. An effective 
early warning system with people-centred approach includes four key elements days 
(United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2009). An author adapted 
version of an early warning system comprising the four key elements as highlighted by 
the UNISDR is shown in Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1 Author adapted version of four key elements of effective early warning suggested by 
UNISDR, highlighting the critical warning period before impact.  
Figure 8.1 further shows the progression of different elements within the early warning 
system starting from T = X~Y days, to T=0 impact. The period of ‘critical early warning’ 
emphasises the risk of communication to be disseminated to the coastal communities to 
reduce the loss of lives. Executing the observed action versus the proposed action by 
UNISDR, the following commonalities were observed across the series of multiple case 
studies and listed in Table 8.2.  
Table 8.2 Identification of critical factors in the cross-case syntheses of the preparedness phase 
Common key issues 
identified during 
preparedness   
Observation from coding  
Lack of early warning 
 






- Hurr. Katrina: early warning issued 24-hrs 
before landfall, leaving the residents with 
insufficient time to prepare. Complicated 
evacuations leading to the non-evacuation 
situation, and a contributing factor towards 
1,800 deaths. Certain population group did not 
receive any warning at all.  
- Cy. Nargis: lack of monitoring and forecasting 
issues, inactive or slow actions observed during 
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Common key issues 
identified during 
preparedness   
Observation from coding  












Slow preparations  
the early stages. Officials alerted about the 
approaching hazard shortly before the landfall. 
Lack of early warnings directly resulted in non-
evacuation, causing 140,000 deaths of the 
residents from the delta region. 
- Ty. Haiyan: due to lack of awareness especially 
storm surges, early warnings were issued on 
other hazards such as rainfall, landslides, and 
heavy winds. No warning issued regarding 
storm surges or their inundation levels.  
- Hurr. Matthew: Haiti was issued with early 
warnings mainly using radio, as their mode of 
communication of early warnings. 
Preparedness was generally slow and exhibited 
insufficient usage of the early warning system. 













Lack of awareness 
 
 
- Hurr. Katrina: Non-evacuation of 25,000 
residents, disabled, and vulnerable people were 
not advised about evacuation routes. Language 
barrier such as non-English speaking residents 
were not translated regarding storm warning or 
evacuations or storm-related instructions. 
- Cy. Nargis: The residents never experienced 
before a cyclone or storm surge in the 
Ayeyarwady delta region. Exposed to the 
hazard for the first time and residents were 
completely unaware of the hazard. Most of the 
resident in LECZs stayed back.  
- Ty. Haiyan: Residents have prior experience 
about typhoons and their heavy winds but 
unaware of ‘storm surge’. Effects of storm 
surge were not interpreted in the local language 
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Common key issues 
identified during 
preparedness   















‘Tagalog’. Emergency responders themselves 
were unaware of the hazard to communicate 
them to the residents. Fatalities of more than 
6,300 lives after the landfall due to partial 
issuance of the early warning system and lack 
of public awareness of the hazard. The 
casualties list also included emergency 
responders who remained without evacuating 
and waiting for further order from officials.  
- Hurr. Matthew: Officials warned and provided 
early warnings 5 days in advance. Despite pleas 
and warning, residents stayed back ignoring 
evacuation. Due to the usage of radio as a 
warning system, residents in remote locations 
(no radio signals) were unaware of the hazard. 
Only coastal outlying residents were evacuated 
to the mainland.    














- Hurr. Katrina: The residents of the city of New 
Orleans, specifically the highly populated 
communities next to the Lake Pontchartrain 
was not communicated about the forecast or 
predictions. Officials were aware of the 
exposure of risk from Katrina entering the Gulf 
of Mexico continued to delay the process of 
communicating the leading to federal failures. 
Despite the deployment of resources in advance 
and readily available in standby condition, poor 
dissemination of risk communication led to a 
dormant situation with no effective action done 
during this period.     
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Common key issues 
identified during 
preparedness   






























- Cy Nargis: Weak telecommunication 
infrastructure was identified in Myanmar. The 
only source of communication is by the official 
emergency teams, local authorities such as the 
Burmese Military Junta. Many residents did not 
have a mobile phone as mobiles were 
considered expensive and satellite phone was 
illegal and prohibited. Spreading of 
communication was very limited and restricted 
in a few areas.  
- Ty. Haiyan: Residents were informed of partial 
risks using local radio to broadcast the disaster 
communication and verbatim was used during 
storm surge risk communications which lacked 
clarity. Many residents reported they did not 
understand the term ‘storm surge’ which was 
communicated by PAGASA.  
- Hurr Matthew: Residents were aware of the 
early warning system in place. But the EWS 
depended mainly on radio broadcasting which 
was reported as not broadcasted in many areas. 
Especially those residents located remotely in 
mountainous regions, and tribal groups did not 
receive any communication.  
- Hurr. Maria: Residents were warned and 
communicated about the risk. The magnitude 
of Maria was extensive and damaged most of 
measuring devices and instruments leading to 
loss of ground data. This made officials rely on 
neighbouring countries for the forecast. 
Language barrier was identified in 
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Common key issues 
identified during 
preparedness   
Observation from coding  
communicating further risks due to the lack of 
interpreters.  
 
Failure of hazard 























Underestimation of storm 
surge prediction levels 
- Hurr. Katrina: the risk was identified in 
advance by NHC, but the rapid intensification 
and the structural changes of Katrina were not 
estimated. The risk from the coastal flooding 
(storm surge) was predicted but the 
compounded effects of storm surge were not 
assessed. Being concerned of an already 
existing levee crack, associated risks such as 
the potential funnel-effect of storm surge in the 
creeks and bays of the Mississippi River 
leading to river over topping was not assessed 
suggesting weak hazard analysis.   
- Cy. Nargis: Lack of data on storm surge risk or 
related hazard analysis. Indian Meteorological 
Department (IMD) and Joint Typhoon Warning 
Center (JTWC) warned the hazard 48 hrs. in-
advance. No further analysis was carried out by 
the authorities of Myanmar. 
- Hurr. Sandy: public and officials were prepared 
for the hurricane. But Sandy underwent a 
deviation in path, structural change and 
downgraded to a tropical storm and lost 
hurricane status. This made tropical warnings 
to be downgraded as a tropical storm watch. 
The hazard is underestimated as many residents 
stayed back stocking up on emergency 
supplies.  
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Common key issues 
identified during 
preparedness   
Observation from coding  
- Ty. Haiyan partial analysis of hazard was 
identified. Due to oversight of above 7 ft storm 
surge levels, the accuracy in prediction was 
compromised leading to underestimation of 
storm surge levels.   
- Hurr. Maria storm surge warning was issued 
but their predicted levels were underestimated. 
 
Declaration of emergency 
(DoE) 
 









- Hurr. Katrina: Delayed DoE. The then Mayor 
was waiting for Presidential declaration. DoE 
was ordered once the President requested to 
Mayor of New Orleans to issue orders. This 
was also associated with the issue of non-
evacuation of coastal residents.  
- Cy. Nargis: Declaration of Calamity was 
declared 3 days after the landfall. 
- Hurr. Sandy: DoE 24 hrs. before landfall. 
- Ty. Haiyan: DoE 24 hrs. before landfall.  
- Hurr. Matthew: Instead of DoE, a red alert was 
issued 48 hrs. before landfall.  
- Hurr. Maria: DoE declared by the US president 
24 hrs. before landfall.  
 
 
In line with Neussner statement, “Messages have to be clear and unambiguous” (2014, p. 
43). This emphasises how communication is an important factor within emergency 
management. This can be understood from the data from Table 8.2 highlighting the lack 
of an early warning system (EWS) directly resulting in loss of lives. Deciphering the early 
warning systems to coastal communities in a way they understand is an important factor 
within emergency management (Neussner, 2014). 
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Variations within early warnings include Katrina’s delayed early warning; Nargis’s no 
early warning; Haiyan’s and Matthew’s efforts of partial early warning; and Maria’s lack 
of EWS from loss or interruption of instruments further resulting in the non-availability 
of ground data. These variations also highlight the significance of preparedness required 
for an effective early warning system. Regarding, ‘risk monitoring and forecasting’ only 
case Cyclone Nargis was identified where the country failed to monitor the risk. 
 
Figure 8.2 A sample coding of the early warning system observed from case study Typhoon Haiyan 
through coding 
From Figure 8.2 we can realise that the NDRRMC continuously engaged in monitoring 
the risk by issuing red alerts. While the second part of the coding highlights how 
evenafter, being warned for storm surge by the JRC, PAGASA delayed the risk analysis 
by 12 hours behind JRC’s warning. This implies how a delayed risk communication 
resulted in socioeconomic loss, suggesting that an early warning system should primarily 
focus on communicating the risk to end-users and communities who are most vulnerable 
to storm surge hazard.  
The difference between understanding the risk and lack of understanding can be 
comprehended in line with Fritz et al., (2009) findings.  His report has identified that the 
coastal community of Mala, along Gwa coastline, Philippines which has faced frequent 
cyclones and storm surges, has employed mitigation measures such as safe shelters at 
high-ground and emergency and response plans. These adaptive measures were observed 
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by the coastal residents of Mala, to have an impact on the community’s progress in 
reducing the loss of lives. The cross-case analysis of the preparedness phase emphasised 
the theory of how effective step-by-step implementation of preparedness should be 
carried out as outlined by UNISDR. A detailed coding of the individual list of activities 
corresponding to the preparedness phase is produced in Appendix C.  
A common key factor in the ‘risk’ assessments was the lack of clarity or risk regarding 
the habitat and housing of coastal residents. Apart from the lack of understanding, lack 
of early warnings made many people choose to stay in their homes and in some cases 
shelter in basements. Whilst occupants may have considered that there may still be a risk 
due to high wind speeds and lack of structural integrity of roofs, walls, and homes to 
withstand such forces, there appears to be little or no understanding of the lack of 
sufficient design of such buildings to address storm surge. This is not only about the low 
coastal elevation locations, but also that none of the homes, schools or hospitals or utilities 
were built in a raised-up position, nor had sufficient structural strength to withstand the 
waterborne forces. 
Communities were not asked to move to higher grounds even after learning lessons from 
events like Hurricane Katrina. Infrastructure barriers within possible pre-deployment 
periods were also lacking in acute areas and communities which would be impacted most 
by storm surge. Despite, some case study locations having experienced previous storm 
surge, there had been either no changes to building regulations and planning for new 
housing; or any retrofit resilience measures applied to the existing housing or utilities. By 
looking the future storm surge resilience, likely, governments and regional authorities 
(within low elevated coastal communities) both in developed and developing countries 
required to undertake and deliver such changes to increase resilience preparedness levels 
for climate emergency factors.  
8.2.2 Phase 2: Analysis of the response stage  
The provision of emergency service and public assistance, executed immediately after the 
disaster, is termed as the ‘response’ by the UNISDR (2009). Table 8.3 is the extraction 
of activities corresponding to Phase -2 response and these were commonly identified via 
the cross-case synthesis detailed in Table 8.1 across all the cases.   
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Table 8.3 Identification of critical factors from the cross-case syntheses of the response phase 
Common key issues 
identified during 
response  
Observations from coding  














Lack of people 










advisories in the mainland  
- Hurr. Katrina: 25,000 residents identified as non-
evacuees. Despite being aware of Katrina’s 
potential over of the Gulf of Mexico, and the 
vulnerability of the Mississippi bays, residents were 
not evacuated. Concerns related to the delayed 
evacuation was linked with the delayed DoE. Re-
evacuation was ordered after the Superdome which 
was acting as the emergency shelter was damaged.  
- Cy. Nargis: Failure of risk identification and early 
warnings further escalated to failure of evacuation. 
As no clear evacuation orders issued, most residents 
in the coastal delta region did not evacuate. 
- Hurr. Sandy: Mandatory evacuations were ordered 
twice as a precaution action to evacuate the last-
minute non-evacuees. However, due to the 
downgraded hurricane status to a tropical storm, 
many residents did not evacuate despite the orders.  
- Ty. Haiyan: The residents of the Philippines 
experience 18-20 typhoons on an average. The 
experience of previous typhoons and super-
typhoons encouraged the residents to stay back in 
their houses. Additionally, lack of public awareness 
and risk communication caused the failure of 
evacuation.  
- Hurr. Matthew: Evacuation was ordered, to the 





- Hurr. Katrina: Lack of clarity in communication and 
coordination among the Federal-National-Local 
responders was observed. NGO’s like Red Cross, 
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Shelter, reported coordination issues with Federal 
agency (FEMA). Concerns related to 
communication and coordination led to delayed 
logistics of emergency supplies.  
- Cy. Nargis: Poor communication and coordination 
were identified when liaising with external 
international actors and NGO’s. Unwanted 
restrictions to the United Nations and many 
established NGO’s, INGO’s and volunteers who 
were already in-field supporting the affected areas 
were restricted access, exhibiting poor 
communication and coordination issues. 
- Typhoon Haiyan: Language barrier in 
communication and coordination between local and 
international agencies identified. Further 
coordination issues were identified when NGO’s 
forecasted the extension of recovery phase to near 
one year.   
- Hurr. Matthew: communication and coordination 
issues in organizing and channeling the 
international funding to the country’s response and 
recovery support.  
- Hurr. Maria: communication issues identified in 
arranging Spanish interpreters and translators when 
the language barrier was impacting response phase. 









- Hurr. Katrina: No specific call for humanitarian 
assistance was made. However, volunteers and 
stakeholder’s involvement were identified to 
support the emergency and recovery.  
- Cy. Nargis: Despite the request for humanitarian 
assistance being made by the Burmese government, 
a compounding factor in lack of activity was the 
delay in issuing visas for NGO’s etc., to enter the 
country.  


















telecommunication led to 





- Hurr. Sandy: more than 17,000 volunteers were 
deployed to the affected areas.  
- Ty. Haiyan: The response exceeded the capacity of 
the Philippines government leading to the call for 
humanitarian assistance. National-level 
humanitarian agencies liaised with their partnering 
international agencies in coordinating the findings 
and relief supports.   
- Hurr. Matthew: the humanitarian agencies already 
operating in the field since the 2010 earthquake and 
post-Ebola outbreak were coordinated for 
additional assistance and increased capacities.  
- Hurr. Maria: Severe impact of the power grids and 
telecommunication infrastructure left the island 
with no cell phones, to communicate further. This 
led the Director of Telecommunication of Dominica 
to call for assistance from NGOs and volunteers in 
support of Puerto Rico’s situation. Many hospitals 
were supplied with a generator from agencies 
operating in the neighbouring countries. ATM’s 
(cash machines) were also non-operational due to 
the damage to telecommunication and power.   
Lack of expertise in 
decision making 
 
Lack of understanding of 








- Hurr. Katrina: Lack of understanding of roles and 
responsibilities and decision-making was exhibited 
in the earlier stages of preparedness. Many of the 
emergency response teams were awaiting official 
hierarchical orders underlining the lack of decision-
making in executing the response plans. 
- Cyclone Nargis: The Burmese Military Junta’s 
stubborn stance in conducting the referendum post-
landfall further exposed the country’s indecisive 
approach of responding to a disaster. The 
inflexibility in negotiating with international 
governments hampering response was due to the 














lack of expertise. Unnecessary complications (visa 
restrictions due to Referendum) and access 
restrictions to perform rapid damage assessment in 
the surge affected areas and exhibited poor choice 
of decision-making and delaying the response. 
- Hurr. Matthew: Haiti’s economic and political 
conditions was a hindering factor during the 
execution of various activities. The poor choices of 
risk communications, residents left to self-respond 
to the disaster, and the overall slow response 
behaviour was identified. Lack of expertise and 
failure of pre-planning in key decision-making 
scenarios identified. However public participation 
with the UN’s WFP, UNICEF, and other aid 




















- Hurr. Katrina: Modern engineered infrastructures 
built to withstand ‘Category 3 and above’ 
hurricanes and their design failed to survive the 
hurricanes imapcts became a noticeable engineering 
failure. The US Army of Corps of Engineers ‘levee 
system’, The Louisiana Superdome, i-10 Twin Span 
Bridge, and the New Orleans pumping station were 
among such infrastructures. Houses were built 
using outdated building codes.  
The adverse impact on the electric grids, water 
treatment plants, sewage plants, pumping stations, 
ports, roads, bridges, telecommunication was clear 
evidence of non-resilient infrastructure. Except for 
a few structures, most of the buildings and 
structures were neither hurricane-proofed nor flood-
proofed.  
- Cy. Nargis: The delta is mainly agricultural 
farmlands with most of the residents living in huts, 
mud houses and non-engineered wooden houses 











housing and power & 
utility infrastructure 














Weak communication & 




which were all completely levelled by the storm 
surge. The weak communication infrastructure, 
which had only a few communication poles and 
singular phone transmission lines were also 
uprooted or severely damaged entirely impeding the 
response and recovery. Power and utility suffered 
similar damage to that of telecommunication and no 
alternate back up of power generators were used.  
- Hurr. Sandy: Despite Sandy’s extra-tropical status, 
the extensive economic loss was due to cost 
inflicted by infrastructure damage. Seven subway 
tunnel inundations, Rockaway boardwalk damage, 
severe damage to power grids and utilities, and 
mass-transit facilities in low-lying lands, 
inundations of the waterfront communities 
demonstrated the city’s weak infrastructure.  
- Ty. Haiyan: Extreme damage to the infrastructure 
includes salination of freshwater, sewage system, 
power, utility telecommunication damage. 90% of 
the houses in the coastal communities of Tacloban, 
Leyte, Samar and Cebu regions were destroyed.  
- Hurr. Matthew: 80% of the infrastructure such as 
roadways, water facilities, hospitals and schools, 
bridges were damaged. Over 29,000 houses and 
public buildings were destroyed or damaged. 
- Hurr. Maria: Power and utility infrastructure 
suffered extensive damage. Additionally, the 
communication infrastructure was also severely 
impacted with more than 1,600 telecommunication 
lines destroyed. The complete failure of power and 
utility systems resulted in the prolonged 
interruption of medical facilities indirectly 
contributing to the increased death post-Maria.  
Page | 189  
 
Power and utility  
 

























Weak power infrastructure 
- Hurr. Katrina: 80% of the city of New Orleans was 
inundated impacting the power and utility 
infrastructure. Around 2.5 million people were left 
without electricity.  
- Cy. Nargis: The country’s power and utility 
infrastructure were the second most severely 
damaged infrastructure.  
- Hurr. Sandy: damage to the mechanical-electrical-
plumbing system resulted in 8.4 million people 
being suffered from a severe power outage.  
- Ty. Haiyan: Around 1,959 transmission facilities 
that were connecting the entire coastal communities 
were damaged.  
- Hurr. Matthew: remote areas were hampered from 
accessing and suffered power outage for more than 
a month.  
- Hurr. Maria: The power and utility infrastructure 
faced severe impact leave 80% of the island being 
isolated from communications, health and further 
impeding the recovery process. 95% of the island’s 
power was restored nearly after 7 months.   
 
Lack of deployment of 
resources  
 










- Hurr. Katrina: resources were deployed and were in 
standby. However, coordination issues impacted the 
flow and the availability of the resources. Though, 
resource deployment was within the capacity of the 
federal government, lack of coherence caused a 
resources paucity.   
- Cy. Nargis: Access for the restricted sites were 
granted only after 2-3 months from landfall limiting 
the supply of resources. Access restricted areas also 
faced poor distribution of the resource.  
- Typhoon Haiyan: Logistics was severely impacted, 
due to damaged road routes. There was no prior 




Lack of resources  
deployment of resources, and post-landfall access to 
resources was constricted.  
- Hurr. Matthew: The country’s economic capacity 
led to shortage of resources. Resource deployment 
was carried out by NGO’s already working in the 
field since the 2010 earthquake. Remotely located 
residents needed access to energy and other 
resources such as radios and even batteries which 
precluded them from access to EWS.  
Transportation 
Gridlock and traffic 
 
 
No road routes 
 
 














Loss of telecommunication 
- Hurr. Katrina: Transportation blockage with 
gridlocks and traffic jams, railroads damages were 
identified. 
- Cy. Nargis: Remote region in the Ayeyarwady 
delta, could only be reached via boat, which even 
became inaccessible due to the debris piling up and 
blocking routes and hampering roadways. 
- Hurr. Sandy: Severe interruptions in the 
transportation network, subway tunnel inundations, 
blocked 80% of the city’s transportation routes. The 
emergency vehicles which were assembled for 
standby were also inundated and remained unused.  
- Ty. Haiyan: With roadways severely being 
impacted, and delay in debris removal further 
blocked the airport access hindering the alternate 
logistics and supply of resources, and INGO’s 
arrival impacting recovery.  
- Hurr. Matthew: roadways suffered severe damage 
and truncated transportation of emergency supplies. 
Breakdown of bridges hindered supply of 
emergency and relief supports.  
- Hurr. Maria: The island was isolated by the 
interruption in the transportation network. Due to 
the loss of telecommunication the severe impact of 
roads, bridges could not be communicated.   
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Table 8.3 highlights the common key issues in communication, coordination, evacuation 
and negligence or poor execution of key aspects of contingency and response plans which 
were generally considered as ‘inadequacy of response’. A sample coding using 
‘evacuation’ taken from the case study Katrina is shown in Figure 8.3. Using the 
extraction of ‘coding’ approach across multiple documents and reports not only assists in 
understanding the response over key time-periods, pre-storm, during, and post-storm 
scenario but also assisted to summarize and understand the information produced in Table 
8.3. 
Figure 8.3 is an illustration of the ineffective evacuation plan, lack of public awareness 
and participation during emergencies. Apart from the commonalities of issues, certain 
differences were also identified underlining the impacts faced by developed countries like 






Figure 8.4 A sample coding on business interruption observed from case study Hurricane Sandy through 
coding 
 
Figure 8.4 highlights the business interruptions experienced post-landfall of Hurricane 
Katrina and Sandy that contributed to the socioeconomic losses. The overall analysis 
highlights that there has been an identification of ‘negligence of response’ in some case 
study events. Whilst there could be a generic solution for mitigation the commonalities 
 
30:3 Despite the declaration of a mandatory evacuation on Sunday before 
la…… (1:1887 [1:2127]) - D 30: evacuation-katrina 
Despite the declaration of a mandatory evacuation on Sunday before landfall, New 
Orleans offcials still did not completely evacuate the population. 
Instead, they opened the Superdome as a “shelter of last resort” for these individuals. 
 
2 Quotations: 
26:1 Over 23,000 businesses and nonprofits employing 245,000 people 
were l…… (1:75 [1:179]) - D 26: Ch4.5_EconRecovery_FINAL_singles 
Over 23,000 businesses and nonprofits employing 245,000 people were located in 
areas flooded by Sandy.  
Figure 8.3 A sample coding on evacuation from case study Hurricane Katrina through coding 
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within response suggests a bespoke measurement should be adapted especially for 
developing and least-developed countries for future adaption to storm surge resilience.  
8.2.3 Phase 3: Analysis of the recovery stage 
Based on the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR 
2009), a response is defined as the ‘immediate focus or short-term needs’ after any 
disaster, while recovery is the ‘extended response’. Sometimes a response is also 
addressed as ‘disaster relief’. According to the UNISDR, there is no clear-cut definition 
between response and recovery stage. Therefore, activities such as emergency sheltering 
are considered as response and temporary shelter, which is extended support, considered 
as recovery. The same situation of differentiating the key activities between response and 
recovery was recognised while reviewing case study data and analysing the search code 
outputs. Therefore, immediate action after the landfall was produced in Table 8.3 and 
those extended responses compiled in Table 8.4.  
Table 8.4 Identification of critical factors from the cross-case syntheses of the recovery phase 
Common key issues 
identified during recovery   
Observation from coding 
Search and rescue 
 
 














- Hurr. Katrina: Initial days of search and rescue 
operation suffered various difficulties such as 
lack of information. Residents who were forced 
to move to rooftops had no access to mobile or 
communication devices resulting in search and 
rescue difficulties. But in general search and 
rescue were carried-out in many locations 
successfully rescuing thousands of people. DoD 
and army were involved in the operation. 
Complications in establishing the structure of 
incident command also confused the rescue 
operation. 
- Hurr. Sandy: The NYC emergency response 
team rescued the residents who were non-
evacuees. Search and rescue were successful in 
most of the cases.  





Rescue from remote areas 
 
 
- Ty. Haiyan: The US DART team guided the 
search and rescue operation and the US military 
aircraft inspecting the affected areas aerially to 
support the operation and clearing the debris and 
the casualties.  
- Hurr. Maria: CDEMA’s National guard together 
supported the search and rescue operations.  
- Cy. Nargis, Haiyan and Matthew exhibited 
similar difficulties in search and rescue. With the 
help of NGO’s search and rescue were carried 
out in remote affected areas.  
 
NGO, INGO, and volunteers 
 
Relief support, search & 











Reached remote locations 
with relief support  
 
Support during curfew times 
- Cy. Nargis: NGO’s, INGO’s supported search 
and rescue in reaching the restricted areas. 
Various level of influences and negotiation and 
liaison was carried out to regain access to 
restricted areas. After the negotiation of ASEAN 
with NGO’s, INGO’s access granted and the 
villages were provided with relief support, 
temporary housing.  
- Ty. Haiyan: The U.S. DoD, USAID, UNWFP, 
UNICEF, IRFC, CARE, ALNAP and various 
local and international agencies NGO’s, INGO’s 
and volunteers collaborated the search and 
rescue, humanitarian aid, relief support through 
partnerships and networks. NGO’s continued to 
operate for 6 years post-event.    
- Hurr. Matthew: NGO and volunteers were able 
to reach the affected people in remote locations 
better than government responders.  
- Hurr. Maria: NGO’s continued to support during 
the island’s curfew times.  
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Lack of coastal prevention 
 
Ignored levee cracks, design, 
and foundational failures 
 
 
Lack of prevention of 
underground systems 
 






lack of investment in coastal 
protection 
 
- Hurr. Katrina: Evidence of design flaws and 
engineering failure were identified. A previous 
crack in levees was ignored causing a subsequent 
breach in the protection system underlining 
ignorance of proper coastal protection. Major 
drainage canals were identified with foundation 
failures.  
- Hurricane Sandy: Lack of coastal prevention 
(NY subway system and tunnels inundations) 
- Ty. Haiyan: the land use planning failed to 
instruct the communities as they lacked coastal 
protection. Most of the fishermen communities 
were close to the coast in low elevated coastal 
zones (LECZ’s) completely exposed to hazard.  
- Cy. Nargis, Ty. Haiyan, Hurr Mathew and Maria 
were identified with little or no coastal 
protections invested to safeguard the coastal 
communities. Some communities were left to 
















- Hurr. Katrina: Some private insurance 
companies either abandoned or did not contract 
fully with policyholders and mortgage holders 
resulting in ambiguity within flood insurance. 
Furthermore, private insurance companies were 
able to provide payments only for the claims that 
suffered minor flooding. Housing which suffered 
serious damage was not funded by private 
insurance and residents were left to rely on 
federal funding. 
- Hurr. Sandy: Insurance-related issues and 
ambiguity in flood policies were identified. The 
recovery phase of Sandy was observed with the 
highest insurance claims relating to storm surge 
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Lack of insurance policies and 
reforms in developing & least-
developed countries 
 
flooding in the US hurricane history. The 
settlement of the raised claims was extended 
until late 2016. 
- Insurance was not commonly identified across 
cases such as Nargis, Haiyan, Matthew, and 
Maria. Rather, relief funds were channelled from 
various organisations and donations.  
Housing 








Multi-dwelling units, low-rise 















- Hurr. Katrina: An estimated range of 275,000- 
300,000 individual housing units were damaged 
in the overall Gulf region.  
- Cy. Nargis: 90% of the houses were destroyed by 
storm surge. Residents were provided with 
building materials and training kits and were 
further provided with training on the ‘build back 
better’ scheme.  
- Hurr. Sandy: 70% of the houses were multi-
dwelling units and suffered severe damage or 
destruction. Coastline infrastructure and 
oceanfront buildings suffered adverse impacts 
including the fire damage in Breezy Point. Low-
rise buildings suffered severe inundation and 
high-rise buildings and their MEP system was 
damaged. Houses built using outdated building 
codes were excluded from floodplain elevation 
and suffered adverse damage.  
- Ty. Haiyan: Most of the coastal communities, 
houses, non-engineered structures were 
destroyed or adversely damaged.  Temporary 
shelter housing was provided 3 years after the 
landfall and permanent housing was provided in 
mid-2016. 
- Hurr. Matthew: Initial recovery phase was five 
months to rebuild the damaged and destroyed 
houses.  
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- Hurr. Maria: Thousands of houses were 
destroyed or severely damaged. One of the 
largest disaster-housing missions in the USA 
occurred during Phase 3 recovery stage.  
Rehabilitation 
 
3-years of rehabilitation 



























- Hurr. Katrina: rehabilitation continued for more 
than three years since the landfall of Katrina due 
to the 27 ft storm surge inundation where debris 
removal alone was estimated to continue for 
several weeks. Environmental contamination, 
Flood insurance, claims, funding to repair or 
demolition, manpower, reconstruction grants 
faced delays at every step of the process 
obscuring the recovery phase.   
- Cy. Nargis: rehabilitation works continued 6 
years since the landfall as various sub-phases. 
The initial phase involved the rehabilitation, 
temporary sheltering, healthcare ensuring basic 
hygiene. Phase two included desalination of 
community ponds, harvesting system to ensure 
access to communal ponds. Phase three included 
training, awareness and improving livelihoods 
programs. Overall, the GOP wanted to conclude 
the rehabilitation works in less than a year, 
however actual rehabilitation works carried out 
the NGO’s was around 5 years.   
- Hurr. Sandy: Destruction of coastline 
infrastructure and oceanfront buildings were 
focused. During the rehabilitation, new 
improved shoreline protection systems and 
hardened dune system were implemented.  
- Ty. Haiyan: Presidential Assistant for 
Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR) was 
implemented in the process to unify all the 











efforts of rehabilitation and recovery under this 
program.  
- Hurr. Matthew: Shelter rehabilitation was carried 
out US AID/OFDA. The first phase of 
rehabilitation involved in debris clearing, 
distribution of emergency materials and shelter 
kits. Rehabilitation of public building such as 
schools, educational facilities and support were 


















- Hurr. Katrina: Power infrastructure was severely 
affected, and pumping stations being 
incapacitated prolonging the restoration process.  
- Hurr. Sandy: restoration of power and utility 
infrastructures and subway system took longer 
than expected.  
- Ty. Haiyan: Power and utilities were restored in 
56 villages out of 138 villages. Improving the 
livelihood was considered as the main section of 
restoration. This involves the restoration of 4 
million workers who lost their jobs either 
temporarily or permanently.  
- Hurr. Maria: restoration of power and utilities 
was extended to more than 7 months. 70% of the 
potable water access was restricted. A bridge 
collapse in Port-au-Prince hampered the 
recovery, relief support delayed recovery.  
 
 
Table 8.4 summarizes the list of common key activities identified across the cases. Key 
activities such as damage assessment, health care was excluded from the list of 
commonalities as they do not impact or change the adaptation and mitigation measures 
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taken. From the economic point of view, flood insurance was a critical factor identified 
during Hurricane Katrina and Sandy. The increased number of flood-related issues and 
insurance claims can also be interlinked with factors such as lack of land use planning in 
the coastal proximity; lack of appropriate coastal protection; failure of effective coastal 
zoning; recommending reassessment of flood policies and reforms.  The Phase-3 recovery 
of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy were viewed as reasonable efforts by the federal, 
national, and local response teams during this study. Relatively, the recovery efforts by 
Burmese government post-Nargis and the Philippines government post-Haiyan was not 
only inadequate but was also observed to be negligent. Nargis was an exception because 
of the blockade of the international aid agencies by the government.  
The country’s lack of adaptive capacities and voluntary in-action to respond and 
cooperate during the recovery phases demonstrated an abandonment of the SFDRR goals. 
This contributes to a key lesson to revise the DRR strategies for future weather events. 
Besides, Haiti’s political instability also contributed to delaying the response and 
recovery. Thankfully, the NGO’s and the UN’s MINUTSHA, who were already operating 
in the field post-2010 earthquake, had previously established relationships with the 
communities and assisted cooperation during the recovery. A detailed coding of the 
individual list of activities corresponding to the recovery phase is produced in Appendix 
C. 
8.2.4 Phase 4: Analysis of the mitigation stage 
Several factors that were identified in the previous three phases that are crucial and were 
the areas which were required to be mitigated. Therefore, adapting to future weather 
events is one of the key theme areas to be suggested via the DAMSS framework.  
Table 8.5 Identification of critical factors from the cross-case syntheses of the mitigation phase 
Common key issues identified 
during mitigation 
Observation from coding 
Lessons learned 
 





- Hurr Katrina: New Orleans residents were left 
vulnerable and failed to implement the 
lessons learned from previous hurricanes. The 
previous simulation of Hurricane Pam (2004) 
and the knowledge gained from the 
simulation was not incorporated into the 






















report for Hurricane Katrina underlining the 
failure of lessons learnt. 
- Cy Nargis: The storm was first to make 
landfall in the Ayeyarwady delta region. 
Previous lessons learnt were not available for 
this case. But the general DRR strategies were 
not followed or implemented and is one of the 
most significant factors in this case study.  
- Hurr. Sandy: Lessons learned from Katrina 
were identified in many areas. Raised 
generators, fire cable deployment, standby 
pumps to drain water after landfall, however, 
the power and utility infrastructure suffered 
significant damage. The MEP system which 
remained grounded was also affected and 
became a key lesson learnt post-Sandy. One 
of the additional key lessons identified was 
‘lack of authority’. 
- Ty. Haiyan: The Philippines faces 23 
typhoons annually on average. Yet, the 
country failed to address the lesson learnt 
incorporate previous experience across all the 
four phases of DRM.  
Land use planning 
 
 








- Hurr. Katrina: Communities developed 
between Lake Pontchartrain and Lake 
Borgne, which connects with the Gulf of 
Mexico, exhibited poor usage of land-use 
plans and lacked to foresight the impending 
risks. Also, flood risk maps suggested that 
houses that were at high-risk zones were 
incorrectly identified as moderate risk zones.  
-  Cy Nargis: No identification of land use plan 
before Nargis. The residents of Ayeyarwady 
were predominantly farmers and were relying 
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Poverty contributing to poor 
infrastructure 
on agriculture as a prime source of income. 
The residents occupied the lands next to 
coasts as there were no stipulated land use 
plans in practice. Post-Nargis, the blueprints 
of existing housing and land use plans were 
adopted from international aid agencies and 
were customized for use in the delta region.  
- Hurr. Sandy: Land use plans and coastal zones 
were not modelled appropriately to survive 
future storm risks. Also, the city of New York 
lacked critical reforms and constant 
upgrading of plans and flood risk zones.  
- Ty. Haiyan: No proper land-use plans were 
identified. Many coastal zones were not 
mapped, and no visionary efforts adhered for 
future storm risk. Due to the country’s 
economic capacity, the residents occupied 
coastal lands for residential use without any 
coastal barriers in place.  
- Hurr. Matthew: Country’s low adaptive 
capacity led to overall poor infrastructure.   
Coastal prevention 
 











- Hurr. Katrina: failure of existing levees, 
dunes and dykes over topping was identified. 
The levees were breached at more than 70 
locations. New embankments, changes to 
levels T-walls, raised pumping station were 
some of the mitigation for coastal prevention 
is carried out.  
- Cy. Nargis, Ty. Haiyan and Hurr Matthew: 
The inundation and the extensive loss of lives 
not only underline the absence of appropriate 
coastal protection in place but also 
emphasises on the future mitigations. 
Restoration of mangroves and forests were 






Installation of flood gates and 







Hazard mapping was the 
primary focus 
 
done post-Nargis as an enhancer of future 
coastal prevention.  
- Hurr. Sandy: coastal protection systems were 
in place but due to the city’s heavily populated 
MDU and closely packed infrastructure, the 
funnel-effect of storm surge over topped the 
River Hudson rapidly inundating all the 5 
boroughs of New York and the city of New 
Jersey. Installation of flood gates, sea gates 
and flood proofed housing were carried out 
till 2016.  
- Ty. Haiyan: Technical remained critical such 
as spatial planning, coastal zoning, building 
codes, risk, and hazard mapping. There is a 
wider scope for improvement in these areas.   
Infrastructure 
 
Elevation of key infrastructure 














Limited protection and 
improvement within 
- Hurr. Katrina: The much-affected New 
Orleans pumping stations were elevated 
several feet above the sea level 10 years after 
Katrina’s landfall. Over the years, New 
Orleans’s population is seeing an increase 
however, housing and infrastructure were still 
being built in high-risk zones. Few key 
activities such as early warning systems, 
evacuation plans were planned with key 
lesson incorporated during Hurricanes 
Florence and Michael (2018) which made 
landfall in New Orleans. However, damage to 
coastal communities and assets yet coastal 
population and assets continued to be exposed 
in the same storm hit zones.  
- Cy. Nargis: The recovery and rehabilitation 
process took almost six years and some 
infrastructures were identified to continue the 
same before Nargis. The densely populated 










Elevated of key infrastructure 












Build back better scheme to 










Wetland restoration was the 
primary focus 
delta region is still vulnerable with limited 
protection. Emergency shelter, suitably re-
enforced embankments are found inadequate 
to mitigate future hazards. Communication 
infrastructure saw some development 
compared to those restricted by the Burmese 
military control during Nargis’s landfall time.  
- Hurr. Sandy: Post-Sandy’s infrastructure 
improvement works included a focus on 
raising buildings several feet above the BFE 
levels. Partnered projects between NYC and 
US Army Corps of Engineers were carried out 
and future projects were at proposal stage. 
Insurance Institute of Business and Home 
Safety (IBHS) and Department of Building 
(DOB) reassessed building codes used in NY 
and NJ. DOB utilised colour coded tags 
‘Green’- less/no damage, ‘yellow’- 
significant non-structural damage, ‘Red’- 
destroyed/severe structural damage.  
- Ty Haiyan: ‘Build Back Better’ was used to 
restore the 90% of damage in the 
infrastructure. Actions and measures were 
taken to strengthen the Local Government 
Unit’s (LGU) capacity. Risk-assessment at 
schools and learning life skills program was 
also introduced to be prepared better in the 
future. 
- Hurr. Matthew: Through the Build Back Safer 
(BBS) program, sustainable shelter and 
housing solutions were ensured for the 
residents. Under this program construction of 
housing and buildings, their vulnerabilities 
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were assessed and evaluated for future storm 
and hurricanes.  
- Hurr. Maria:  Projects on wetland restoration 
and further stabilization of dunes, beaches 




Extended support from a retail 







NGO and INGO developed 
partnered networks (cross-






International agencies and 









- Hurr. Katrina, Sandy, and Maria: similar 
pattern of extended capacity, multi-
dimensional and multi-agency approaches 
were included in the process. Walmart 
supported during Katrina and IFRC during 
Sandy and Maria. In these cases, roles and 
responsibilities were shared between federal 
agencies and volunteers, NGO’s.  
- Cy. Nargis and Ty. Haiyan experienced 
difficulties in establishing coherence in 
coordinating with the government. In both the 
cases, in-field NGO who had already 
established rapport and liaison with the local 
authorities continued to find it tricky to liaise 
post-landfall. 
- Hurr. Matthew: International agencies like 
WFP, CARE was co-leading as cash working 
groups. International Humanitarian 
Partnership (IHP), including 17 health and 
education sectors were involved in the 
response and recovery of Matthew. 
- Hurr. Maria: Ford, Open Society, and 
Rockefeller foundations were involved in 
multi-year commitment and investment 
strategies. In addition to these volunteer 
agencies such as French Civil Protection 
Agencies, European Civil Protection, and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), UN 
Development Program (UNDP) supported 
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 during the logistics management, internet 
connections and information sharing. This 
was greatly beneficial as the country’s power, 
utility and communication infrastructure were 
severely damaged.  
 
Table 8.5 summaries some common mitigation approaches which had been undertaken 
highlight the potential mitigation and adaptation approaches required for the future. Case 
study such as Haiyan not only highlight the limitations in current approaches insisting on 
various key lessons learnt, but also confirms the post-Haiyan efforts taken place at 
different levels. The PAGASA worked on issuing storm surge hazard maps by adapting 
FEMA’s READY project and incorporated the lessons learnt from Haiyan. Another key 
factor was the lack of coastal prevention or protection, which amplifies the effects of the 
hazards leading to direct exposure. While Hurricane Katrina was an example of weak 
coastal protection, Cyclones Nargis, Haiyan and Matthew were cases with a significant 
lack of coastal protection.  Therefore, adapting appropriate coastal protections could 
provide one of the viable and feasible solutions to directly mitigate the risks involved, 
although, this can be high in cost.  
Countries with low levels of coastal investment for resilience may consider a combination 
and natural engineering and wetlands. This could include mangroves and salt marshes as 
a possible combination to mitigate the hazard. The review of the case studies shows how 
the actions, adaptations and the adaptive capacity post-disasters has largely varied for the 
different regions. Even, the adaptation of the US after Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy 
varied largely concerning the adaptive measures taken by Myanmar, the Philippines or 
Haiti. Countries exhibiting different adaptive strategy and approaches show their adaptive 
capacity, their differences between developed countries and small island developing 
states (SIDS) such as the USA and Puerto Rico. Based on this observation, a future 
guidance ‘framework’ approach is likely to be helpful for many countries. To mitigate 
this future gap regardless of the country’s adaptive capacity, using a framework approach 
to filter the best-practices and simultaneously address potential ‘bottleneck’ resilience is 
important. Furthermore, given the current climate emergency scenario and their relative 
impacts in many countries especially for those low elevated coastal zones is crucial. This 
may also be a guideline even for countries who are yet to experience storm surge, and 
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such guidance will not only be helpful but will be essential to be incorporated into existing 
and future planning and construction. 
8.3 GAP analysis of the timeline within DRM 
While analysing the individual cases, with a concept of interpreting the success and 
failure factors during the execution of the disaster phases, the ‘timeline’ was observed to 
play a vital role in Phase-1 of DRM. As stated by Yin (2014) and Bryman (2012), timeline 
is a critical and a vital factor which helps in visualising the gap between specific scales, 
duration, and events. To analyse if there are any substantial difference in the execution of 
certain key activities, the timeline between Phase-1 (preparedness) and Phase-2 
(response) of every individual event is observed. In each case, the selection of two critical 
factors namely ‘risk identification’ and ‘issuance of first warning’ was chosen between 
Phase-1 (before-impact) & Phase-2 (during-impact). The reason behind choosing these 
two phases is that the following key activities taken place between these two phases were 
observed to be crucial first step as suggested by the UNISDR (2006), which could 
contribute to a considerable reduction of mortality rate.  
- Early warning system    
- Forecast and monitoring    
- The readiness of the emergency plan 
- The readiness of deployment of resources 
- Preparations for evacuation if necessary 
- Readiness to set-up emergency shelters 
The above listed factors across all the six studies were collected and merged to understand 
how the timeline between the progression of the hurricane against the preparedness steps 
was taken. Figure 8.5 shows the timeline gap during each event that was observed 
between the two critical phases. Day ‘0’ is the day when the hurricane or the potential 
risk is being identified by the hurricane monitors and forecasters. ‘X’ is the day when the 
first warning is issued by the authorities to the communities. It is from this period, that 
any of the processes such as evacuations, preparing for the hurricane begins. It is also 
important how early they assess and how early they issue that first warning alerting the 
communities in preparation for the hazard. During this period, the resources such as food, 
emergency shelters, etc., were also deployed. The dotted red line indicates the landfall of 
the tropical cyclone and any preparedness ends by now as the disaster has occurred and 
only a response to the disaster is possible from this phase. From Figure 8.5 Hurricane 
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Katrina was identified with an inactive period of 11 days between the risk identified (Day 
0) and the issuance of first warning (x). It not only highlights the failure of preparedness 
but, in case if the authorities had prepared between these 11 days the loss of more than 
1,800 lives could have been minimised. Consequently, Typhoon Haiyan was observed 
with a gap of 1-day between risk identification and issuance of first warnings of NHC. 
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Figure 8.5 Timeline of the execution of key activities in Phase 1 and Phase 2  
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As highlighted in Figure 8.5 countries like the Philippines and Myanmar whose shallow 
coasts, bays, and estuaries are extremely vulnerable, should consider the fact that they 
may have lesser response period between risk identification and landfall. Therefore, it is 
recommended that their disaster governance and policies should include such crucial 
factors for future storm surge mitigation. Although this data does not produce the typical 
timeline of any event, this could be a guideline that if a hurricane of similar pattern and 
magnitude is forecasted in future in their corresponding ocean basin then these number 
of days denoted as ‘n’ days between pre-impact and during-impact phases will act as a 
‘buffer’ to assist underlined the actions to be expedited.   
 
8.4 Proposal of the DAMSS framework 
The findings from the Chapters 5, 6, and 7 together with the cross-case analysis 
demonstrated there is no consistent approach to enhance the preparedness. Given the 
changes due to climate change, sea-level rise, and increasing hurricane and storm surge 
events more countries and communities will be affected in the future. A holistic approach 
to harness the preparedness investigating the storm surge impacts which can aid 
governments, planners, public departments, and the public is essential to reduce the 
socioeconomic losses.  
As there is no prior framework for storm surge resilience identified in an academic 
environment, this framework was proposed after an investigation of storm surge impacts 
from previous responses and process of preparedness. It is also designed such that it is 
applicable regardless of the geographic regions. The framework this research put in 
forward is inclusive and might be applied to different countries with different economic 
capacities and geographic regions. It does not serve as a generic disaster approach which 
is identified as the current approach in the case study countries. The framework could 
harness previous learning outcomes which could also act as a feedback loop contributing 
to knowledge for countries and communities. 
The Disaster Adaptation and Mitigation to Storm Surge (DAMSS) framework is proposed 
as Figure 8.6. The proposed framework is the culmination of the data presented via Table 
8.1, followed by the specific analysis of the four phases listed in Table 8.2 - 8.5 where 
similarities of limitations have been drawn from the analysis. 
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Figure 8.6 Proposal of the DAMSS framework 
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Phase 1: Preparedness 
The first phase was designed to help focus on the pre-emptive to avoid the acceleration 
of an ordinary event into a disastrous event. From the analysis of cases, it is understood 
that the initial step before the occurrence of the event has the maximum scope in risk 
reduction and risk transfer in some cases. This is also equally critical as the possibilities 
and likelihoods of the tentative hazard are subject to change rapidly. The analysis of the 
cases and the aftermath of these events without a prevention mechanism suggests that a 
potential measure could contribute to reducing the mortality rate and economic losses. 
Therefore, planning the preparation of the equipment and relevant procedures must 
include at least the following key areas for increased prevention and lead further to 
effective response which is elaborated in phase 1 of the DAMSS framework.  
- Pre-resilience measures (e.g., adapting future housing, utilities designed for 
storm surge floods, emergency shelter locations, community halls, medical 
centres) 
- Risk identification (e.g., planning for storm surge floods, land-use restrictions, 
deployment of resilient infrastructure) 
- Early warning system (e.g., timelines, risk area or zone, community 
identification) 
- Risk communication (e.g., clarity, meaning, understanding and action to take)  
- Evacuation (e.g., rendezvous locations, rebuilt higher evacuation zones, in-
built roof access windows, ‘hold and rescue’ zones on roofs) 
Phase 2: Response 
The second phase of the DAMSS framework was designed based on the provision of 
immediate emergency services post-impact.  This stage mainly focuses on reducing the 
loss of lives from disaster and ensuring safety measures to prevent the subsequent losses. 
The proposed list of key activities to address the disaster with an effective response must 
include increased capacity through effective communication and coordination.   
- Emergency sheltering (e.g., rapid construction, weatherproof and flexible) 
- Communication and coordination (e.g., across key public sector bodies, 
emergency services and utilities, hierarchy, roles, and responsibility, also 
utilising experienced responders i.e., NGO’s) 
- Public health (e.g., classification of priority, operational response, the 
effectiveness of response inputs and outcomes). 
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Phase 3: Recovery 
The third phase of the framework focuses on the extended response or recovery from the 
disaster. Commonly, most of the case study documents defined recovery as short-term 
and long-term recovery. The short-term recovery considers the quick restoration of 
affected communities which includes health and safety, restoring the assets and 
communities. The long-term recovery considers reconstruction, rehabilitation coupled 
with areas of improvement such as  
- Rehabilitation, restoration, and reconstruction 
- Health and safety 
- Organisational capacities  
This phase also involves public engagement, awareness, and training under rehabilitation 
processes.  
Phase 4: Mitigation 
The final phase of the framework focuses on the corrective measures of improved disaster 
risk management addressing the specific issues of the risk from previous learnt lessons. 
The action for this phase considers addressing the gap in the current practices:  
- Lessons learnt of various activities of phases 1, 2 & 3.  
- Reflecting on the critical factors and determining the measures 
- Adapting the public knowledge for future through public awareness, training, 
and education 
Phase 4 of the framework is considered to have the potential to improve the areas (where 
necessary) and contribute to reducing the mortality and economic losses in the future. The 
proposed DAMSS framework constituting the four phases with an additional focus of 
improving pre-emptive measures within Phase 1 (preparedness) and Phase 4 (mitigation). 
The proposed framework is considered not only to bridge the gap between the current 
practices and future adaption but also execute the following procedure thereby enhancing 
the resilience of coastal habitat to storm surge practices.  
- Define DRM and DRR strategies outlined in DAMSS framework 
- Execute the strategies  
- Identify the gaps 
- Learn from best practices  
- Implement the lessons learnt  
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- Measure the gap again 
 
8.5 General discussion of key activities of the DAMSS framework  
8.5.1 Risk identification and early warning, monitoring and forecast 
The United Nations’s (2006) and UNISDR’s (2009) statements on effective 
preparedness acknowledges a step-by-step execution of the early warning system. The 
UNISDR emphasises the importance of such an early warning system. Reflecting on the 
UN’s statement, focus more should be on risk communication. A good risk 
communication also means focusing on the technical aspects of monitoring and 
forecasting and identifying the end-users who are most likely to be affected by the 
inaction of the early warning system.   
The USA under its disaster governance wing, FEMA, adapts hurricane preparedness 
through a program called ‘Ready’. The program instructs the first step towards preparing 
for such cyclones, and storm surges by initiating effective early warning systems 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2019). In addition to the existing hurricane watch-
warning, predicted storm surge warnings were also issued within the early warnings. 
Strategic planning such as the ‘Ready’ program should be adopted by the developing 
countries toward enhancing their first step in DRM.   
The Sendai Framework’s Priorities for Action (PFA), also highlights the vitality of 
understanding the risk and enhancing disaster preparedness. In principle, these case 
study countries appeared to have risk assessments, protocols and emergency planning 
in place. Despite this, inadequacy in understanding the risk leading to an ineffective 
early-warning was observed. With existing conditions such as technical limitations in 
calculating the hurricane intensity, which greatly influences the storm surge levels, 
further extends the gap in risk analysis and hazard assessment. It is recommended that 
all coastal areas should run prediction models including the possible inundation from 
the ‘funnel-effects’ of storm surge. 
Larger gaps in forecasting data and risk assessment are more likely to happen to 
countries where technical capabilities of hurricane monitoring and prediction systems 
are weak and have to depend on the neighbouring countries for weather prediction and 
forecast information. For instance, Myanmar who had to rely on the Indian 
Meteorological Department (IMD) and Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) for its 
forecasts and monitoring has to enhance their communication and coordination when 
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liaising with their neighbouring agencies. Flexibility and inter-dependency are vital for 
countries like Myanmar to reduce the future risk and enhance their disaster risk 
governance.   
8.5.2 Communicate the risk and public awareness and education on storm surge 
The gap in risk communications which was observed across the cases was witnessed to 
have occurred when authorities failed to understand their audiences. Typhoon Haiyan was 
an example when the PAGASA’s experts communicated in technical language whilst the 
common people were looking for information in a simple language without technical 
jargons. Also, the public is not a homogenous entity; therefore, different groups of society 
require different methods of communication. 
CERC (2014) quotes that effective risk communication should include the following 
basic steps:  
• Risk knowledge 
• Communicating the risk  
• Monitoring the outcome of the communication  
Reflecting on CERC’s quote on the characteristics of effective risk communication, it is 
suggested that the future communications should focus not only in communicating the 
risk, but it should also focus on the outcome of such risk communication. This key step 
not only ensures the public’s understanding of the hazard but also induces the public’s 
participation once the received communication is understood by the end user.   
8.5.3 Understanding the role and responsibilities and decision-making during 
emergencies  
Decision-making is another important factor that was observed during the analysis of the 
research. The USA, as a developed country, even with its utmost adaptive capacity, faced 
severe criticism post-hurricane Katrina (2005) mainly for its poor choice of decision-
making. Beginning with insufficient EWS; delayed declaration of emergency; delayed 
evacuation orders followed by re-evacuation after landfall; every step was criticised for 
its poor decision-making that resulted in the loss of 1,800 lives and with an estimated 
economic loss US $108 billion (2005) which is currently estimated as US$ 160 billion 
(currency corrected with 2018 inflation). This is even highlighted in the report of the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2006). Therefore, making 
the right decision at the right time not only becomes part of effective preparedness but 
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also becomes essential in saving the country from socioeconomic losses inflicted by these 
disasters. 
8.5.4 Execution of effective evacuation 
The execution of the evacuation plan connects with both Phase-1 preparedness and Phase-
2 response. The primary mitigation action towards an approaching tropical cyclone is 
evacuation, followed by an escalation of deployed resources to the victims. Although this 
sounds a very straightforward action, execution and planning mass evacuation as 
observed in the cases is regarded to be a complex process.  
In the case of Sandy, even after two mandatory evacuations have been ordered, there was 
still a certain percentage of people chose to stay back. The case studies have highlighted 
how planning and executing emergency evacuations is a major procedure that requires a 
coordinated response from officials and cooperative responses from people. The analysis 
also highlighted that it is not an identical approach that is adapted during every emergency 
and was often subject to change. This implies that an ‘ongoing’ understanding and 
assessment is required to achieve successful evacuation before every event. A more 
transparent and explanatory evacuation plan, provision of continuous drills and training 
at regular intervals, realistic communication of anticipated hazards, can enhance public 
participation during evacuations.    
8.5.5 Implementation of response plan 
The DRM approaches indicate that understanding the roles and responsibilities to execute 
the contingency plan appropriately is the key to implement the response plan and related 
strategies. Except for Hurricane Sandy, almost all the cases exhibited overall inadequate 
execution of the response plan. This was recognized because of the lack of understanding 
of roles and responsibilities of the emergency responders, and interaction between the 
national, sub-national, and local response. This seemingly weakened the process of 
making the strategic decisions required on time thereby offsetting the primary focus of 
responding to the emergency. Even though response plans were in place as a guiding 
principle, issues were underlined during the implementation of the response plan in a 
‘vertical approach’ as shown in Figure 8.7 (right) where the sub-national and local team 
were awaiting orders from their hierarchical national teams. Kapucu (2016) discusses the 
advantages of horizontal escalation of roles and responsibilities during emergencies. 









Adapting to Kapucu’s statement, and applying the theory of positivism in achieving 
results, a ‘horizontal approach’ and its implementation within the response plan is 
suggested via Figure 8.7 (left) in comparison with the illustration of a vertical approach. 
The suggestion was given based on the disadvantages identified in a vertical escalation 
and with an assumption of possibly executing the key activities and sharing the 
responsibilities simultaneously.  
8.5.6 Land use planning and coastal communities  
According to the UNISDR’s (2009) terminologies, the process of identifying, assessing, 
and deciding on the various options of land usage is called land-use planning. This process 
involves the analysis of long-term economy, social and environmental hazard data. As 
stated by the UNISDR, the key to successful study and mapping of the land use planning 
relies on the formulation of alternative land-use decisions.   
The cases have highlighted how such land-use planning (or lack of) for the coastal 
communities have determined the vulnerability of the country through their exposure 
level to the hazard. The heavily populated communities in the New Orleans; or the coastal 
communities in the City of Tacloban; Ayeyarwady delta in Myanmar; or the MDU’s in 
the five boroughs of New York City and New Jersey; were subjected to insufficient land-
use planning relative to the risks. Developed countries are often financially capable of 
bearing the cost of damage as seen in the recovery phases in the USA, in comparison with 
the 4 years of extended recovery phases identified in cases such as Nargis and Haiyan.  
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From Katrina and Sandy, it is obvious that these developed countries have ‘coastal 
zoning’ systems under which coastal lands were classified as high, moderate, or low-risk 
zones. The breaches in coastal zoning system in Sandy and Katrina cases reveals the 
closely packed infrastructures and land-use intensity. Issues with coastal habitat zoning 
systems beyond their mapped areas highlight the possible gaps between mapping methods 
and actual observation.  This could be mainly from issues such as the use of outdated 
maps, the decadal gap in the census records, and continuous change in coastal 
hydrography. But they specifically indicate the requirement for reassessed coastal zones 
and land-use plans to adapt for future surge events. Also, land use planning can also aid 
in mitigating the disasters risk specifically by reducing the risk of exposure to coastal 
extremities.  
8.5.7 Linking NGO’s, INGO’s and volunteers for multi-level networking 
The role of Non-government Organizations (NGO’s) and International NGO’s during and 
post-impact period was widely accepted and recognized. These NGO’s have a 
competitive advantage than the local government themselves in engaging with the 
regional residents. Their partnerships and collaborations with private and local 
governments were observed in the recovery and extended recovery phases during almost 
all the cases. The recovery phases of Haiyan demonstrated how the NGO’s and 
volunteer’s contribution have encouraged women participation during rebuilding, 
restoration, and reconstruction works. NGO’s were also observed to have the potential to 
support capacity building at greater levels by building community-level participation. 
This may be mainly due to their resources and flexibility to act locally and internationally. 
Although local NGO’s have limited access than the local governments, their knowledge 
from various previous disasters can be greatly beneficial to communities who have never 
experienced the impact from certain disasters, as observed during Cyclone Nargis. Across 
certain cases, their services (NGO’s) were observed to be more rapid than governments, 
especially in those less acessible, remote locations.  
 
During the 2010 Haiti earthquake, although the aid from various countries was provided, 
only minor portions were channelled through the government. This is not because Haiti, 
is a low-income country, but various other reasons include political instability, non-
localized evacuation plans, and poor infrastructure. The United Nation’s Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) who were already operating in field since the 2010 
earthquake were also involved during the post-Matthew recovery phase. Improvement by 
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way of channelling the international emergency funding was observed since the 2010 
earthquake, mainly due to the involvement of NGO’s and the United Nations.  
By adapting to a cross-sectoral partnership, the lack of risk knowledge could be reduced 
by working with trained volunteer or NGO teams operating in the field. NGO’s 
participation could be one of the most resourceful communication media routes in the 
process of creating awareness in remote and rural coastal areas of developing and low-
income countries. Through a well-coordinated multi-level network and organised 
relationships, knowledge transfer and learning from other global events concerning 
disaster risks and response needs into effective communication outreach could be 
achieved. While highlighting the support and assistance received from NGO’s, and 
international agencies throughout critical emergencies, considerable emphasis should be 
placed on expanding the multi-level networking for its advantages.   
 
8.5.8 Developing stakeholder involvement   
By reviewing the multiple case studies, involving Phase-2 (response) and Phase-3 
(recovery), it is noticeable that the required levels of response and recovery activities were 
beyond the national response team’s capacity and capability in developing countries. 
During those circumstances, the involvement of the primary stakeholder highlighted in 





Figure 8.8 Overview of a stakeholder involvement enhanced within DRR  
Primary stakeholder Secondary stakeholder Tertiary stakeholder 
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From the case studies, it is identified that stakeholder participation has supported in 
various instances during the recovery phase of the incident management. Additional 
support from the secondary stakeholder highlighted in yellow was observed during the 
Phase-3 recovery stages. Finally, the involvement of tertiary stakeholder highlighted in 
green was observed to have supported during the Phase-4 mitigation where policies and 
land-use planning post-cyclone events were carried out. The different stakeholders which 
have been identified during this analysis which has strategic input are shown in Figure 
8.8. 
As observed during the cases, the key role of all the stakeholders was to enhance the 
collaborative partnerships and multi-dimensional access to resources in support of the 
emergency. Although, these may look more of generic stakeholder involvement, for 
developing countries like Haiti, the Philippines, Myanmar, external stakeholders have 
played key roles as observed from the case studies. These cases were identified to have 
stakeholder involvement on ad-hoc basis only during the time of disasters occurrence. 
However, for a long-term improved network and to understand the coastal communities 
and the people’s requirement during the emergency, a more structured approach is 
required. Such an approach should be formalised with an understanding of roles and 
responsibilities of primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders is required. Previous 
established networks could minimise the communication and coordination issues which 
occur during the response and recovery phases and increase the coastal adaptation for a 
better future.   
8.5.9 Increase coastal resilience with appropriate coastal protection 
Low-income countries and few developing countries are not likely to invest and allocate 
resources on coastal defence (PreventionWeb, 2015). This was observed during the 
analysis of the cases. Case studies on tropical cyclones Nargis, Haiyan and Matthew, also 
confirmed that these countries have either little or very few coastal investments. Primarily 
this may be the reflection of the country’s adaptive capacity, or socioeconomic 
inequalities, or poverty. However, it appears there was also an inclination by authorities 
to not to allocate resources on coastal defence or refine their coastal flood protection 
policies annually. As stated by Wallemacq & Below (2018), poverty and lack of economic 
capacity, directly connects the country’s adaptive capacity in terms of disasters which 
further increases the gap within adaptation and mitigation measures which this author 
terms as ‘protection-gap’.   
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Figure 8.9 Comparison of developed (USA - major landmass) and least-developed (Haiti - island) 
countries for death toll and economic loss due to significant tropical storms  
 
According to Lewis (2014), the societal loss of the developing countries is generally 
higher than those developed countries and consequently, the economic damage of the 
developed countries is generally observed to be higher than those faced by developing 
countries. In line with the statement of Lewis (2014), the case study data of Nargis, 
Haiyan, Matthew and Maria have been identified with little or no coastal protection in 
their corresponding countries. From another perspective, considering Hurricane 
Matthew’s losses (financial and deaths) in the USA versus Haiti, reproduced in Figure 
8.9 demonstrates the diversity of impact. Haiti which is a small island but less developed 
for coastal protection resilience than the USA had low economic losses but experienced 
a much higher death toll.  The case studies of Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, and Matthew 
identified that various coastal protections such as seawalls and levees were already in-
place protecting the communities. The sea wall in front of the financial district in Lower 
Manhattan; the I-walls of the 350 km of engineered levees replaced by T-walls in New 
Orleans; restoration of embankments, dune and dykes in New Jersey; all highlight the 
importance of having coastal protection. Though these coastal protections were in-place 
the communities suffered substantial damage during significant events. This suggests that 
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locations as a solution for storm surge mitigation. It is to be noted that these engineered 
protection systems should be constantly maintained,   
Consequently, building those engineered storm surge barriers incurs high construction 
and maintenance cost as discussed earlier in Chapter 3. Reflecting on projects such as the 
‘Ike-Dyke’ proposed after the Hurricane Ike (2008); New York’s-New Jersey Storm 
Surge Barrier proposed after Hurricane Sandy (2012); were still in the proposal stages.  
The probability of constructing such barriers in a low-income country are practically not 
realistic. McIvor et al., (2015), emphasised the advantage of mangrove vegetation in 
attenuating the storm surge peak water levels to a certain degree. Mirroring his thoughts, 
the analysis further suggests that low-income countries should focus on the alternate 
strategic approach to mitigate these coastal hazards in the future. Although McIvor’s 
studies highlight mangrove vegetation (which is a much lower cost), it is suggested that 
this should be used alongside other coastal risk reduction measures, such as robust 
seawalls, high strength levees and flood protection measures.  
 
8.5.10 Improved coastal construction and flood-proofed housing 
Construction is another major sector that was identified to have suffered severe damage 
across multiple cases. This remarks on the necessity of improved coastal construction 
when it comes to risk mitigation. Bhatta (2010) stated that coastal urbanization, blue 
economy, and industrialisation have not only triggered physical environmental impacts, 
but their expansion as coastal sprawl further complicates the task of adaptation. New 
York’s MDU or the Ayeyarwady delta’s non-engineered structure were samples of 
coastal occupants and settlements.  
Post-Katrina and Sandy, FEMA’s - MAT team assessed the building where many were 
house were identified with outdated building codes. The rejection of many of the 
insurance claims post-Sandy was also an example of how the houses not being adapted 
under building codes.  In line with Bhatta’s statement, and in support of adapting 
construction, the new coastal developments and buildings should consider updating 
building codes, for both wind and flood proofed housing. Such adaption should include 
new techniques and building regulations that are durable and incorporate sustainable 
designs to cope with the shifting weather-extremities. Figure 8.10(a) & (b) shows the 
post-Sandy mitigation in construction is elaborated through the following codes.  





Various ongoing improvements in the construction industry such as smart cities, green 
infrastructure, and blue-green infrastructure observed in Phase-4 (mitigation) of Katrina 
and Sandy. This is a positive approach towards climate change and sea-level rise 
adaptation and mitigation.  
The research further suggests such adaptations should also be considered by the 
developing and low-income countries in agreement with their economic capacity. It is 
worth noting that the exciting sectoral developments, should not camouflage or divert the 
important critical basic aspects of improved design and building regulations, which are 
required in many countries to cope with future risks. 
 
8.5.11 Mitigate the issues within the transportation network 
Transportation plays a key role in society’s mobility and this infrastructure was detected 
to have experienced adverse impact immediately after the landfall of many hurricanes 
and storms. Serious hampering of transportation network was observed in all these cases 
when the cyclones combined with storm surges. The data from the individual cases 
registered the impacts undergone by the transportation network from uprooted trees, 
knocked-down communication poles, roads and bridges cut-off and rail routes and 
airports hampered by debris. The dynamics of transportation are profoundly challenged 
 
77:5 FEMA recently issued revised advisory base food-elevation maps. It 
is…… (3:821 [3:1038]) - D 77: Post-Sandy-Rebuilding_IBHS 
FEMA recently issued revised advisory base food-elevation maps. It is important to 
note that FEMA recommendations are not the law. Towns still must incorporate the 
guidance into local zoning and building ordinances 
 
76:6 Three critical elements of building construction infuence how a 
buil…… (2:1168 [2:1415]) - D 76: Post-Sandy-Building-Codes_IBHS 
Three critical elements of building construction infuence how a building fares in 
storm surge and fooding: 1) elevation of habitable spaces and utilities; 2) type of 
foundations used, and 3) use of food-resistant materials in vulnerable areas. 
Figure 8.10(a) A sample coding of mitigation in construction observed from Hurricane Sandy  
Figure 8.10(b) A sample coding of mitigation in construction observed from Hurricane Sandy 
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in Phase-2 response and Phase-3 recovery stages when national response teams or NGO’s 
try to reach the victims during emergencies. The lesson learnt from these cases highlight 
the vulnerability of transport infrastructure and its network to cyclones and surges. 
Regardless of the storm size or status they can still cause potential damage. Disruption in 
logistics of emergency resources (food, water, and medical supply) mainly caused by 
impeded transportation. Phase-1 transportation issues related to gridlocks, and blockade 
of evacuation routes temporarily creating bottleneck situation, further complicates the 
evacuation process.  
Although such significant changes have increased the robustness of the transportation 
network, their efficiency is challenged during unpredictable conditions and have become 
inevitable in every single event. So, to mitigate this risk, planned evacuation and 
emergency transportation at safe standby locations, alternate evacuation routes should be 
included in the emergency plans for future execution. This is even more important for 
island communities with limited geographic dispersal availability for populations to move 
to safe havens. Expanded multi-level networks and increased stakeholder participation 
can also be considered. During Katrina’s response, the support from Walmart by 
distributing the emergency supplies using its delivery vehicles. when the federal response 
team’s standby emergency vehicles were submerged and became unusable, was a strong 
example of extended stakeholder involvement. It is recommended that when local 
authorities or region are planning emergency responses, they engage with other 
stakeholders, industry in the preparation and practice exercises for such response.  
 
8.5.12  Sustainable power and utility infrastructure 
The power outage is a crucial factor which remains critical during hurricanes and storm 
surges. Although, power grids are designed to sustain the hurricane’s heavy winds, the 
case studies identified how power and utility infrastructure has suffered severe damaged 
or destroyed during storm surges. The period of seven months for the restoration of power 
and utilities in Puerto Rico post-Maria explains the critical attributes of this infrastructure. 
Hurricane Maria’s death toll was also associated with the loss of power outage over a 
prolonged period cutting access to life-saving instruments. Few solutions which can be 
adapted more easily by developed countries include installation of food gates, 
prioritization of investment in utilities, energy station and pumping motors operated in 
sealed water-tight gates like those observed post-Katrina Phase 4 mitigation measures. 
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Raising power grid substations as witnessed in the Phase 4 mitigation stage of Hurricane 
Sandy, may serve as possible future solutions for many countries to reduce power outage 
period. Developing and low-income countries should focus on the usage of battery-
operated emergency lights, alternate power-backed inverters for households through 
encouraged multi-level networking and support from neighbouring countries. Additional 
insights for future innovations such as real-time power outage and restoration time frames 
could support community engagement during the restoration period.  
 
8.5.13 Improving the recovery phase from the insurance perspective  
According to Tower Hill Insurance (2013), a private insurance company, ‘storm surge’ is 
a peril that creates ambiguity for the people to understand. The insurance policies 
currently differentiate the classification of damage into ‘water damage’ and ‘wind 
damage’. As such storm surge is linked to both, primarily water-borne but originates from 
pressure wind source.  
In line with the annual report of the Marsh Insurance (2015), the insurance industry has 
made changes to their policies and in the way of assessing risk based on the lessons learnt 
from significant storm surge events such as Hurricane Katrina and Sandy. In agreement 
with this report, Phase 4 mitigation observed changes in the way risk is being assessed 
and insured.   
However, these events also underline how the simulated catastrophic models and their 
results have greatly deviated and have exaggerated or underestimated the risk compared 
to the actual loss in the past. While carrying out the analysis for case Sandy, additional 
data were identified on FEMA’s- NFIP - Flood Insurance Risk Map (FIRM) do not appear 
to have incorporated the future forecasted sea-level rise 2100 scenario, which leaves a 
potential gap in policies (FEMA, 2017).  
As far as observed in Myanmar, Philippines, Haiti or Puerto Rico, no standardized 
insurance programs or policies were being commonly put into practice, unlike the USA. 
These countries after having faced significant cyclone events have not mandated any such 
reforms within insurance, flood risk or property damage funding for those residing within 
the LECZ’s.  These countries generally rely on national disaster relief funds to rebuild 
their houses. Considering the difference in developed versus developing or low-income 
countries highlights the gap within the insurance, and further raises questions concerning 
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to the role of private insurance companies and their stakeholder participation. If 
participation of insurance as a key stakeholder in developed countries are delicate 
regardless of utmost adaptive capacity, then the situation in developing and low-income 
countries remains even more critical. 
 
8.6 Additional factors to consider for enhanced resilience  
 
8.6.1 Sustainable drainage system  
During Katrina, the most efficient pumping system of the New Orleans, which could drain 
300 million gallons of water in a day, was fully inundated by storm surge making the 
system inoperable leaving the city flooded for more than two weeks. The similar situation 
was also observed post-Sandy in New York. Drainage system controls the surface water, 
especially during inundations from inland and coastal flooding, can become critical. This 
can also invoke outbreaks of infectious disease, health-issues and epidemics, post-
disaster. The observation of the cholera outbreak in Haiti post-Matthew is a sample of the 
poor drainage system. The situation occurred in New Orleans clearly emphasises the 
necessity for increased drain holes, and efficient sustainable drainage system as an active 
protection measure. Economically efficient investments such as trench drainage systems, 
French drains, spoon drains, roof water drains, gully grate, open channels could be 
installed in developing and low-income countries. 
8.6.2 Media involvement and social media 
According to a study published by Five Thirty-Eight’s Dhrumil Mehta (2017), it is 
observed that Hurricane Maria received less media attention relative to the previous 
hurricanes such as Harvey and Irma, which had its landfall in the US mainland (Centro, 
2018). The general observation from the cases identified that media coverage of these 
disasters was subjective in some instances. While collecting the newspaper data, many 
events were identified to have not received sufficient media attention in comparison with 
the hurricane activities monitored in a few other countries. Because media one of the key 
stakeholders, their increased involvement is vital during emergencies. This could also 
increase the country’s obligations to respond in a reasonable homogenous way.  
Additional observation of Hurricane Sandy exhibited a new way of communicating risk 
via social media. Many residents used Twitter as a platform to network and communicate 
with FEMA, state, and local response teams. Although this trend is widely observed in 
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developed countries, and the authorities of developing and low-income countries were 
yet to migrate to this technology entirely. The language barrier, illiteracy rates, ambiguity 
in understanding modern terminologies and communications were identified to take the 
lead for occasional or less use of social media. It is highlighted via this research that this 
could be a possible next-generation approach for effective risk communication.   
8.6.3 Lack of record and data 
This is one of the key limitations observed while collecting research data and caste study 
data. Some events were observed to have two set of data such as official and unofficial or 
direct and indirect death statistics. Cases such as Hurricane Matthew, where the official 
statistics in Haiti is 546 (Stewart, 2017), and the reported unofficial statistics of 1,332 
deaths (Aon Benfield, 2017). Similarly, in 2017, during Hurricane Maria, 65 deaths are 
recorded as official death statistics but, new reports claim the death statistics are as high 
as 2,975 (Milken Institute School of Public Health, 2018). As disaster damage data are 
vital to analyse the underlying risk, lack of data or inaccurate data can result in the 
underestimation of actual storm surges risk. This research suggests the importance of 
constant and consistent maintenance of the disaster database for future risk analysis and 
assessment of the return period of these events.   
8.7 Summary  
This chapter considered the analysis of the research data collected via the six case studies. 
Each case study which was chosen as a typical representative of the total research 
population were not considered as a sample but as an opportunity to conceive and conduct 
empirical analysis. The analysis of individual case studies as cross-case syntheses led to 
the identification of commonalities and differences as key findings and provided the 
evidence of limitations and challenges within the current approaches of disaster risk 
management and risk reduction. The identification of the commonalities across the cases 
which was considered as both strengths and weaknesses from the cross-case synthesis 
were given as guidelines towards achieving the best practices in DRM and DRR. The 
analysis which produced the lessons learnt of the lessons learnt as research findings, the 
gap analysis of the timeline within the first two phases led to the development of the 
DAMSS framework. The final section includes the discussion of the various key activities 
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION OF THE DAMSS FRAMEWORK AND GUIDELINES 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
9.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter provided the analysis, findings and interpretation of the results 
based on the case studies, which has supported the recommendations in the proposed 
DAMSS framework. This chapter discusses the issues of current generalised risk 
reduction frameworks, such as Sendai. This chapter discusses how the framework is 
aligned within and to the key priorities of United Nation’s Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (SFDRR). This may help synergize, align, and incorporate the 
recommendations in an existing framework structure, allowing the flexibility for earlier 
or ‘ready’ future adoption. In future if a specific framework for improving the resilience 
for storm surge was to be introduced, the DAMSS framework proposed in Chapter 8 and 
aligned against the Sendai could act as a guideline.  
 
9.2 Alignment of SDG and the Sendai Framework for DRR  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 
is the successor of the previous Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) with a goal period 
of 2015-2030 (United Nations, 2015).  According to SFDRR, countries should develop 
plans for existing and new disasters through a strong commitment to achieving seven 
global targets through four priority phases (United Nations, 2015). The seven global 
targets (A-G) are spread over two distinct categories of reducing and increasing, as shown 
in Figure 9.1. 
Reduce Increase 
A Mortality E 
Countries (national 
and local) DRR 
Strategies 




C Economic loss 
G 
Availability & access to 
EWS, DRR information 
and assessments D 
Damage to critical 
infrastructure 
 
Figure 9.1 Sendai Framework seven global target indicators [source: United Nations (2015)]   
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The UNDRR guidance and international knowledge platforms such as ‘prevention web’ 
for disaster risk reduction have alignment (as shown in Figures 9.2 and 9.3) with three 
primary UN Sustainable Development Goals 1, 11, and 13 involving: No. 1 - No Poverty; 
No. 11 - Sustainable Cities and Communities and No. 13 - Climate Action. 
 
Figure 9.2 Alignment of the UN Sustainable Development Goal Indicators and Sendai Framework 
Indicators [source: United Nations (2015)]   
 
Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable
Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and 
its impacts
SDG Clauses Synergies between SDG and Sendai Section
1.5.1, 11.5.1, 3.1.1
REDUCE  Number of deaths, missing persons and  directly 
affected persons attributed to disasters per 100,000 population
A1, B1
1.5.2, 11.5.2
REDUCE Direct economic loss attributed to disasters in relation to 
global gross domestic product (GDP). REDUCE Damage to critical 





INCREASE  Number of countries that adopt and implement 
national disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai 




INCREASE Proportion of local governments that adopt and 
implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with 





UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Indicators
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Figure 9.3 Diagram showing the alignment of the Sendai (SFDRR) seven global target indicators  
and UN SDG goals and target indicators [source: PreventionWeb, n.d.] 
 
9.3 Global DRR frameworks and integration of the DAMSS framework 
One of the major drawbacks of the current global frameworks (such as the SFDRR) found 
during this study is an imprecise or generalized approach to disasters. Whilst there are 
some primary aspects, processes and structures which have a commonality in existing 
global frameworks. The common characteristics however are not aligned nor do not give 
the sense to be custom-made to specific types (storm surge) and there are no sub-
frameworks for this specific disaster response. This highlights how the DRM framework 
is not being implemented considering specific sub-disasters types. 
Oxley (2015) claims that though the SFDRR framework is a successor of the HFA 
framework, it under utilises the lessons learned from HFA’s and rather proposes a new 
set of targets and priorities.  He further adds that SFDRR is weak at problem analysis and 
connecting the lessons learnt and implementing future actions. This research considers 
the proposal of SFDRR as a positive approach towards DRR while also recognising its 
weaknesses as stated by Oxley (2015).  
Despite the availability of various international protocols, frameworks, and federated 
emergency management plans being utilised the significance of storm surge awareness is 
still underestimated. As discussed in Chapter 3 there has been an increasing trend in storm 
strength, economic cost, and societal impact due to storm surge. Reflecting on the critical 
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importance of these current limitations within DRM and DRR and forecasting the future 
exposures to storm surge, it is understandable that a holistic focus through the framework 
approach is required. Such a focus of an operational framework should cover the 
individual phases of DRM overarching, to help mitigate storm surge risk. Hazards such 
as climate change and sea-level rise take their course over an extended period. Long-term 
planning and approaches do not align with near-term hazards such as storm surge.  
The SFDRR’s seven global targets as shown in Table 9.1 have a focus for improvements 
in the key indicators between the years 2015-2030. It is unlikely that such a generic 
framework could impact within the specifics of storm surge and within low elevated 
coastal zones. The period for SFDRR targets, changes and plans are much shorter than 
the global warming and climate change time actions of net-zero by 2035, 2045 and 2050. 
The risks from storm surge are in the ‘near and present’ and it is recommended that any 
storm surge resilience approach should be able to be rapidly adopted and utilised. The 
case study findings and the current gaps before and after the proposal and implementation 
of the SFDRR highlight the way that these PFA’s could act as an abstract for disaster risk 
reduction. The underlined requirement of additional tangible key actions designed within 
the DAMSS framework aims to add value to the SFDRR which is considered as an 
‘abstract’ version of DRR by the author.    
Although there are few setbacks with the current SFDRR frameworks highlighted by 
Oxley (2015), this framework is adopted by the UN’s participating countries for the 
period 2015-2030. Instead of proposing a new variable for the DRM and DRR 
approaches, the DAMSS framework is aligned against the SFDRR to underlines the fact 
the framework is adaptable and a possible integration within existing frameworks and 
indicators. This alignment assists in creating synergy and tracking of key indicators across 
such frameworks. This would also assist in the cross-referencing of the indicators, 
deployment, and actions to enhance the DRR approaches for storm surge. As the Sendai 
Framework is a global framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), a comparison of 
the key components of the Sendai Framework’s PFA’s, with the DAMSS framework is 
considered ‘implicit validation’ of the framework.  
The Sendai Framework has four priorities for actions (PFA) are as follows:  
• PFA 1: Understanding the risk  
• PFA 2: Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience 
• PFA 3: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk  
Page | 229 
 
• PFA4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to ‘build back 
better in recovery, rehab and reconstruction 
If coastal countries adopted the DAMSS framework approach within their national or 
local plans, this may provide a positive contribution to increasing the resilience, 
specifically for those vulnerable low elevated coastal communities. Figure 9.4 shows the 
Sendai (SFDRR) priorities for action (PFA) and the alignment of proposed DAMSS 
priorities for actions (PFA’s).  
 
 
Figure 9.4 SFDRR priorities for actions (PFA) and the integration of a DAMSS framework (PFA) 
 
Therefore, by aligning and validating the DAMSS framework, the recommendation is to 
increase the storm surge awareness in all the countries adapting the SFDRR as a step 
towards enhancing their DRM and DRR approaches. The DAMSS is designed to act in 
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harmony with the SFDRR, which may further lead to policy refinement and best practices 
and minimise the inadequacy particularly in the field of storm surge.  
Various issues identified within the subject area are (i) formulation of DRR related 
policies (ii) lack of awareness of the hazard (storm surge) (iii) inadequate pre-emptive 
measures and (iv) technical knowledge. The DAMSS framework and its findings as 
potential guidelines resonate the claim of Hansom (2015) who suggested that having a 
framework is important to alleviate the impacts. The framework further resonates on 
Wilson & Fischetti (2010) who emphasised on developing innovative approaches to 
address the changing risks. This framework provides an opportunity to act as ‘step-
change’ required to fill the potential gap in understanding storm surge as highlighted by 
Ellis (2015). By reflecting on Nguyen’s (2012) statement on enhancing storm surge 
awareness, this framework also creates a contribution to storm surge knowledge for 
coastal communities. This research extends further into a wider data collection and 
analysis of storm surge and its preparedness issues. As highlighted previously in Chapter 
3, this research contrasts with Bouwer & Jonkman (2018), which claimed that the 
mortality rate from storm surge is decreasing. The reason for contradicting is based on 
various points such as the study exempted South East Asian Cyclones and the study 
period ended in 2015. This research reinstates that since 2015 there are changing 
patterns, increasing sea-levels which sets the new base for storm surge and further 
highlighted in Chapter 2 and 3, how the increase in frequency and intensity of hurricanes 
is capable to trigger more storm surges in the future. In general, this study contrasts with 
previous studies and further reinstates that since 2015 there are changing patterns, and 
storm surge should not be deviated and considered non-perilous. In general, this study 
contrasts with any previous studies which deviate or underestimate storm surge as non-
perilous. Adapting to augment the emphasis and activities by improving preparedness 
through a DAMSS framework approach, aligned with a timeline-based approach for early 
warning processes, would allow the countries to be prepared ahead for better response. 
This may be influential for the future declarations of emergency soon after the risk and 
its associated hazard and their potentials are analysed. 
9.4 Guidelines and recommendations intended for best practices  
The following recommendations and guidelines were provided based on the in-depth 
analysis of the common key issues identified in Chapter 8. Some of these 
recommendations and guidelines may have already partly been practised in some 
developed countries. It is the recommendation of this research to embed such approaches 
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across developed countries and to enhance the current practice in developing and low-
income countries. Because developing and low-income countries are less likely to invest 
and allocate resources on coastal defence mainly due to their socioeconomic inequalities 
(PreventionWeb, 2015), these suggestions and recommendation could guide in assuring 
a concerted baseline approach is practised.  
9.4.1 DAMSS PFA1: Understanding the Risk  
Land-use planning: Critical coastal lands like the case study location such as the Gulf of 
Mexico, North Atlantic basin, 7,600 islands in the Philippine, and various bays, creeks, 
estuaries, and rivers connected to the ocean often combat with elevated storm surge 
activity from cyclones. Coastal environment, evaluation of exposed assets, communities 
and segmentation of coastal zones should be reassessed. Whilst the developed countries 
were recommended by the DAMSS framework and the guidelines, to reassess their 
existing zoning system, initiating ‘coastal zoning system’ becomes paramount in 
developing countries, island countries and low-income countries. 
Modelling of low elevated coastal zones: for various storm surge heights would enable a 
better understanding of the risk. This coupled with the understanding of the types of 
construction habitat, locations and heights of key infrastructure such as major roads, rail, 
airports, and utilities (e.g., electricity substations) would assist in prioritising future the 
DAMSS resilience and risk reduction investment. 
Realization from the previous experiences:  Analysis of multiple case studies also 
highlighted the scale of damage to private and public buildings such as schools and 
hospitals post-events. Taking this into account as vital lessons learnt from the immediate 
past events should be transferred into future strategies, approaches or plans. Further 
integration in the subsequent risk assessment and disaster plans will project a cohesive 
approach of best practices. 
9.4.2 DAMSS PFA2: Investment in Risk Reduction  
The following section outlines some key aspects to be considered in the future DAMSS 
framework PFA2, regarding investment within the built environment to reduce future 
risks, which include: 
• elevated infrastructure,  
• housing adaptation to existing roofs,  
• raised housing habitat constructions, and  
Page | 232 
 
• construction or adaptation for ‘safe community zones’ above the potential surge 
levels.  
One of the critical factors of storm surge is their strength of inundation when there is a 
shallow continental shelf which is considerably higher than their strength over a steep 
coast. This characteristic when combined with the increasing sea-levels in future will 
observe new elevated surge levels.  
NOAA provides an example of the difference in surge height which can occur. A 
Category 4 storm hitting the Louisiana coastline, which has a very wide and shallow 
continental shelf, may produce a 20 ft storm surge. While the same hurricane in a place 
like Miami Beach, Florida, where the continental shelf drops off very quickly, might see 
an 8 or 9ft surge. As such the planning, design and construction of future elevated building 
structures and building codes for coastal locations should specifically consider the 
coastline features. The construction sector already designs for wind loading based on 
regional and local variations of wind speeds resulting in changes to the structural facade 
wind loading designs. So, in effect, incorporating future geographic regional or local 
variations to building codes or design standards does have precedent. 
Table 9.1 shows the maximum storm surge level observed during each case study event 
and a resultant proposed future elevation of construction of coastal buildings. Although 
the proposed elevation is provisional, nevertheless it could provide a base level guidance 
of surge elevation levels and the recommended construction elevation above these levels 
as a starting point. This aligns with this study’s findings that it may be necessary to re-
evaluate the baseline assessments (BFE) for constructions thereby improving resilience 
for future events. 
Table 9.1 Maximum storm surge levels and proposed elevation for shoreline housing and constructions 










ft (m)  
H. Katrina 2005 Atlantic 27.8 (8.5) >30 (9) 
Cy. Nargis 2008 Indian  16 (4.87) >16.5 (5) 
H. Sandy 2012 Atlantic 12 (3.7) >13 (4)  
Ty. Haiyan 2013 Indian  23 (7) >26 (8) 
H. Matthew 2016 Atlantic  9.88 (3.0) >13 (4) 
H. Maria 2017 Atlantic 6 (1.9) >13 (4) 
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 Elevated infrastructure: Findings from the analysis have identified housing with 
insufficient base flood elevation (BFE) levels (Katrina & Sandy) and building codes to 
cope with the storm surge flooding. By elevating the key infrastructures established in the 
shoreline such as power and utilities, water pumping stations, chemical plants, 
communication systems and housing, to higher grounds to avoid the direct impact from 
the storm surge flooding is also recommended. Recommendation of elevating the 
infrastructure above the BFE levels could be one of the possible solutions in addition to 
developing robust building codes. The existing constructions and public buildings should 
also be evaluated against the maximum surge levels and elevated accordingly.  
This is one of the important recommendations to the developed countries whose assets 
are endangered from the substantial storm surge damage. Coastal infrastructure in the 
developing, small island developing states (SIDS) and low-income countries (LCD) could 
consider installation of appropriate embankments, revetments rock armours (tripods and 
tetra pod), sand-dunes where possible.  
In addition to the elevation of infrastructure alternate strategic design innovations such as 
increased structural strength to withstand the magnitude of storm surge, exit roofs, flood-
proofed or elevated mechanical-electrical-plumbing units, should also be considered for 
future ‘worst-case scenario’. Water treatment plants should also be included within 
elevated infrastructure, specially to avoid the saltwater intrusion, damage to treatment 
plants during storm surge flooding. Furthermore, the drainage system and underground 
sewage system should also consider their corresponding resilience measures to mitigate 
future flooding and contamination scenarios.  
Housing: New or retrofitted housing should further focus on emergency exits from roof 
spaces (within attics) such as roof windows (also termed roof-lights) to allow people to 
escape during inaccessible (jammed) main doors conditions, and in case of sudden flash 
flooding and rapid storm surges. Such retrofitted and newly fitted roof-lights should also 
consider design innovation leading to a ‘safe-haven’ platform for occupants to await 
before the arrival of rescue teams. Buildings, including existing housing, which are low 
elevated high-risk areas for storm surge, should be retrofitted and amendments made to 
approved building codes. New developments should also readily incorporate these 
changes to increase resilience and safety for occupants. Household-level measures such 
as the installation of sewage water backstop, elevated boilers, walls coated with sealants 
(to stop walls from being discoloured and peeled post-flooding) could be considered. 
Moreover, checked inlet and outlet pipes and non-return valves, sump/pump to drain 
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floodwater, raised electric sockets could also increase the resilience of housing to storm 
surge and coastal flooding. These additional efforts would also minimise the flood 
damage potentially reducing future flood insurance premiums and further claims post-
events.  
Construction use of housing habitat zones above surge levels: from this study it is 
evident that given the typical surge levels which can take place; therefore, the study 
suggests a review of the current practice of habitable spaces within buildings at first floor 
in low elevated coastal zones. Future housing design which can provide habitable space 
above 3m from finished ground level would lead to fewer impacts and reduced recovery 
costs. Whilst this would be a major global change to the design of new housing (and 
where possible adaptation of existing housing) given the forecast rise in sea levels, there 
will likely be an increase in the natural environmental factors which will dictate or guide 
future building codes. This has already happened in the energy performance of buildings 
and to target reductions of GHG emissions. For existing housing of two storeys or more 
communities may decide in future to alter the use of their buildings to utilise ground floor 
and basements for storage and move habitable spaces, utilities and ‘white goods’ to the 
first floor or higher, where practicable. 
An area of future research is the study of the future types of construction systems for 
buildings in storm surge locations. There is evidence from the case studies that most of 
the housing damage occurred to lightweight structures, such as timber frame and 
lightweight gauge steel systems. One of the most comprehensive studies on storm surge 
damage to buildings was undertaken by Marshall (2014), which reviewed a series of 
storms and building damage from survey evidence from the US Army Corps of Engineers. 
This paper highlighted the impacts of both hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces from the 
water on buildings, as shown in Figure 9.5.  
Most of the damage (not unexpected) was on lightweight buildings and specifically 
ground floor levels (images A-H). In some cases, the hydrostatic and hydrodynamic 
forces of the storm surges were so strong resulting in complete building collapse (images 
A, B, C, E).  
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Figure 9.5 Examples of previous US storm surge damage to buildings [source: Marshall (2014)] 
Whilst many concrete-based structures survived (image G) there were in some (few) cases 
of major collapse (image H). This was primarily due to some thinner load bearing walls 
being so badly damaged, leading to a disproportionate structural collapse. So, it is 
recommended for future research in this area that an assessment of existing thin concrete 
structures (walls/columns) requiring to be strengthened and for new building codes to be 
designed to avoid such disproportionate collapse.  
Currently designing to avoid disproportionate collapse is included in many building 
regulations and codes globally for five storeys or more. But these are not currently 
designed for storm surge induced forces. This is a potential area of future research. It is 
also notable within some low-level housing images that there are no roof-lights or exit 
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points from attic to roof zones in these homes. Here the term low-level housing refers to 
single main floor build above the street-level which may have basement and attics.  
Construction or adaptation for ‘safe community zones’ above surge levels: in low 
elevated coastal zones with high population densities and insufficient funding to adapt 
existing buildings, one option may be to develop and construct safe-havens. As such the 
existing low-level housing is not altered and alternative resilience and safety are 
considered. This could be in the form of new community halls, schools and other public 
building assets which are constructed on an elevated site or artificially raised site, for 
communities to retreat to as safe havens during a storm surge. In some towns and cities 
in China, this has already been undertaken where community halls, schools and medical 
buildings are built on raised platforms. 
9.4.3 DAMSS PFA3: Governance, Co-ordination & Communications 
Disaster Governance: A sophisticated disaster governance considering the complexity 
and magnitude of the hazard in-terms of vulnerability (human safety and economic assets) 
should be planned and implemented. Multiple cases identified, inactive-key-period 
between risk identification and risk impact underlining the delay in various key activities 
such as response and evacuations. The future disaster plans, procedures and protocols 
should be tailored and integrated with the technical aspects such as early warning system. 
Continuous implementation and reassessment against the bench marked list of key 
activities are recommended. This would help minimise the lag in key-time periods 
(inactive periods) and achieve effective risk action lists, outputs and communication 
involving national and sub-national actors.  
Public awareness and participation should be encouraged, through continuous drills on 
accessing: the evacuation routes; user-friendly risk maps to key locations; transportation 
modes and routes. Training workshops on kick-starting disaster readiness stage and 
exercises related to emergency kits and supplies checklist should be practised among the 
communities.  
Education and training: In extension to the public awareness of the risk, schools and 
colleges should initiate disaster preparedness education. Under this initiation, students 
should be informed regarding their country’s regional hazards. This measure could be 
significant to countries with low-literacy rate. Educating about disaster preparedness 
activities and evacuation drills in schools and colleges is recommended, involving 
students and their families. This approach will make the process of evacuation more 
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straightforward to the public avoiding evacuation complications during unforeseen 
situations.  
Stakeholder participation is pivotal in disaster management and future prevention.  It is 
recommended to define a clear structure of formal vs informal activities, temporary vs 
permanent roles, synchronisation between primary, secondary, and tertiary stakeholder, 
during emergencies should be planned within the DRM strategies. Stakeholder 
involvement can lead to identifying risk reduction opportunities and innovative 
developments.  
Multi-level stakeholders: Disaster management and risk prevention involve various 
actors from national to international. Cross-border (regional and national) coordination 
of stakeholders may also result in combining resources and extending the scope of 
knowledge and input. Cross-operational partnerships between corporate businesses, 
NGO’s, volunteers, regional bodies, and academia can also enhance the multi-level 
stakeholder approach. This is an approach which many developed countries have adopted 
such as UK, The USA, Japan, Italy, and France. In less developed or developing countries 
such an approach or structure would assist DAMSS PFA3.  
9.4.4 DAMSS PFA4: Enhancing disaster preparedness and response 
Early warning system: Low-income countries whose technical facilities are limited 
should increase their institutional capacities to strengthen their technical facets such as 
early warning system, forecasting and monitoring. A standard EWS agenda with a 
systematic distribution of warnings and alerts should be discussed among the local 
authorities, key experts, and governments. As mentioned earlier, by minimising the 
inactive period between the risk identification and risk impact period, and by improving 
the current practices of the early warning system, potentially could reduce the loss of lives 
from these major events.  
Risk communication should be prioritised to minimise the existing imbalance between 
the emergency responders and the population/residents. Case studies analysis identified 
‘lack of clarity’ in communication resulting in non-evacuees to take shelter within their 
basements followed by loss of lives from storm surge flooding. Certain case study events 
of developing and least-developed countries identified many victims as ‘passive 
recipients’ of information, resources or assistance. The inversion from passive to ‘active 
recipients’ is proposed as a future recommendation. The communication and coordination 
between the responders and the residents should be complemented with public awareness 
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and public participation. Also, designated volunteer or community-based wardens could 
eliminate the inconsistency in communication between officials and residents. The 
designated volunteers should be trained to act as a primary focal point in disseminating 
the warnings as received from authorities and comprehending the same to the residents.  
Use of diverse communication: such as social media platforms should be enhanced for 
countries whose land-based telecommunication infrastructure is limited. Many developed 
and developing countries are considering social media as an emerging substitute for risk 
communication. The current COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic in many countries is an 
example of how social media and diverse media communications have reached wide 
populations and specific groups.  
Image/video sharing, threaded communications under a common hashtag has generated 
new dimension in risk communication over the traditional practices such as the use of 
radios and telephones. New channels broadcasting disasters and live field situations have 
sustained in gaining public attention worldwide. Stakeholder participation from trusted 
news channels and other media source should be enhanced to support the increased focus 
of attention by the public. 
Temporary emergency sheltering: During emergencies, public buildings such as schools, 
colleges, libraries, and other communal spaces such as churches assessed in advance 
could act as a temporary emergency shelter. This measure is recommended to ensure that 
evacuated population were moved to safety and no further re-evacuations were needed.  
Maintenance of storm surge database is recommended especially in low-income and 
developing countries. Currently, most databases are maintained only for cyclones with 
storm surges as an underlying risk. Maintaining this database supports during the analysis 
risk assessment and analysis with history of data and creates an awareness about the risk. 
This is a low-cost effort which helps in future analysis and storm surge return-period 
calculations.  
Growth of mangrove vegetation and its primary effort of acting as a natural buffer should 
be made emphatic within coastal communities. Discussion with coastal ecology expert 
Professor. Mark Huxham at Edinburgh Napier University who had spent two decades on 
local Kenyan communities provided various insights on mangrove coastal defences.  
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Figure 9.6 Proposed DAMSS framework PFA’s and interlink with ‘continuous improvement or 
knowledge approaches’ to enhance resilience from storm surge events 
His inputs (Huxham et al., 2017), on how mangroves can grow according to the increasing 
sea levels and continue to act as a barrier in attenuating storm surges are significant. This 
research also recommends the investment in natural vegetation in coastal lands to 
attenuate the direct impacts of storm surge and coastal flooding. This lower cost 
intervention may be attractive for low-income countries. However, it is to be noted that, 
mangroves could attenuate storm surge to a certain extent, while it is unable to completely 
reduce impacts of tsunamis. Although storm surge and tsunamis share similarities in 
bringing harbour waves to its coasts, these two phenomena differ significantly. Figure 9.6 
summarises the proposed DAMSS framework PFA’s and interlink with ‘continuous 
improvement/knowledge approaches’ to enhance resilience. The DAMSS framework and 
recommendations, when integrated within the four main priority phases of disaster risk 
management (DRM), with continuous reviews of the process and impacts would possibly 
enhance the formulation and implementation of livelihood strategies and risk reduction 
(DRR) activities.  
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9.5  Storm surge risk countries and DAMSS framework 
Table 9.2 List of continents and countries exposed to storm surge hazard 




The United States of America 
Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia  
 
US Territories 
Puerto Rico, Guam, US Virgin Islands 
 
Caribbean Islands  
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, The 
Dominican Republic, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Martinique, The 
Bahamas, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 






Gulf of Mexico, Tamaulipas (Yucatan), Campeche, Veracruz, 
San Blas, Honduras, Guatemala, Belize, San Miguel de 
Cozumel, San Blas 
British Overseas Territories  




India   
Odisha, Bombay, Chennai, West Bengal 
China  
Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin 
Bangladesh  
Khulna, Barisal, Chittagong 
Japan  
Regions:  Kyushu, Shikoku, Okinawa, Kansai, Kanto 
The Philippines 
Cebu, Dinagat, Las Pinas, Leyte, Manila, Palawan, Paranaque, 
Samar 
Myanmar 
Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) delta region, Yangon 
South America Venezuela, Coastal Columbia 
 
Europe Netherlands, Venice, United Kingdom,  
 
Africa Madagascar, Mozambique, Zimbabwe 
 
Australia Cairns, Mackay, Port Douglas, Burke town, Anguru, 
Townsville 
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As mentioned previously in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 highlights the requirement to consider 
storm surge as a global priority. Table 9.2 is compiled by drawing from the literature 
review and considering global storm surge using various sources of SURGEDAT, EM-
DAT, NHC, Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), SwissRe, 
Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BoM). Table 9.2 shows the list of continents, 
countries and their corresponding cities, states, and regions vulnerable to storm surge.  
   
 
<1.5 m(5ft) 1.5-3.0 m (5-10ft) 3.0-4.5 m(10-15ft) 4.5-6.0 m (15-20ft) >6.0m (20ft) 
 
Figure 9.7 shows the global storm surge vulnerability across different continents 
(SURGEDAT, n.d.; Needham & Keim, 2012). Understanding the storm surge risk zones 
coupled with DAMSS approaches supports enabling and future planning and impact 
scenarios. The development of the DAMSS framework along with the guidelines can be 
utilised to integrate, systematize, assess, design, or regulate the country’s vulnerability, 
risk, and adaptation strategies. The framework could also be utilised as a tool to think and 
comprehend their current DRM and DRR strategies for developed countries. Those 
countries who do not have a standard DRM and DRR strategies could utilise the 
framework to develop heuristic approaches, policies for future adaptation. 
Figure 9.7 Global peak surge levels observed in different continents [source: SURGEDAT, n.d.] 
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9.6 Overview of execution of the framework and guidelines  
The challenges and the limitations identified in all the stages of this research has assisted 
in guiding the development of the proposed DAMSS framework. As the framework aims 
to potentially enhance the performance of DRR and DRM, it is important to understand 
the benefits of executing the framework. The effectiveness and the benefits of executing 
the framework can be answered using the following questions.  
(i) How the model is expected to fill the current gaps?  
Drawing on the proposal of the DAMSS framework discussed in Chapter 8 and Chapter 
9, the implementation of the framework is expected to fill the following gaps:  
- By addressing a systematic evaluation of the performance of current DRM and 
DRR practices at regular intervals. 
- By enhancing the efforts of all four phases of DRM underlining preparedness and 
mitigation as core phases. 
- Minimise the execution errors in risk planning and risk communication. 
- Increasing the capacity building for awareness-raising. 
- Enhance multi-level organisational and institutional participation by closing the 
gaps in stakeholder involvement.  
- Minimise the miscalculations in technical specifics such as hazard mapping, risk 
modelling, micro, and macro coastal zoning etc.   
 
(ii) What are the benefits of the DAMSS framework? 
By encouraging the beneficial factors and by continuous practising it is further anticipated 
to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of DRM and DRR overcoming the current 
limitations.  
Figure 9.8 depicts the preview of the execution of the DAMSS framework. While all the 
four phases are important, two phases namely preparedness and mitigation are 
significantly important to prevent the scale of future damage in cost-effective manner. 
The below factors are stated as anticipated implementation benefits in support of the 
DAMSS framework and practice guidelines. 
1. To offer valuable guidance, for future adaptation intended for local environments, 
particularly in developing and low-income countries that demand special attention 
beyond a standard approach.  
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2. Implementing of explicit and implicit demands of risk, associated risk assessment in 
concurrence with the changing risk patterns and the increasing densities of coastal 
lands through a cost-effective solution.    
3. Strengthen the integrated disaster risk governance by involving multi-level 
stakeholders.  
4. Translating best practices to required minimum standards and progress towards 
disaster prevention.   
5. Improving the micro and macro-level factors influencing the adaptation and 
mitigation strategies. 
6. Adaptation and utilisation of the DAMSS framework, guidance, and recommendation 
for best practices in conjunction with the country’s existing national and local 
frameworks without altering the country’s inputs.  
7. Partnership with industries as key stakeholders to reduce future economic and societal 
impacts and operational capabilities. 
8. Commitment to translate learning into the planning and implementation of DRM 
strategies.  
9. Contributing practical recommendations to policymakers through frameworks and 
highlighting where existing procedures were obsolete. 
Although the DAMSS framework has listed key activities for each phase, the guidelines, 
and suggestions, when executed in line with the lessons learnt, would support the disaster 
risk reduction and future disaster risk prevention. 
Figure 9.8 illustrates the beneficiaries of executing the DAMSS framework, from a 
horizontal perspective of interlinked stakeholders. As mentioned earlier stakeholder 
involvement is pivotal and ensuring the ongoing participation of these contributors when 
adapting the DAMSS framework in-conjunction with the guidelines, recommendations 
will be one of the key benefits. The sub-themes within the dotted lines are the key focus 
areas for the developing and low-income countries to prioritize their actions for future 
storm surge mitigation. The emphasis on the sub-themes further enables the identification 
of potential gaps in various sectors involved in an emergency management.  
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Figure 9.8 Beneficiaries of execution of the DAMSS framework and guidelines 
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9.7 Summary  
Many people globally are yet to experience a storm surges and their direct impacts. The 
global frameworks play a vital role in disaster risk reduction; however, they lack in 
emphasizing the practical actions for individually identified hazards. Without achieving 
this major component, transforming from disaster management to disaster prevention 
becomes unrealistic. To overpass this gap, the research studied various root causes that 
impeded the execution of DRM. With an effort to address the ‘risk blind spots’ the 
DAMSS framework was proposed not only to support the findings but also recommend 
its contributions to all its major participants including governments, victims, 
organisations, institutions, industries and sectors. The DAMSS framework is proposed 
with an aspiration to support an integrated approach in reassessing risks, hazard, and 
vulnerability of current and future storm surge scenario in an economically efficient and 
effective way. The alignment and operation of the DAMSS framework proposed within 
this research provides a continuous chain-link structure from the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals, the Sendai Framework and aligns with the Priorities for Future 
Actions (PFA’s), as outlined below as Figure 9.9. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
10.1 Introduction  
Based on the key findings from the case studies and analysis, this thesis proposes a 
framework to enhance storm surge resilience. This concluding chapter addresses the 
research questions and themes outlined in Chapter 1. By reflecting on the overall research 
outcome, an understanding of how the aim is examined at a broader level, connecting 
across the different chapters, highlighting the preliminary findings from the literature 
review and the key findings from the analysis can be understood. This chapter also 
discusses the achievement of the aim and objectives that were designed for the research. 
The critical reflection of the Disaster Adaptation to Mitigate Storm Surge (DAMSS) 
framework and any limitations are also highlighted with suggestions and 
recommendations for future research.  
10.2 Summary of the research process   
This research has studied the various aspects of disaster management implemented in the 
context of the six chosen case study events. The case studies examined the process of 
disaster management involving planning, preparing, organising, communicating, 
coordinating, and executing the actions required. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 presented the 
individual case studies regarding the underlying conditions of the disaster management 
protocols practised by a region or their community. The individual cases gathered 
information on activities in the operations corresponding to the preparedness, response, 
recovery and mitigation phases, and their effectiveness in managing the incident. All the 
collected data within the case studies were analysed and compared against the same 
primary list of activities. The usage of the Atlas.ti software facilitated the investigation 
across the case studies involving a wide range of reports, documents, articles, and media 
extracting information relating to activities that took place. This was also termed as 
coding (activity) within the study. 
The observations from pre-impact conditions included preparedness, early warning, 
monitoring, forecast, and risk communication which identified scenarios such as the 
usage or non-usage of advanced early warning system (EWS) in some countries. The 
relationship between national and sub-national was explored. Then the response phase 
which is list of the activities carried out during the impact was studied. The observation 
Page | 247 
 
of the during-impact conditions included evacuation, shelters, incident management, 
communication, coordination, NGO, and volunteer participation. This phase also 
identified the impacts of delayed evacuation, failure of evacuation leading to fatalities. 
From all the case studies, Cyclone Nargis (Myanmar) was considered to have the most 
significant failure of response. Hampering the efforts after requesting the humanitarian 
assistance by the Burmese government was a unique situation which was observed during 
this cyclone. None of the other cases was identified with such a response. The imposition 
of such restrictions was condemned by countries such as the USA, UK, Canada and by 
the UN. This particular observation summarised the difference in the approach of 
evacuation in developed versus developing countries. Furthermore, differences were 
observed in terms of searching and rescuing the victims, providing safe shelters, the 
adaptive capacity in addressing the vulnerable population was also observed under this 
phase.  
The recovery phase which is an extension of the response phase was studied and collated 
case studies of this phase provided information on the long-term recovery, rehabilitation 
and reconstruction works that took place in the case study countries. This study further 
attempted to understand the improvements, measures, and time taken to recover from the 
incident. The overall findings of this phase supplied the information on how and to what 
extent even developed countries suffered the impact from storm surge. The case study of 
Hurricane Katrina is considered as an important observation of recovery being extended 
for more than five years considering America’s economic capacity. The lack of learning 
and applying outcomes from Katrina such as the need to flood-proof or elevate the 
electrical substations was not implemented until during Hurricane Sandy in New York, 
some seven years later. 
Mitigation phase or the post-impact phase was also examined. In this phase, the actions, 
adaptations taken towards the reduction or moderation of challenges and limitation faced 
in the past event were studied. The observation also highlighted the substantial change 
within the capacities that have been developed or proposed to be developed in future for 
the recurrence of a similar situation.  
Many such observations supported by evidence, before and after images, maps and by 
document search using software (Atlas.ti), supported the research investigations and the 
subsequent analysis and recommendations. The cross-case syntheses of all the six case 
study events and the analysis of the pre-impact, during-impact and post-impact conditions 
encompassed within the four phases of DRM was complemented with the identification 
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of commonalities and variations. The analysis broadened the understanding of the 
relationship between the federal-state-local or the national and sub-national level and the 
village-communities level practised in the developed and developing countries. The 
commonalities identified during the findings were grouped to complement the 
development of the DAMSS framework.  
The DAMSS framework was supplemented with guidelines and recommendations. The 
key recommendations for developing and low-income countries include a focus in the 
early warning system, evacuation, adaptation of infrastructure, risk communication and 
coordination, public awareness and stakeholder participation.   
Throughout the progression of this research one of the significant reflections that were 
observed was the recent increase in the intensity of the tropical cyclones in the Atlantic 
Ocean since 2015-2018, which resulted in triggering increased storm surge events. 
Because the cases chosen for study were a representation of a typical case, the framework 
can be implemented to ‘similar-case’ which replicates the original case. The subsequent 
recommendations and the guidelines may also have the benefit of being adopted by any 
country those experience threats from tropical-cyclone and storm surge.   
10.2.1 Reflection on the theory of this study 
The research began with a very generic question which is what are the current practices 
and strategies of disaster management for storm surge hazard triggered by tropical 
cyclones? The very first stage of the study began by understanding the choice of approach. 
The qualitative research approach was preferred over quantitative to retain the degree of 
freedom in exploring the research. Because the research is exploratory, a further 
‘inductive theory’ approach was adopted. The research progressed with the notion of 
looking at various storm surge incidents and considered ‘all the data’ approach. This 
strategy allowed the research, to not to ignore or preclude any data.  Each incident then 
became the indicator of the concepts within the data and supported in an unbiased 
understanding of the main concern of the subject of study and not the researcher’s main 
concern of the study.  
The qualitative research allowed the researcher (oneself) to be an instrument in data 
collection. From a quantitative perspective, this may be overlooked as a ‘subjective’ and 
‘impressionistic’. To avoid this, a careful choice was made to eliminate the subjectivism 
affecting the view of the researcher. Positively the choice of exploratory research with 
open-ended approach resulted in a much wider literature review. This advancement 
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allowed the research to continue investigating the preliminary data and identify potential 
gaps in the subject field of study. The follow-on process of data and information 
convergence assisted narrowing-down the context leading to a more focused process.  
The converged data was then transformed as coding for further analysis and development 
of the framework. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3 regarding the Pfeffer and Sutton’s 
(1999) theory of “the knowing-doing gap” the proposed framework fulfils the gap by 
improving the storm surge understanding between ‘what was done’ (current approach) 
and ‘what should be done’ (future needs) to minimise the losses incurred from the incident 







10.3 Achievement of the research aim 
The impact of storm surge on coastal habitat and communities was the underpinning drive 
for conducting this research. These impacts and the apparent lack of resilience or 
preparedness motivated the investigation further towards a non-structural solution to 
storm surge resilience. This led to the concept of developing a framework as a sustainable 
solution for this long-term battled hazard. The study aimed to develop a framework for 
storm surge resilience adapting to the current and future increasing coastal hazards and 
weather extremities. The proposal of the framework with supplementary 
recommendations outlined in Chapter 8 reinforces the achievement of the aim of this 
research.   
Following a presentation of the research by the author at an international conference on 
disaster resilience, a very positive feedback from senior public health and international 
resilience experts was that a ‘framework had never been suggested before for storm surge 
and there was a need to develop and start such a process’. 
 
Figure 10.1 The knowing-doing gap [source: Pfeffer & Sutton (1999)] 
 
Knowing 
(what was done within 
the current DRM) 
 
      Doing  
  (What is the future adaptation  
and mitigation needs) 
GAP  
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10.4 Achievement of research objectives  
The research objectives outlined in Chapter 1 were fulfilled and integrated at various 
stages within the research process.  
10.4.1 Background study 
The characteristics of the storm surge and their uniqueness in impacting the coastal 
communities and critical infrastructures were reviewed. The interconnection between 
climate change, global warming, sea-level rise, tropical cyclones, and storm surges were 
also investigated. It is with the help of the research objectives; it was determined how the 
risk incurred from storm surge were predominantly higher than the risk incurred from 
tropical cyclones. The reassessment of the various cyclones, typhoons, or hurricane 
events, when assessed in terms of storm surge, revealed that the estimated damage from 
the water was more than the estimated damage from the wind. The background study 
exposed how a particular ‘funnel effect’ of the storm surge has the potential to inundate 
villages, towns, and cities deep inland. The study further revealed how the complexity of 
the surge was influenced by these six characteristics such as the cyclone forward speed, 
the angle of approach, the pressure and the intensity of the storm, the continental shelf, 
and the coastal bathymetry. In addition to this complexity, the review of the existing storm 
surge measuring systems, current mitigation measures and the limitations of the coastal 
protection mechanisms underpinned the need for framework approach. 
10.4.2 Literature review findings  
Literature in this field was principally connected with hurricanes and their impacts under 
which storm surge was partially considered. The literature also highlighted how areas 
such as dynamics of storm surge characteristics, hurricane intensities remain critical with 
limited studies. Drawing from the results of a regional study, some research tends to 
deviate from the actual understanding of the underlying risk from storm surges. From the 
literature, one of the preliminary findings that were identified was the ambiguity in the 
classification of storm surge as a convective storm which underrates the genuine threat 
from this hazard. The critical review of the existing research and journal papers provided 
insights on the vulnerability of some coastal communities who have never experienced 
the impact of storm surge in the past and how they would be impacted in the future. The 
review also showed how some global frameworks developed are generic and not 
customised to individual hazard. Furthermore, the review underlines how such generic 
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addressing of the hazard could be trivial and inconsiderate regarding the changing 
hazards. The regional disaster frameworks are tailored according to the regional factors 
limiting the extended usage. The comparative review of the global and regional 
framework was identified to establish the gaps and limitation both in addressing the key 
activities within DRM and in addressing future DRR.  
10.4.3 Case study data  
Each case study provided an event synopsis, followed by the review of the four phases 
which are the preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation continued with the 
physical damage and impact from storm surge. A breakdown of key activities and their 
corresponding key phases executed during the events were examined. The achievement 
of the objectives was fulfilled not only by investigating the events and their disaster 
strategies executed but also by finding the gaps within the current approaches identified 
under their corresponding key themes. This facilitated the investigation and assessment 
of DRM practices.   
10.4.4 Case study analysis  
The investigation of the key activities is carried out through the cross-case analysis. In 
each phase, the common issues within the key activities were grouped under their 
corresponding key theme. In addition to the common issues, the difference in issues 
between the cases was also addressed. While observing the commonalities and 
differences, the lag in the timeline of execution of the key activities was also identified. 
The timeline analysis depicted the gap in the execution of the activities in developed and 
developing countries. The exploration of the analysis and the findings from the 
commonalities became fundamental for the development of the DAMSS framework.  
10.4.5 Framework development 
The aim was to propose a framework by determining the list of key actions categorised 
under their corresponding themes. The proposed list of actions was designed with 
anticipation to enhance the current practices and minimise the existing limitations within 
the disaster management. The framework was further supplemented with 
recommendation and guidelines as a holistic approach towards enhancing the storm surge 
resilience for the coastal communities and critical infrastructures. By proposing the 
framework, the aim and objective of the research is accomplished. The DAMSS 
framework was compared and aligned with the United Nation’s Sustainable development 
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goals (SDG) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) as shown 
in Chapter 9 which is considered as an implicit validation. This comparison allows the 
end-user of the DAMSS framework to realise how the framework specifically focuses on 
storm surge as a priority among the other disasters and could be adopted within existing 
overarching guidance and frameworks for disasters. However, a detailed validation is 
required to pilot the framework further which is listed as a future recommendation.  
10.5 Overall knowledge  
The major contribution of this study to overall knowledge is the proposal of a new 
framework for storm surge protection as there is currently no evidence-based framework 
available specifically designed for this purpose. This research gained insight into the 
understanding of the performance of the disaster risk management, strategies, and 
protocols followed in countries chosen for the study. The integration of the DRM and 
DRR elements within the DAMSS framework, along with the guidelines and 
recommendations, contributes to knowledge by creating awareness of storm surge hazard. 
Creating such awareness could be beneficial to the communities, particularly to those 
developing countries with limited capacities. This research further contributes to 
knowledge by initiating a ‘call for action’ towards improved and structured disaster 
governance in terms of storm surge. The critical importance of learning from previous 
events and revising the resilience measures was recommended to be an integral part of 
any future resilience measures. This was embedded within the DAMSS framework 
approach. This knowledge if piloted and trialled could contribute further by advancing 
the overall disaster risk reduction and anticipated to enhance community resilience and 
human security. These contributions can create both short-term and long-term beneficial 
factors and further act as a knowledge loop if fed continuously together with the lessons 
learned in creating a better understanding of the storm surge hazard from a third 
dimension.  
10.6 Critical reflection and limitations of the framework 
Despite adding value to the theory and the practice, the study was identified with some 
limitation. Critically reflecting on the research is considered significant and therefore, 
aimed at raising as many questions as possible to answer. 
The limitations of this research were identified as follows: - 
(i) choice of method.  
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The case study methodology was the choice of the method used to collect the data. This 
research embraced desk-based data collection of information. However, an additional 
approach such as focus group discussion among the affected people and emergency 
responders, observatory tours and participatory experiments might have possibly added 
or provided additional insights to this research.  
Another common limitation in the subject field of study is the ‘lack of accurate data’ and 
‘abundant unwanted data’ concerning a disaster event, especially with storm surge events. 
The sources such as government reports varied from the organisation’s field reports. 
Therefore, an impression of the researcher’s subjectivism may have possibly had an 
unconscious bias which is not visibly identified.   
(ii) choice of case studies  
The choice of cases was identified as both an opportunity and a challenge for this 
research. The research population was extensive. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, 
more than 700 hundred cyclone events were observed over a decade. However, when 
sampling the research population, many events did not have storm surge inundation data. 
This was observed either there was no such practice or loss of instruments, which 
measures such data, leaving little or no ground data in the subject of study. This was 
considered as one of the limitations.  
The study is desk-based research, so data collection was carried out using documents as 
the primary source of information. After applying the initial screening of events and 
during the process of collecting information as documents about storm surge, another 
limitation was observed. A broad range of data was connected only with hurricanes, the 
development of their path, monitoring methods and their landfall data. But storm surge 
related information was sparsely observed despite being a major contributor in creating 
damage to the safety and well-being of inhabitants. Following the selection of optimal 
case studies as typical representatives of the wider sample, the thought of other exemplary 
or unique cases which might have drawn a different solution and might have given a 
different perspective to addressing a strategic disaster risk management is considered as 
a limitation.   
Finally, some key activities of the case studies despite their crucial factor only reflected 
a regional approach, which is not typically followed by another region. Because of this 
unique difference they had to be extracted and excluded from the framework including 
only the commonalities identified among the cases. Although this was not included within 
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the framework component, they were added within the supplementary guidelines as 
recommendations. Even though this does not limit the research and its findings 
significantly still was considered as an indirect element of limitations.  
10.7 Recommendations for further studies 
During the progression of the research, various recommendations surfaced in the process 
of data collection, observation of case studies, analysis of the observation and 
interpretation. Though limitations were identified in the research, recommendations of 
additional approach could only have led to additional insights rather would not have 
altered the overall results. Based on these limitations, and for the future education and 
learning, the following research suggestions and recommendations are proposed: 
• The importance of this research relies in providing an understanding of disaster risk 
management and risk reduction for storm surge, an area that has not been studied 
previously. This study highlighted the key activities previously ignored or faced 
implications during execution. The obtained framework is expected to enhance the 
performance of the DRM and DRR. Therefore, ‘validation of the framework’ with 
expert opinion or focus groups articulating their perceptions with the suggested areas 
of improvements is recommended to increase the credibility of the framework.   
• The second recommendation is ‘piloting of the framework’. The piloting process will 
act as a ‘trial and error’ method to understand the progressive development of the 
framework. This will also provide constructive feedback on the effectiveness and 
feasibility of the framework. By monitoring and measuring the outcome, additional 
key activities or sub-stages may lead to other new outcomes or adaptations. 
• The list of activities encompassed within the framework and their related stakeholder 
participating industries such as insurance, construction companies, transportation, 
land-use planning authorities could develop their strategies and new advancements 
measuring their performances concerning the four key themes. This could lead to 
industrial growth and innovative advancements for future disaster risk reduction. 
Research which analyses the effects and potential impacts of factors which alters the 
planning in built environment approaches in different countries to increase resilience 
(utilising previous storm surge data), would be useful. 
• The framework is currently developed for storm surges triggered by cyclones. The 
utilisation of the framework could be extended to certain coastal hazards such as 
flooding. However, the applicability of the framework between cross-hazards and the 
multi-hazard situation is recommended for further studies.   
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• The future needs to adapt existing housing for roof escape and safe zones and the 
construction technology and architectural technology designs would also be useful.  
• Finally, developing a future dynamic model which could be utilised by local 
authorities and governments to assess and map the risk for various coastal 
geographies. This could facilitate an earlier preparedness and resilience approach, 
particularly for less developed or developing countries where financial limitations 
exists. This will allow resilience investment to be focused on the most critical areas 
affecting population health and well-being.  
Because the hazards and exposures are subject to variations with respect to future changes 
in coastal and marine hazards, this outcome of the research may become conditional in 
the future. Nevertheless, this research could be a fundamental and a prelude to many 
prospective studies and research. The change in risks and hazards tend to change the 
assessment and analysis of disaster risk management and disaster risk reduction strategies 
thereby concluding that the progression of the DAMSS framework will be an ‘ongoing’ 
process with continuous evolution paving way for future innovations.  
If the outcomes of this research and DAMSS proposal are taken to a further stage of the 
trial, utilisation, and assessment by a public body, whether local or national, the author 
hopes that this will be potentially a ‘keystone’ to advancing awareness and preparedness 
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APPENDIX A 
Research Population and country profiling 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Hazard means “a process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, 
injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or 
environmental degradation” (PreventionWeb, 2017) .  A country may even be subject to 
multi-hazard situations i.e. cascaded or cumulative events hazardous events may occur 
simultaneously or sequentially (PreventionWeb, 2017) According to the UNISDR 
disaster profile and ranking, the hazards contribution from Cyclones are 37.58% and 
storm surge are 16.67% towards the Average Annual Losses (AAL) (PreventionWeb, 
n.d.) . Some of the significant events which took place before the research’s study period 
2000-2017 are listed in Table A1. 
Table A1 List of significant storm surge events before the study period 
Event Year Country Death toll Storm surge 
(m) 
 1737 India 300,000 12.0 
 1864 India 50,000 12.0 
 1876 Bangladesh N/A 13.7 
Cy. Mahina 1899 Australia   
Galveston, Texas 1900 TX, USA 8,000  
New Orleans 1915 Lou, USA  5.18 
Cy. Mackay 1918 Australia   
Cy. Innisfail 1918 Australia   
Labour Day 1935 FL, USA  6.10 
North Sea Flood 1953 Bristol, UK 2,551  
Oct 30-31 1960 Bangladesh 5,149 9.1 
May 6-9 1961 Bangladesh 11,466 8.8 
Carla 1961 Texas, USA  5.64 
May 1963 Bangladesh 11,520 9.1 
Sep-Oct 1 1966 Bangladesh 850 9.6 
Beulah 1967 Tx, USA  5.49 
Camille 1969 Mi, USA  7.50 
Cy. Bhola 1970 Bangladesh 300,000 9.1 
Cy. Ada 1970 Australia   
Eloise 1975 FL, USA  5.55 
North Sea SS 1978 England   
April 19 1991 Bangladesh 140,000 8.2 
 
Table A2(a): List of tropical Cyclone from 2000 – 2017 
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2001 USA 41 5 2.5 
(0.75) 
Low surge levels 
H. Iris 2001 USA 31 0.25 15 (4.6) High surge and 
low death toll 
H. Isabel 2003 USA 17 3 8 (2.4) Low death toll 
H. 
Charley 
2004 USA 15 15 >7 
(2.1) 
Low death toll 
H. 
Frances 
2004 USA 7 8.9 6 (1.8) Low death toll 
H. Ivan 2004 USA 92 14.2 10-15 
(3-4.5) 
High surge and 
low death toll 




2005 USA 1,800 160 28 (8.5) Costliest 
hurricane in US 
history, death 
toll and highest 
surge 










2005 Australia 5+ 0.014 1.08 
(0.33) 
Low storm surge  
Ty. 
Saomai 




Cy. Larry 2006 Australia 1 1.1 7.55 
(2.30) 
Moderate surge 




2007 Australia 5 0.0158 7.2 (24) High surge, but 
lowest death toll 









2008 Myanmar 140,000 12.9 16 (4.9) Highest death 
toll 





Tc. Nisha 2008 India 204 0.8 - No surge data  






















High surge and 
death 
Cy. Yasi 2011 Australia 1 3.6 23 (7.0) High surge, but 
lowest death toll 
Cy. 
Thane 




Cy. Lua 2012 Australia None 0.230 -  No surge levels  

















Cy. Ita 2014 Australia 40 1 - A minor surge 
was recorded 
and 
merged with low 
tide. Limited 
damage.  
H. Odile 2014 USA 18 1.25  Minor flooding  
Ty. 
Soudelor 
2015 Ph, Taiwan, 
China, Japan 
59 4.09 1.97 
(0.6) 





47 4.8 7-10 
(2-3) 
Moderate surge 






111 1.89 48 (15) High surge 
levels 
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The total research population is compiled from EM-DAT, CRED, NCAR list of tropical 
cyclones, Dube et al (1997), De (2005), Garriott (1900), Cline (1915), McDonald (1935), 
Dunn et al (1962), Sugg and Pelissier (1968), Simpson et al (1970), Hebert (1976), NWS 
(2003), Knabb et al., (2006), Keim and Muller (2009), Landsea et al., (2009) and Berg 
(2009). From the global research population Table A2(a), Table A2(b) is adapted. 



















chosen as a case 
study 






country) hurricane  
Cy. Sidr India Cat 5 10,000 1.7 16.4 
(5) 
High surge, high 




2016 Haiti, USA >800 15 7.5 
(2.3) 
Moderate surge 




2016 India 47 3.4 -  No surge data  
H. 
Harvey 
2017 USA 68 125 6 (1.8) Loss is not 
associated with 
storm surge. The 
death toll caused 
by rainfall 






H. Maria 2017 Puerto Rico, 
USA 
2,967 90 >6 
(1.8) 
Highest death 










warning system  
Not associated 
with storm surge 




Cat 4 140,000 12.9 16 
(4.9) 










747 1.09 20 
(6.1) 
High surge levels 







High surge and 
death 




category but a 
high surge  
Ty. Haiyan The 
Philippi
nes 
Cat 5 6,900 2.98 17 
(5.2) 







Cat 5 111 1.89 48 (15) High surge levels 
H. Matthew Haiti, 
USA 
Cat 5 >800 15 7.5 
(2.3) 
Moderate surge 
and relatively high 
death toll  
H. Maria Puerto 
Rico, 
USA 
Cat 5  2,967 90 >6 
(1.8) 
Low surge and 
contradicting high 
death toll 
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Country Profiling:  
The United States of America: 
With a population of 316 million, the United States of America ranks number one 
generating a $20, 494,100 million US (World Bank Group, 2018). The Atlantic Basin 
includes the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea. The United States 
and the Small islands developing states (SIDS), were potentially vulnerable and 
significantly at high risk along the East and Gulf coasts as most of the coastal megacities 
were in Low coastal elevation zone (LECZ’s). Therefore, every year when the Atlantic 
hurricane season which runs from June 1st to November 30th the coastal cities could face 
a ‘landscape inundation’ threat by a hurricane triggered storm surges (RMS, 2015; 
National Hurricane Center, n.d.).  
 
               Figure A1 Continental U.S hurricane strikes from 1950-2017* (source NOAA) CONUS 
(Courtesy NCEI) (National Hurricane Center, n.d.) 
The United States and the Small islands developing states (SIDS), were potentially 
vulnerable and significantly at high risk along the East and Gulf coasts as most of the 
coastal megacities were in Low coastal elevation zone (LECZs) as shown in Figure A1.  
The Atlantic Basin includes the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, 
and the coastal cities along these basins were at potential risk of suffering a ‘landscape 
inundation’ threat from these storm surges (RMS, 2015); (National Hurricane Center, 
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n.d.) in any given year when the Atlantic hurricane season which runs from 1st June – 
30th November.  
Table A3 Costliest mainland United States hurricanes from 1900 to 2013, by total economic damage (in 
2013 billion U.S. dollars) 
Year  Storm Damage in billion U.S. dollars 
2005 Katrina (SE FL/LA) 128.3 
2012 Sandy (NJ/NY/CN) 72.1 
1992 Andrew (SE FL/SE LA) 43.8 
2008 Ike (TX/LA) 31.8 
2005 Wilma (S FL) 24.44 
2004 Charley (SW FL) 18.38 
2004 Ivan (AL/NW FL) 17.42 
2011 Irene (NC) 16.06 
1989 Hugo (SC) 13.09 
2005 Rita (N TX/W LA) 11.87 
1972 Agnes (FL/NE U.S.) 11.6 
2004 Frances (FL) 10.9 
1965 Betsy (SE FL/SE LA) 10.43 
1969 Camille (MS/SE LA/VA) 8.88 
2004 Jeanne (FL) 8.48 
1979 Frederic (AL/MS) 7.37 
2001 Allison (N TX) 6.56 
1999 Floyd (Mid-Atlantic & NE U.S.) 6.26 
1996 Fran (NC) 4.75 
1983 Alicia (N TX) 4.65 
2008 Gustav (LA) 4.65 
1995 Opal (NW FL/AL) 4.54 
2003 Isabel (Mid-Atlantic) 4.24 
1985 Juan (LA) 3.23 
1985 Elena (MS/AL/NW FL) 2.73 
2005 Dennis (NW FL)  2.63 
1991 Bob (NC, NE U.S) 2.52 
1985 Gloria (Eastern U.S.) 1.92 
2005 Ophelia (NC) 1.9 
1998 Georges (FL Keys, MS, AL) 1.64 
2008 Dolly (TX) 1.13 
 
Table A3 is compiled from the data published by (NOAA (Hurricane Research Division), 
2017). Until 2013, Hurricane Katrina and Sandy were the costliest hurricanes and the 
most significant storm surge events. Therefore, these two events were chosen as the most 
significant events for study.  
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Table A4 Top 5 hurricanes in US history with the highest cost of damage 
 
Name Year The estimated cost 
of Damage 
(Billion US$) 
Associated with storm 
surge (ft) 
Katrina 2005 161 27.8 
Harvey 2017 125 Not associated 
Maria 2017 90 6 
Sandy 2012 71 14 
Irma 2017 50 3-5 
 
The Top 5 US Atlantic hurricane which also includes events from the year 2013 – 2017 
were listed in Table A4. 
Myanmar (Burma) 
Myanmar is the largest country in the Southeast Asian which covers the land area of 
676,578 sq. km ranked seventy-one in the World Bank Group’s GDP 2018 ranking list 
with the yearly GDP of US$ 71,215 million (World Bank Group, n.d.).  Roughly 30% of 
the population in the Ayeyarwady delta division was living below poverty. It is the same 
delta that is considered as the ‘rice granary’ of Myanmar depending primarily on 
agriculture for their income and living. Figure A2 shows the physical map of Myanmar. 
 
Figure A2 Physical map of Myanmar (source: freeworldmaps.net) 
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The residents in this community were also considerably living without lands and in 
poverty mainly depending on wage labour (Dash, 2008) Myanmar is identified as one of 
the countries whose highest mortality rate is caused by the storm (PreventionWeb, 2015). 
Myanmar state controls the national media and restrictions were eased only since 2011, 
after the end of the Military Junta rule. The country currently experiences political 
instability and UN addresses the country genocide due to the Rohingya attacks (BBC 
News, 2018).   
The Philippines  
With a GDP of US$330,910 million, as of 2018, the Philippines ranks number thirty-eight 
as per the World Bank Group (World Bank Group, n.d.).  The Philippines is made up of 
7,000 islands with much of its populations living is eleven islands (BBC, 2018), shown 
in Figure A3. 
 
Figure A3 Physical map of the Philippines (source: freeworldmaps.net) 
The Philippines is extremely prone to meteorological and seismic disaster and holds a 
multi-hazard profile ranking as the third most prone country in the world according to the 
World Risk Report 2012 (UNU). With a total population of 105 million (Lum & 
Margesson, 2014), an average of 3 million people is affected by typhoons every year and 
suffers estimated economic damage of USD 200 million per year. The country has a 
previous typhoon history. Typhoon Bopha (Pablo) made landfall in 2012 on the southern 
island of Mindanao. The typhoon killed nearly 2,000 people (Lum & Margesson, 2014).  
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In 2013 the country was struck with a powerful 7.1 magnitude earthquake which 
displaced around 350,000 people. Before Typhoon Haiyan, the country was struck with 
Tropical Storm Thelma (uring) in 1991 which killed around 5,000 people (Lum & 
Margesson, 2014). 
Republic of Haiti: 
Haiti is classified as the low-income countries in the Americas and cascades under the 
Small island developing States (SIDS). It is further identified as a heavily indebted poor 
country by the United Nations (United Nations, n.d.) with a GDP of $9,658 generated per 
year (World Bank Group, n.d.). Haiti, with 10.2 million (BBC News, 2019) population is 
exposed to hazards such as earthquakes, cyclones, wildfire, landslide, and river, coastal 
and urban floods. The Physical map of Haiti is shown in Figure A4 
 
Figure A4 Physical map of Haiti (source: freeworldmaps.net) 
According to the Climate Risk Index 2016 rating, Haiti ranked the third among the 
countries affected by extreme weather events (World Food Programme, 2016). It also 
holds 163rd position out of 188 countries on the 2015 Human Development Index. The 
country suffers chronic poverty, and more than 50 percent of the population were 
undernourished (World Food Programme, 2016). Haiti was hit by a Category 4 hurricane 
Felix in 2007, then by 2010 earthquake, 2012 Hurricane Sandy in 2016 by Hurricane 
Matthew. Table A5 shows the top hurricanes made landfall in Haiti. The 2010 earthquake, 
together with the chronic political instability made the country to sustain as the poorest 
nation in the Americas (BBC News, 2019). 
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Table A5 List of hurricanes in Haiti: SIDS with the highest cost of damage 
 
Name Year The estimated 
cost of Damage 
 (Billion US$)  
Associated with 
storm surge (ft) 
Gustav 2005 161  27.8 
Harvey 2017 125 Not associated  
Maria 2017 90 6 
Sandy 2012 71 14 
Irma 2017 50 3-5 
Table A5 shows some of the significant hurricane events which made landfall in Haiti 
resulting in severe socioeconomic damage. It is to be noted radio is the most popular news 
medium and hundreds of local and privately-owned media stations are there (BBC News, 
2019). 
Puerto Rico 
Puerto Rico is one of the US territories, bordered by the Atlantic Ocean in the north and 
Caribbean Ocean in the South is one of the islands of Greater Antilles.  Figure A5 shows 
the physical map of Puerto Rico. 
 
Figure A5 Physical Map of Puerto Rico (Source: Freeworldmaps.net) 
The self-governing unincorporated overseas US territory has a population of 3.7 million 
(BBC News, 2019).  According to the World Bank’s 2018 GDP, Puerto Rico was given 
sixty-three with a GDP of US$ 101,131 million (World Bank Group, n.d.). The territory’s 
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media is controlled by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (BBC News, 
2019).  
Average Annual Hazard (AAL) by storm surge  
Table A6 Average Annual Hazard (AAL) by storm surge (PreventionWeb, n.d.) 










The USA 316 2,726,323  8,774.38  
 
Haiti 10.2 9,658 10.51  
 
Puerto Rico 3.7 101,131 320.03  
 
The Philippines 104 330,910 2,541.62  
 
Myanmar 53.2 71,215 40.61 
 
    
 
Table A6 complied from  (PreventionWeb, n.d.); (Global Assessment Report on Disaster 
Risk Reduction (GAR), 2015); (PreventionWeb, n.d.); (PreventionWeb, n.d.). Table A6 
shows the population of the target case study countries and their corresponding GDP in 
the year 2018 and their average losses incurred by storm surge for the year 2018. This 
table provides an overall idea of the total population and their exposure to storm surge 
followed by the economic damage caused by the storm surges. The full disaster Risk 
Profile  (Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR), 2015) of the 
target countries is attached at the end of Appendix A.  
Vulnerability, hazard, and lack of coping capacity 
The definition of vulnerability is according to UNISDR terminology is “The 
characteristics determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or 
processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or 
systems to impacts of hazards” (PreventionWeb, 2017). Table A7 shows the hazard, 
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Table A7 INFORM Risk index for the profiled countries (PreventionWeb, n.d.) 
 




Lack of coping 
capacity 
The USA 6.7 2.9 2.1 
Haiti 6.2 6.3 7.3 
The Philippines 7.8 4.7 4.1 
Myanmar 8.6 5.3 6.3 
Puerto Rico No data  No data  No data  
 
Although there is no data on the risk vulnerability of Puerto Rico the Figure A6 shows 
the vulnerability of Puerto Rico particularly to hurricanes and storm surges.  
 
Figure A6 Top 10 countries/ territories in terms of absolute losses (billion US$) 1998-2017 (EM-DAT, 
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APPENDIX B 
Hurricane Timelines, watch-warning and extended data  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Case Study 1:  Hurricane Katrina (2005) 
(I) Predicted path of Hurricane Katrina 





















of Nassau 175 
  
24-Aug 0000 30 34.56   
  24-Aug 0600 30 34.56   





of Nassau 65 
24-Aug 1800 40 46.08   
 
 
25-Aug 0000 45 51.84   
25-Aug 0600 50 57.6   
25-Aug 1200 55 63.36   
25-Aug 1800 60 69.12   
25-Aug 2100   
Category 1 
hurricane 











26-Aug 0000 70 80.64 
Category 1 
hurricane  












on in 24hrs 
26-Aug 1200 75 86.4   
26-Aug 1800 85 97.92 
Category 2 
hurricane  
27-Aug 0000 90 103.68   
27-Aug 0600 95 109.44   
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n in less than 
12 hrs 28-Aug 0600 125 144 
Category 4 
hurricane  
28-Aug 1200 145 167.04 
Category 5 
hurricane    





pi River 170 
Peak 
Intensity 












29-Aug 0600 125 144 
Category 4 
hurricane  
29-Aug 0900 115 132.48   





29-Aug 1200 110 126.72 
Category 3 
hurricane 






29-Aug 1800 80 92.16 
Category 1 
hurricane 
30-Aug 0000 50 57.6 
tropical 
storm 
30-Aug 0600 40 46.08   
30-Aug 1200 30 34.56 
tropical 
depression 
30-Aug 1800 30 34.56   
31-Aug 0000 30 34.56 extratropical  
31-Aug 0600 25 28.8   
31-Aug 1200   0 dissipated 
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(II) Watch-warning details of Hurricane Katrina  
 




23-Aug 2100 Central Bahamas to NW Bahamas TS Warning Issued 
  
24-Aug 0300 Seven Mile Bridge to Vero Beach TS Watch Issued 
  
24-Aug 1500 Seven Mile Bridge to Florida City TS Watch modified to 
  
24-Aug 1500 Florida City to Vero Beach TS warning and Hurricane 
Watch issued 
  
24-Aug 2100 Vero Beach to Titusville TS Watch Issued 
  
24-Aug 2100 Lake Okeechobee TS warning and Hurricane 
Watch issued 
  
25-Aug 0300 Florida City to Vero Beach and Lake 
Okeechobee 
TS Warning / Hurricane watch 
modified to Warning 
  
25-Aug 0900 Florida City to Englewood including 
Florida Bay 
TS Watch Issued 
 
  
25-Aug 1500 Grand Bahama, Bimini, and Berry 
Islands in the NW Bahamas 
TS Warning modified to 
 
  
25-Aug 2100 Florida City to Jupiter Inlet including 
Lake Okeechobee 
Hurricane Warning modified to 
 
  
25-Aug 2100 Jupiter Inlet to Vero Beach, Key West 
to Ocean Reef & Florida City to 
Longboat Key including Florida Bay 
TS Warning Issued 
  
25-Aug 2100 Longboat Key to Anclote Key TS Watch Issued 
  
25-Aug 2300 Grand Bahama, Bimini, and Berry 
Islands in the NW Bahamas 
TS Warning discontinued 
  
26-Aug 0300 Vero Beach to Titusville TS Watch discontinued 
  
26-Aug 0300 Jupiter Inlet to Vero Beach TS Warning discontinued 
  
26-Aug 0500 Deerfield Beach to Florida City Hurricane Warning changed to 
TS Warning 
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26-Aug 0500 Dry Tortugas to Ocean Reef 
including Florida Bay, Florida City to 
Longboat Key 
TS Warning modified to 
26-Aug 1500 Florida City to Longboat Key, all 
Florida Keys and Florida Bay 
TS Warning modified to 
26-Aug 2100 All TS Watch discontinued 
  
26-Aug 2100 Florida City to Longboat Key TS Warning discontinued 
  
27-Aug 0900 Dry Tortugas to Seven Mile Bridge TS Warning modified to 
  
27-Aug 1500 Dry Tortugas to Key West TS Warning modified to 
  
27-Aug 1500 Morgan City to Pearl River Hurricane Watch issued 
  
27-Aug 2100 All TS Warning discontinued 
  
27-Aug 2100 Intracoastal City to FL/AL border Hurricane Watch modified 
  
28-Aug 0300 Morgan City to FL/AL border 
including Lake Pontchartrain 
Hurricane Warning Issued 
  
28-Aug 0300 FL/AL border to Destin TS Warning Issued 
  
28-Aug 0300 Intracoastal City to Morgan City TS Warning Issued  
28-Aug 0300 FL/AL border to Destin Hurricane Watch modified to  
28-Aug 0900 Destin to Indian Pass and Intracoastal 
City to Cameron 
TS Warning Issued 
29-Aug 1500 All Hurricane Watch discontinued  
29-Aug 2100 Pearl River to FL/AL Border 
including Lake Ponchartrain 
Hurricane Warning changed to 
TS Warning  
29-Aug 2100 Cameron to Pearl River and FL/AL 
border to Destin 
Hurricane and TS Warnings 
discontinued  
30-Aug 0300 All TS Warning discontinued  
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(III) Visual images of Hurricane Katrina       
 
               Figure B1 Visual view of damages from Hurricane Katrina 
       
 
 
                                  
    
  (a) Search & rescue operation (UH60 helicopter)                      (b) Lost Bascule Span (Bay St Louis Bridge) 
  
     (c)Transportation route inundated during Katrina                           (d) Lower 9th Ward, New Orleans (Rare News, 2015) 
     
(e)   Oil spillage around homes in Louisiana                       (f) Inundated areas in New Orleans (Source: NOAA) 
(Source: Louisiana Dept. Env Quality) 
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Case Study 2:  Hurricane Sandy (2012) 
(I) Predicted path of Hurricane Sandy 
Table B3 Hurricane Sandy’s track/path predicted by NHC/NOAA. (Data extracted from NHC/NOAA) 




wind              
speed                
(in 
mph) 
Stage  Location 










22-Oct 1200 30 34.56 tropical depression 
22-Oct 1800 35 40.32 tropical storm 
23-Oct 0000 40 46.08   
23-Oct 1800 45 51.84   
24-Oct 0000 55 63.36   
24-Oct 0600 60 69.12   
24-Oct 1200 65 74.88  Category 1 hurricane 
24-Oct 1800 75 86.4   
24-Oct 1900 75 86.4 
First landfall as 
Category 1 hurricane  
Bull Bay, 
Jamaica 
25-Oct 0000 85 97.92  Category 3 hurricane  
25-Oct 0525 100 115.2 
Second landfall as 





25-Oct 0900 95 109.44  Category 3 hurricane 
 
25-Oct 1800 90 103.68   
26-Oct 0000 75 86.4   
26-Oct 0600 70 80.64   
26-Oct 1200 65 74.88   




Abaco 125 n mi 








Carolina   
29-Oct 0000 70 80.64   
 








29-Oct 0600 80 92.16     
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Jersey 220 n mi 
reached peak 
intensity 
29-Oct 1800 80 92.16   
 
   
29-Oct 2100 75 86.4 extra-tropical 
29-Oct 2330 70 80.64 




30-Oct 0000 70 80.64 extra-tropical 
 
30-Oct 0600 55 63.36   
30-Oct 1200 50 57.6   
30-Oct 1800 40 46.08   
31-Oct 0000 35 40.32   
31-Oct 1200 30 34.56   
31-Oct 1800     dissipated 
 
(II) Watch-warnings issued Hurricane Sandy   




22-Oct 1500 Jamaica TS Watch Issued  
23-Oct 0900 Jamaica TS Warning Issued  
23-Oct 1500 Jamaica Hurricane Watch issued  
23-Oct 0900 Haiti TS Watch Issued  
23-Oct 1500 South-eastern and Central 
Bahamas 
TS Watch Issued  
23-Oct 1500 Camaguey and Guantanamo Hurricane Watch issued  
23-Oct 1800 Haiti TS Watch to Warning   
23-Oct 2100 Camaguey and Guantanamo Hurricane Warning Issued  
23-Oct 2100 North-western Bahamas TS Watch Issued  
24-Oct 0300 Central Bahamas TS Warning Issued  
24-Oct 0900 Jupiter Inlet to Ocean Reef TS Watch Issued  
24-Oct 0900 Ocean Reef to Craig Key TS Watch Extended  
24-Oct 1200 North-western Bahamas TS Warning Issued  
24-Oct 1500 Central and North-western 
Bahamas 
Hurricane Watch  
24-Oct 2100 Central and North-western 
Bahamas 
Hurricane Warning  





25-Oct 0300 South-eastern Bahamas TS Watch to Warning  
25-Oct 0300 Lake Okeechobee TS Warning Issued  
25-Oct 0300 Ragged Island Hurricane Warning Issued  
25-Oct 0900 Jamaica Hurricane Watch 
discontinued  
25-Oct 1500 Haiti TS Warning discontinued  
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25-Oct 1500 Camaguey and Guantanamo Hurricane Watch 
discontinued  
26-Oct 0300 Central Bahamas Hurricane Watch to TS 
Warning  
26-Oct 0300 South-eastern Bahamas TS Warning discontinued  
26-Oct 0300 Ragged Island Hurricane Watch 
discontinued  
26-Oct 0300 North-western Bahamas Hurricane Warning Issued  
26-Oct 0600 Andros Island TS Warning Issued  
26-Oct 0900 Savannah River to Oregon Inlet TS Watch Issued  
26-Oct 1500 The north-western Bahamas except 
Great Abaco and Grand Bahama 
Hurricane Watch to TS 
Warning  
26-Oct 1500 Ocean Reef to Craig Key TS Watch Discontinued  
26-Oct 1500 Bermuda TS Watch Issued  
26-Oct 1500 Central Bahamas TS Warning discontinued  
26-Oct 1500 Andros Island TS Warning discontinued  
26-Oct 1800 Great Abaco and Grand Bahama 
Island 
Hurricane warning to TS 
warning  
26-Oct 1800 The north-western Bahamas except 
Great Abaco and Grand Bahama 
TS Warning discontinued 
26-Oct 2100 St Augustine to Fernandina beach TS Watch Issued  
26-Oct 2100 Lake Okeechobee TS Warning discontinued  
26-Oct 2100 South Santee River to Duck TS Watch Issued  
27-Oct 0000 St Augustine to Fernandina beach TS Watch Discontinued  
27-Oct 1500 Sebastian Inlet to St Augustine TS Warning discontinued  
27-Oct 2100 Bermuda TS Watch to warning  
27-Oct 2100 Great Abaco and Grand Bahama 
Island 
TS Warning discontinued 
28-Oct 0300 South Santee River to Duck TS watch discontinued  
29-Oct 1500 Bermuda TS Warning discontinued  
29-Oct 2100 
 
TS Warning discontinued  
 
(III) Visual images of Hurricane Sandy  
 
(a) Aerial photographs of the NASA Wallops facility and coastline (left) is a before the image was taken on 
Aug 2012, and (right) an after-image was taken in Nov 2012 post-Hurricane Sandy (Source: NASA) 
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(b) New inlet that was cut across the barrier island of the New 
Jersey coastal town Mantoloking just north of where 
Hurricane Sandy made landfall in Ocean (Source: NOAA) 
(c) Homes flooded after Hurricane Sandy landfall on the 
southern New Jersey coastline on Oct 30, 2012 in 
Tuckerton, NJ (Source U.S. Coast Guard via 
GettyImages) 
(d) Burned houses are seen next to those which survived in 
Breezy Point, New York City borough of Queens. (Pic: 
Reuters_Adrees Latif) 
(e) Storm surge flooding in NJ by Hurricane Sandy in 
Oct 2012, Credit U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt 
Mark C. Olsen 
(g) Boardwalk of Seaside Heights NJ, damaged by 
Hurricane Sandy (Source AP/Mike Groll) 
(h) Street damaged by storm surge in Ortley Beach, NJ 
(Source: Tim Larsen / Governor’s office /Reuters) 
Figure B2 Visual view of damages from Hurricane Sandy (2012) 
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Case Study 3: Cyclone Nargis (2008)   
(I) Predicted path/track of Cyclone Nargis  






Cyclone’s stage  Location 
Structural 
Change 
25-Apr     Tropical depression   
  




and US Joint 
Typhoon Warning 
Centre (JTWC) 
28-Apr 0000  Cyclone Storm 




550 km east of 
Chennai, India 
28-Apr    Category 1 Cyclone 
Identified by JTWC as 
Category 1 in SSWHS  
29-Apr  100    
Wind speed was 
identified as 160 
km/h (100 mph)  
01-May     





took place at this 
time  
02-May  135   
Approaching 





winds of 215 
km/h (135 mph)  
02-May   
First landfall as 
Category 3 cyclone   
Ayeyarwady Delta 
region approx. 250 
km southwest of 
Yangon (Rangoon) as 
Cat 3     
03-May   
Second landfall as 
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(II) Visual images of Cyclone Nargis  
    
 








(a) Aerial view of Irrawaddy delta affected by 
cyclone Nargis (Source: BBC) 
(e) Impact of storm surge flooding in the delta region 
of Myanmar (Source: Humanitarian coalition) 
(b) Coastal communities of the delta region 
flooded during Nargis (Photo: Agency France-
Presse / Rappler) 
(c) Damage in the Dedaye region by cyclone 
Nargis Pararas-Carayannis (2008) 
Figure B3 Visual view of damages from Cyclone Nargis (2008) 
 
(c) Flooded villages near airport in Yangon during 
cyclone Nargis (Source: Reuters/Telegraph) 
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Case Study 4:  Super-Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) (2013) 
(I) Predicted path of Super-Typhoon Haiyan 
Table B6 Super-typhoon Haiyan’s track/path predicted by PAGASA  
Date Time (UTC) 
Wind    
speed 
(kph) 
Wind     
speed       
(in 
mph) 
Stage  Location 
Structural 
Change 
03-Nov       Tropical depression Western Pacific 
  
05-Nov    Tropical storm  





(PAR) from East 
of Mindanao 













08-Nov 2040 235 195 






08-Nov 2300  195 
Second landfall            
Category 5 
Typhoon Tolosa, Leyte 
08-Nov 0140   





08-Nov 0240   





08-Nov 0400   





08-Nov 1200   



























10-Nov       extra-tropical   
  
(II) Visualization of the damage from Super-Typhoon Haiyan 
   
 (a) Before image Anibong, Coast of Tacloban            (b) After-image of Anibong, Coast of 
Tacloban 
   
 (c) Pontoons & moorings in coastal Tacloban           (d) After-image of coastal Tacloban 
devastated   
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(e) Before-image of Tacloban Port (BBC News, 2013)         (f) An After-image of Tacloban port post-
landfall 
    
 
     
 
(g) Aerial view of destroyed houses in Leyte 
Province, City of Tacloban (Source: Ted 
Aljibe/AFP/GettyImages) 
 
(g) Tacloban City destroyed by Typhoon Haiyan 
(Source: Reuters) 
 
(g) Impact on Super-typhoon Haiyan on Samar 
province central Philippines                               
(Pic: Erik De Castro /Reuters) 
 
(h) City of Guiuan, post Typhoon Haiyan_Bryan 
Denton for The NY times 
 
Figure B4 Visual view of damages from Super-Typhoon Haiyan (2013) 
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Case Study5:  Hurricane Matthew (2016) 
(i) Predicted path of Hurricane Matthew  
 







Wind         
speed      
(mph) 
Stage  Location 
Distance                 
(in n mi) 
Structural 
Change 
28-Sep 1200 50 57.6 Tropical storm 
    
  
29-Sep 0000 55 63.36   
29-Sep 1200 60 69.12   
29-Sep 1800 65 74.88 
Category 1 
hurricane 





30-Sep 0600 85 97.92   
30-Sep 1200 100 115.2 
Category 3 
hurricane  
30-Sep 1800 120 138.24 
Category 4 
hurricane  
01-Oct 0000 145 167.04 
Category 5 
hurricane  




01-Oct 0600 140 161.28   
  
  
01-Oct 1200 135 155.52 
Category 4 
hurricane  
01-Oct 1800 130 149.76   
02-Oct 0600 125 144   
re-
intensification 
02-Oct 1200 130 149.76   
02-Oct 1800 135 155.52   
South of 
Tiburon, Haiti 105 
03-Oct 0000 130 149.76   
 
   
03-Oct 0600 125 144   
04-Oct 0000 130 149.76   
04-Oct 1200 125 144 





04-Oct 1800 120 138.24    
05-Oct 0000 115 132.48 
Second landfall as 
Category 4 
hurricane  Juaco, Cuba 




05-Oct 1200 105 120.96   
06-Oct 0600 110 126.72   
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07-Oct 0000 115 132.48 






07-Oct 0600 110 126.72 
Category 3 
hurricane  
East of Vero 
Beach 35 
07-Oct 1200 105 120.96   
  07-Oct 1800 100 115.2   






Beach, Florida 50 
08-Oct 0600 85 97.92   
Offshore of 
Georgia Coast 50 
08-Oct 1200 80 92.16    
  
08-Oct 1500 75 86.4 








to the coast of 
South Carolina 
08-Oct 1800 70 80.64   
offshore of 
the coast of 
South 
Carolina   












10-Oct 0000 40 46.08 extra-tropical  









(ii) Storm surge inundation levels 
Table B8 Storm surge inundation levels from Hurricane Matthew 
State & County Estimated Storm 
surge Inundation 
Height (in ft) above 
ground level  
Cuba   
The south-eastern coast of Guantanamo Province 10-13ft 
North-eastern Coast of Guantanamo Province  >11.00 
Santiago de Cuba Province 16.00 
Holguin Province 3-5ft 
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Coast of Camaguey Province <3.00 
Bahamas   





Florida    
Brevard County 3-4ft 
Fernandina Beach 6.96 
Summer haven and Matanzas 3.00 
Fort Matanzas 6.40 
Marineland and Matanzas Inlet   
Jacksonville 7.00 
Volusia County 4-6ft 
Nassau County  3-5ft 
Anastasia Island >2.00 
St. Augustine Beach and Castillo de San Marcus >4.00 
Cape Canaveral 1-2ft 
Coast of St. Johns River   
Racy point 4.60 
Georgia   
Coast of Georgia  3-5ft 
Ft. Pulaski Monument  7.70 
National park Service ground, Fort Pulaski   
South Carolina 3-5ft 
Georgia-South Carolina Border (Ft. Pulaski)   
Charleston 6.20 
North Carolina 6.06 
Cape Hatteras (North-South Carolina border) 2-4ft 
Cape Fear River  2.00 
Coast on the sound side of the Outer Banks 4-6ft 
Coast Guard Station, Hatteras Island   
North of Cape Hatteras 1-3ft 
Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware   
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(III) Hurricane watch-warning issued by NHC  
 




28-Sep 1500 Guadeloupe and Martinique TS Warning Issued 
28-Sep 1500 St Lucia TS Warning Issued 
28-Sep 1500 Barbados, Dominica, St. 
Vincent & Grenadine Islands 
TS Warning Issued 
28-Sep 2100 Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao TS Watch Issued 
29-Sep 0300 Barbados, Dominica, St. 
Vincent & Grenadine Islands 
TS Warning discontinued 
29-Sep 0300 Dominica, St. Vincent & 
Grenadine Islands 
TS Warning Issued 
29-Sep 0900 Guadeloupe and Martinique TS Warning discontinued 
29-Sep 0900 St Lucia TS Warning discontinued 
29-Sep 0900 Dominica, St. Vincent & 
Grenadine Islands 
TS Warning discontinued 
29-Sep 0900 St. Vincent & Grenadine Islands TS Warning Issued 
29-Sep 0900 All TS Warning discontinued 
29-Sep 2100 Colombia/Venezuela border to 
Riohacha 
TS Watch Issued 
30-Sep 0600 Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao TS Warning discontinued 
30-Sep 0600 Aruba and Curacao TS Watch Issued 
30-Sep 1200 Aruba and Curacao TS Warning discontinued 
30-Sep 1200 Aruba  TS Watch Issued 
30-Sep 1500 Colombia/Venezuela border to 
Riohacha 
TS Watch to Warning 
30-Sep 1500 All TS Warning discontinued 
30-Sep 2100 Southern Haiti/ Dominican 
Republic to Port-au-Prince 
TS Warning Issued 
30-Sep 2100 Jamaica Hurricane Watch Issued 
01-Oct 1500 All TS Watch & Warning 
Discontinued 
01-Oct 1500 Southern Haiti/ Dominican 
Republic to LeMole- St. 
Nicholas 
Hurricane Watch Issued 
01-Oct 2100 Jamaica Hurricane Watch to Warning 
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01-Oct 2100 Southern Haiti/ Dominican 
Republic to LeMole- St. 
Nicholas 
Hurricane Watch to Warning 
01-Oct 2100 LeMole- St. Nicholas to 
northern border 
Haiti/Dominican Republic 
Hurricane Watch Issued 
01-Oct 2100 Camaguey to Guantanamo Hurricane Watch Issued 
02-Oct 0600 Puerto Plata to northern border 
Haiti/Dominican Republic 
TS Watch Issued 
02-Oct 0600 Southern Haiti/ Dominican 
Republic to Barahona 
TS Warning Issued 
02-Oct 0900 LeMole- St. Nicholas to 
northern border 
Haiti/Dominican Republic 
Hurricane Watch discontinued 
02-Oct 0900 Turks & Caicos and South-
eastern Bahamas 
Hurricane Watch Issued 
02-Oct 0900 Southern border Haiti/ 
Dominican Republic to LeMole- 
St. Nicholas 
Hurricane Watch discontinued 
02-Oct 0900 Haiti Hurricane Warning Issued 
02-Oct 0900 Las Tunas to Guantanamo Hurricane Warning Issued 
03-Oct 0300 South-eastern Bahamas Hurricane Watch to Warning 
03-Oct 0300 Turks & Caicos and Central 
Bahamas 
Hurricane Watch discontinued 
03-Oct 2100 Turks & Caicos  Hurricane Watch Issued 
03-Oct 2100 North-western Bahamas Hurricane Watch Issued 
04-Oct 0900 Turks & Caicos  Hurricane Watch to TS Warning 
04-Oct 0900 South-eastern Bahamas to 
North-western Bahamas 
Hurricane Watch to Hurricane 
Warning 
04-Oct 0900 South-eastern Bahamas to 
North-western Bahamas 
Hurricane warning modified 
04-Oct 1500 Seven Mile Bridge to Deerfield 
Beach 
TS Watch Issued 
04-Oct 1500 Jamaica TS Warning discontinued 
04-Oct 1500 Deerfield Beach to 
Volusia/Brevard County Line 
Hurricane Watch Issued 
04-Oct 2100 Seven Mile Bridge to Golden 
Beach 
TS Watch modified to 
04-Oct 2100 Golden Beach to Volusia/ 
Brevard County Line 
Hurricane Watch modified 
05-Oct 0300 Seven Mile Bridge to Golden 
Beach 
TS Watch to Warning 
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05-Oct 0300 Chokoloskee to Ocean Reef TS Warning Issued 
05-Oct 0300 Golden Beach to 
Volusia/Brevard County Line 
Hurricane Watch discontinued 
05-Oct 0300 Sebastian Inlet to 
Flagler/Volusia County Line 
Hurricane Watch Issued 
05-Oct 0300 Golden Beach to Sebastian Inlet Hurricane Warning Issued 
05-Oct 0900 Sebastian Inlet to Fernandina 
Beach 
Hurricane Watch modified 
05-Oct 1500 Haiti Hurricane Warning changed to 
TS Warning 
05-Oct 1500 All TS Watch discontinued 
05-Oct 1500 southern border Haiti/ 
Dominican Republic to 
Barahona 
TS Warning discontinued 
05-Oct 1500 Flager/Volusia County Line to 
Fernandina Beach 
Hurricane Watch modified 
05-Oct 1500 Golden Beach to Flager/Volusia 
County Line 
Hurricane Warning modified 
05-Oct 1800 Turks & Caicos TS Warning discontinued 
05-Oct 2100 Chokoloskee to Suwannee River TS Watch Issued 
05-Oct 2100 Haiti TS Warning discontinued 
05-Oct 2100 Cuba Hurricane Watch discontinued 
05-Oct 2100 Cuba Hurricane Warning 
discontinued 
05-Oct 2100 Flager/Volusia County Line to 
Savannah River 
Hurricane Watch modified 
06-Oct 0300 Flager/Volusia County Line to 
Savannah River 
Hurricane Watch discontinued 
06-Oct 0300 Fernandina Beach to Edisto 
Beach 
Hurricane Watch Issued 
06-Oct 0300 Golden Beach to Fernandina 
Beach 
Hurricane Warning modified 
06-Oct 0900 Fernandina Beach to Edisto 
Beach 
Hurricane Watch discontinued 
06-Oct 0900 Altamaha Sound to South 
Santee River 
Hurricane Watch Issued 
06-Oct 0900 Golden Beach to Altamaha 
Sound 
Hurricane Warning modified 
06-Oct 1200 Central Bahamas to North-
western Bahamas 
Hurricane Warning modified 
06-Oct 1500 Chokoloskee to Anclote River TS Watch modified 
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06-Oct 1500 Anclote River to Suwanee River TS Warning Issued 
06-Oct 1500 Edisto Beach to South Santee 
River 
Hurricane Watch modified 
06-Oct 1500 Golden Beach to Edisto Beach Hurricane Warning modified 
06-Oct 2100 South Santee River to Surf City TS Warning Issued 
06-Oct 2100 All Hurricane Watch discontinued 
06-Oct 2100 Golden Beach to South Santee 
River 
Hurricane Warning modified 
07-Oct 0000 Englewood to Anclote River TS Watch modified to ??? 
07-Oct 0000 Chokoloskee to Ocean Reef TS Warning discontinued 
07-Oct 0000 Seven Mile Bridge to Boca 
Raton 
TS Warning modified  
07-Oct 0000 Boca Raton to South Santee 
River 
Hurricane Warning modified 
07-Oct 0300 Ocean Reef to Boca Raton TS Warning modified 
07-Oct 0900 Anna Maria Island to Anclote 
River 
TS Watch modified 
07-Oct 0900 Boca Raton to Jupiter Inlet TS Warning modified 
07-Oct 0900 Jupiter Inlet to South Santee 
River 
Hurricane Warning modified 
07-Oct 1200 Jupiter Inlet to Sebastian Inlet TS Warning modified 
07-Oct 1200 North-western Bahamas Hurricane Warning 
discontinued 
07-Oct 1200 Sebastian Inlet to South Santee 
River 
Hurricane Warning modified  
07-Oct 1500 All TS Watch discontinued 
07-Oct 1500 Surf City to Duck TS Warning modified  
07-Oct 1500 Sebastian Inlet to Cocoa Beach TS Warning modified  
07-Oct 1500 Anna Maria Island to Anclote 
River 
TS Warning discontinued 
07-Oct 1500 Surf City to Cape Lookout Hurricane Watch Issued 




07-Oct 1500 Cocoa Beach to Surf City Hurricane Warning Issued 
07-Oct 2100 Sebastian Inlet to Cocoa Beach TS Warning discontinued 
07-Oct 2100 Volusia/Brevard County Line to 
Flagler/Volusia County Line 
TS Warning Issued 
07-Oct 2100 Flagler/Volusia County Line to 
Surf City 
Hurricane Watch modified 
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08-Oct 0000 Volusia/Brevard County Line to 
Flagler/Volusia County Line 
TS Warning discontinued 
08-Oct 0300 Flagler/Volusia County Line to 
Fernandina Beach 
TS Warning Issued 
08-Oct 0300 Fernandina Beach to Surf City Hurricane Warning modified 
08-Oct 0900 Flagler/Volusia County Line to 
Fernandina Beach 
TS Warning discontinued 
08-Oct 0900 Altamaha Sound to Surf City Hurricane Warning modified 
08-Oct 1800 Edisto Beach to Surf City Hurricane Warning modified  
08-Oct 2100 South Santee River to Surf City Hurricane Warning modified 
09-Oct 0300 Surf City to Duck Hurricane Watch modified  
10-Oct 0300 Little River Inlet to Surf City Hurricane Warning modified 
11-Oct 0900 Cape Fear to Duck TS Warning modified  
12-Oct 0900 All Hurricane Warning 
discontinued 
13-Oct 1500 All Hurricane Watch discontinued 
14-Oct 1800 Surf City to Duck TS Warning modified  
15-Oct 2100 All TS Warning discontinued 
 
(IV) Visual damage of Hurricane Matthew  
    
 
(a) Homes and businesses in Lumberton, North 
Carolina cutting roads and bridges               
(Source: AP/Photo /Chuck Burton) 
 
(b) City of Lumberton water treatment facility 
surrounded by floodwater both rainfall and storm 
surge (AP/Photo /Mike Spencer) 
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(c) Communities in Lumberton submerged 
in Hurricane Matthew (Source: Reuters / 
Chris Keane) 
 
(d) Bridge collapsed by storm surge in Haiti 
(Source photo Tim Schandordff_Mission 
Network.net) 
 
(e) West coast of Haiti impacted by 
Hurricane Matthew (Source: Reuters) 
 
(g) West coast of Haiti impacted by Hurricane 
Matthew (Source: Reuters) 
 
(h) A house in Lumberton, NC submerged 
in Hurricane Matthew impacted by (Source: 
Reuters/ Chris Keane) 
 
Figure B5 Visual view of damges from Hurricane Matthew (2016) 
 
(f) City of Flagler beach and roads damaged from 
storm surge hurricane Matthew (Source: CDR 
emergency management 
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Case Study 6:  Hurricane Maria (2017) 
(i) Predicted path of the Hurricane Maria  










Stage  Location Structure   Change 
16-Sep 1200 30 34.56 tropical depression 
  
  
16-Sep 1800 40 46.08 tropical storm 
17-Sep 0000 45 51.84   
17-Sep 0600 55 63.36   
17-Sep 1200 60 69.12   
17-Sep 1800 65 74.88 
Category 1 
hurricane  
18-Sep 0000 75 86.4   
18-Sep 0600 80 92.16   
rapid 
intensification 
18-Sep 1200 100 115.2 
Category 3 
hurricane  
18-Sep 1800 110 126.72   
19-Sep 0000 145 167.04 
Category 5 
hurricane  
19-Sep 0115 145 167.04 
First Landfall as 
Category 5 
hurricane   Dominica 






strength 19-Sep 1200 140 161.28   
19-Sep 1800 145 167.04   
  
20-Sep 0000 150 172.8   
20-Sep 0300 150 172.8   
20-Sep 0600 140 161.28   
20-Sep 1015 135 155.52 
Second Landfall as 
Category 5 
hurricane   
Near Yabuca, 
Puerto Rico 
20-Sep 1200 115 132.48   
 





21-Sep 0000 95 109.44   
21-Sep 0600 100 115.2 
Category 3 
hurricane  
21-Sep 1200 100 115.2   
21-Sep 1800 105 120.96   
  
22-Sep 0000 110 126.72   
22-Sep 0600 110 126.72   
22-Sep 1200 110 126.72   
22-Sep 1800 110 126.72   
23-Sep 0000 105 120.96   
23-Sep 0600 100 115.2   
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23-Sep 1200 100 115.2   
23-Sep 1800 100 115.2   
24-Sep 0000 100 115.2   
24-Sep 0600 95 109.44 
Category 2 
hurricane  
24-Sep 1200 95 109.44   
24-Sep 1800 90 103.68   
25-Sep 0000 85 97.92   
25-Sep 0600 75 86.4 
Category 1 
hurricane  
25-Sep 1200 70 80.64   
25-Sep 1800 70 80.64   
26-Sep 0000 70 80.64   
26-Sep 0600 65 74.88   
26-Sep 1200 65 74.88   
26-Sep 1800 65 74.88   
27-Sep 0000 65 74.88   
27-Sep 0600 65 74.88   
27-Sep 1200 65 74.88   
27-Sep 1800 65 74.88   
28-Sep 0000 65 74.88   
28-Sep 0600 60 69.12 tropical storm 
28-Sep 1200 60 69.12   
28-Sep 1800 55 63.36   
29-Sep 0000 55 63.36   
29-Sep 0600 50 57.6   
29-Sep 1200 50 57.6   
29-Sep 1800 50 57.6   
30-Sep 0000 50 57.6   
30-Sep 0600 50 57.6   
30-Sep 1200 50 57.6   
30-Sep 1800 45 51.84 extra tropical 
 
(ii) Hurricane watch Warning issued by NHC  
Table B11 Hurricane Maria's watch warning issues by NHC 
Date Time (UTC) Location Action 
16-Sep 1500 St. Lucia Tropical Strom Watch Issued  
16-Sep 1500 Martinique TS Watch  
16-Sep 1500 Guadeloupe  TS Watch 
16-Sep 1500 Dominica  TS Watch Issued 
16-Sep 1800 Barbados TS Watch Issued  
16-Sep 1800 St. Vincent & Grenadine  TS Warning Issued 
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16-Sep 2100 Antigua/Barbuda/St. 
Kitts/nevis/Montserrat  
Hurricane Watch Issued 
17-Sep 0000 Guadeloupe  TS Watch Changed to 
Hurricane Watch 
17-Sep 0300 Saba/St. Eustatius Hurricane Watch Issued 
17-Sep 0300 St. Maarten Hurricane Watch Issued 
17-Sep 0300 Anguilla Hurricane Watch Issued 
17-Sep 0900 Dominica  TS Watch Changed to TS 
Warning 
17-Sep 1200 St. Martin/St. Barthelemy Hurricane Watch Issued 
17-Sep 1500 St. Lucia TS Watch Changed to TS 
Warning 
17-Sep 1500 Dominica  Hurricane Watch changed to 
the hurricane warning 
17-Sep 1800 Martinique TS watch changed to TS 
warning 
17-Sep 1800 Guadeloupe  Hurricane Watch changed to 
the hurricane warning 
17-Sep 2100 Antigua/Barbuda TS Warning Issued 
17-Sep 2100 Saba/St. Eustatius TS Warning Issued 




17-Sep 2100 U.S. Virgin Islands Hurricane Watch Issued 
17-Sep 2100 The British Virgin Islands Hurricane Watch Issued 
17-Sep 2100 St. Kitts/Nevis/Montserrat  Hurricane Warning Issued 
18-Sep 0000 Martinique TS Warning changed to 
Hurricane Warning 
18-Sep 0900 Puerto Rico/Vieques/Culebra Hurricane Watch Issued 
18-Sep 1200 St. Lucia TS Warning changed to 
Hurricane Warning 
18-Sep 1200 St. Maarten TS Warning Issued 
18-Sep 1500 U.S. Virgin Islands Hurricane Watch changed to 
the hurricane warning 
18-Sep 1500 The British Virgin Islands Hurricane Watch changed to 
the hurricane warning 
18-Sep 1500 Anguilla TS Warning Issued 
18-Sep 1800 Barbados TS watch discontinued 
18-Sep 2100 Puerto Rico/Vieques/Culebra Hurricane Watch changed to 
the hurricane warning 
18-Sep 2100 St. Lucia Hurricane warning changed 
to TS warning 
18-Sep 2100 Puerto Plata to Northern DR/Haiti 
Border, Dominican Republic 
TS watch issued 
18-Sep 2100 Isla Saone to Puerto Plata, Dominican 
Republic 
Hurricane watch issued 
19-Sep 0000 Martinique Hurricane warning changed 
to TS warning 
19-Sep 1200 St. Vincent/Grenadines TS watch discontinued 
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19-Sep 1200 St. Lucia TS warning discontinued 
19-Sep 1800 Puerto Plata to Northern DR/Haiti 
Border, Dominican Republic 
TS Watch Changed to TS 
Warning 
19-Sep 1800 Guadeloupe  Hurricane warning changed 
to TS warning 
19-Sep 1800 Martinique TS warning discontinued 
19-Sep 1800 Cabo Engano to Punta Palenque, 
Dominican Republic 
TS Warning Issued 
19-Sep 1800 Isla Saona to Coba Engano, 
Dominican Republic 
Hurricane watch modified to 
19-Sep 1800 Cabo Engano to Punta Plata, 
Dominican Republic 
Hurricane Warning Issued 
19-Sep 2100 Antigua/Barbuda TS warning discontinued 
19-Sep 2100 Turks and Caicos Islands/South-
eastern Bahamas 
Hurricane Watch issued 
19-Sep 2100 Dominica  Hurricane Warning 
discontinued 
20-Sep 0000 Anguilla TS warning discontinued 
20-Sep 0000 Anguilla Hurricane Watch 
discontinued 
20-Sep 0000 St. Kitts/Nevis/Montserrat  Hurricane Warning 
discontinued 
20-Sep 0600 Saba/St. Eustatius TS Warning changed to 
Hurricane Watch 
20-Sep 0600 Saba TS Warning issued 
20-Sep 0900 Turks and Caicos Islands/South-
eastern Bahamas 
Hurricane Watch changed to 
the hurricane warning 
20-Sep 0900 Guadeloupe  TS warning discontinued 
20-Sep 0900 Saba/St. Eustatius Hurricane Watch 
discontinued 
20-Sep 1200 St. Martin/St. Barthelemy Hurricane Watch changed to 
TS warning 
20-Sep 1500 Saba TS warning discontinued 
20-Sep 1500 St. Maarten TS warning discontinued 
20-Sep 1500 St. Martin/St. Barthelemy TS warning discontinued 
20-Sep 1500 St. Maarten Hurricane Watch 
discontinued 
20-Sep 2100 U.S. Virgin Islands Hurricane Warning 
discontinued 
20-Sep 2100 The British Virgin Islands Hurricane Warning 
discontinued 
21-Sep 0300 Puerto Rico/Vieques/Culebra Hurricane Warning 
discontinued 
21-Sep 1200 Central Bahamas TS watch issued 
21-Sep 1500 Cabo Engano to Andres/ Boca Chica, 
Dominican Republic 
TS Warning modified to 
21-Sep 1500 All Hurricane Watch 
discontinued 
21-Sep 2100 Cabo Engano to Andres/ Boca Chica, 
Dominican Republic 
TS warning discontinued 
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22-Sep 1200 Central Bahamas TS warning discontinued 
22-Sep 1500 Puerto Plata to Northern DR/Haiti 
Border, Dominican Republic 
TS Watch Changed to TS 
Warning 
22-Sep 1500 Cabo Engano to Puerto Plata, 
Dominican Republic 
TS warning discontinued 




23-Sep 0900 All Hurricane warning changed 
to TS warning 
23-Sep 2100 Surf City to North Carolina/Virginia 
Border 
TS warning discontinued 
23-Sep 2100 Pamlico Sound TS Watch issued 
23-Sep 2100 Albemarle Sound TS Watch issued 
23-Sep 0900 Pamlico Sound TS Watch Changed to TS 
Warning 
23-Sep 0900 Albemarle Sound TS Watch Changed to TS 
Warning 
23-Sep 0900 Duck to North Carolina/Virginia 
Border 
TS Watch modified to 
23-Sep 0900 Cape Lookout to Duck TS warning Issued 
23-Sep 2100 All TS watch discontinued 
23-Sep 2100 Cape Lookout to Duck TS warning discontinued 
25-Sep 2100 Bogue Inlet to North Carolina/Virginia 
Border 
TS Warning Issued 
27-Sep 1500 Ocracoke Inlet to North 
Carolina/Virginia Border 
TS Warning modified to 
27-Sep 2100 Cape Hatteras to North 
Carolina/Virginia Border 
TS Warning modified to 
28-Sep 0000 All TS warning discontinued 
 
(III) Storm surge watch-warnings  
Table B12 storm surge watch-warning issued by NHC 
 
Date Time Location Action 
24-Sep 2100 Cape Lookout to Duck, North Carolina SS Watch issued 
26-Sep 1500 Ocracoke Inlet to Cape Hatteras SS Watch changed to SS Warning 
27-Sep 1500 West of Ocracoke Inlet SS Watch discontinued 
27-Sep 2100 All SS Watch discontinued 
27-Sep 2100 All SS Warning discontinued 
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(IV) Visual damages of Hurricane Maria  
    






(a) Telecommunication poles damaged by 
Hurricane Maria (Source: Carlos Giusti/AP) 
 
(b) Aerial view of flooding in Puerto Rico from 
Maria (Source: Ricardo Arduengo /AFP/Getty) 
 
(c) Storm surge in communities of Juana 
Matos, Catana Puerto Rico during Hurricane 
Maria (Source: Ricardo Arduengo/AFP/Getty 
Images /abc News) 
 
(d) Effects of storm surge in Palo Verde rice 
plantation are in Montecristi province the 
Dominican Republic (Source: © 2017 World 
Vision 
 
(e) Damage to the Guajataca Dam, Quebradillas, Puerto Rico from 
Hurricane Maria’s aftermath (Source: Alvin Baez/Reuters) 
 Figure B6 Visual view of damages from Hurricane Maria (2017) 
 




Screenshots of Atlas.ti Coding 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
A sample case for which the process of analysis and categorisation of Atlas.ti coding is 
shown below. Atlas.ti version 8 is used for this research. The software is an emerging 
method for computer assisted qualitative data analysis (Friese, 2020). Based on the 
preliminary literature review, the documents required for data collection and further 
analysis is imported to the software. Once the documents were imported, then further 
codes were created for analysis and to draw output.  
 
 
Figure C1 Workflow of Atlas.ti 
 
Each document within a project will include several codes (key activities) which are 
called codes (smart codes). Importing graphic files, images, interviews, and newspaper 
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Case Study: Super-Typhoon Haiyan  




Figure C2 Importing documents to Atlas.ti and grouping 
 
Figure C2 shows how the imported documents can be viewed in the navigation pane. The 
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artciles, organisation report, research and websites. These are the sources of evidence 






Figure C3 Viewing multiple documents for comparison 
 
Viewing multiple documents side-by-side allows comparison of similar documents as 




















Page | 331 
 
Step 2: Systematic document search  
Each document is search for the key words – which are the list of activities or related key 





Figure C4 Document search by key word/key activity 
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Step 3: Creating a coding  
Once the data segment which are the key word or key activity as stated in step 2 is 
searched, the selected segment of information is then converted as a ‘new code’ using 
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Step 4: Code grouping   
Each coding is then grouped under corresponding code group which are the four key 




Figure C6 Grouping the coding 
 
Figure C6 shows how the codes were grouped into four main code groups for case study 
Typhoon Haiyan. Creation of the codes and their code group were carried out for all the 
six case studies. This step of grouping the code was essential to cross-case analysis of 
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Figure C7 Generating code report 
As a final step a code report is generated as shown in Figure C7. These code reports were 
greatly beneficial in designing the case study chapters 5, 6, and 7. For each case study a 
code report is generated. Sample codes were also provided in Chapter 8 which supported 
the analysis. In addition, these code reports further benefited during the identification of 
commonalities and differences which became the fundamental for the development of the 
DAMSS framework and defining the guidelines for best practices. 
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